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Abstract. 
This thesis aims to provide detailed investigation into
the role and functioning of the FTSE-100 stock index
futures contract, by examining four interrelated issues.
Chapter 1 reviews the literature, demonstrating that
stock index futures can increase investor utility by
offering hedging and investment opportunities. Further,
the price discovery role of futures is discussed.
Chapter 2 investigates the risk return relationship for
the FTSE-100 contract within a CAPM framework. While
CAPM adequately explains returns prior to October 1987,
post-crash the contract is riskier and excess returns
and a day of the week effect are evident.
Chapter 3 examines the impact of futures on the
underlying spot market using GARCH, which allows
examination of the link between information and
volatility. While spot prices are more volatile
post-futures, this is due to more rapid impounding of
information. The view that futures destabilise spot
markets and should be subject to further regulation is
questioned.
Chapter 4 examines futures market efficiency using the
Johansen cointegration procedure and variance bounds
tests which are developed here. Results suggest futures
prices provide unbiased predictions of future spot
prices for 1, 2 and 4 months prior to maturity of the
contract. For 3, 5 and 6 months prior to maturity the
unbiasedness hypothesis does not hold.
Chapter 5 discusses the major role of futures; hedging.
Hedge ratios and hedging effectiveness are examined in
relation to duration and expiration effects. Hedge ratio
stability is also examined. Finally, hedging strategies
based on historical information are examined. Results
show there are duration and expiration effect, hedge
ratios are stationary and using historical information
does not greatly reduce hedging effectiveness. The
FTSE-100 contract is shown to be a highly effective
means by which to hedge risk.
Chapter 6 provides a summary and concluding remarks
concerning the relevance of the research carried out
here.
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Introduction. 
"Popular narratives of popular movements appeal
to the fancy and carry with them all that is
pleasing to the public taste, but... [a]musing
and instructive as these histories usually are,
they frequently fail in defining those
connecting links in the general chain of
circumstances, a knowledge of which is deemed
indispensable by the studious enquirer for
arriving at correct results." (Evans, 1849, pl).
Popular narratives and popular beliefs should not form
the basis of policy or investment decisions. In order to
inform the policymaking and investment decision making
processes it is essential that detailed scientific
investigation be carried out. Unfortunately, as regards
the role and functioning of financial futures markets,
while a body of evidence exists for the markets in the
USA and much anecdotal evidence has been forthcoming in
relation to the UK, detailed enquiry has not previously
been undertaken for UK markets. This is particularly
true for the market for the FTSE-100 stock index futures
contract. Such a lack of understanding also exists as
regards the connecting links between the market for
stock index futures and the market for the underlying
asset.
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The main aim of this thesis is to fill this gap in the
literature by providing a detailed investigation into
the role and functioning of the FTSE-100 stock index
futures market. The issues investigated in this thesis,
while not being exhaustive in coverage, are seen as
relating to the most important aspects of futures
markets. As such, rather than concentrating on only one
aspect of futures trading, the thesis investigates four
different, but interrelated, issues regarding the
functioning and impact of futures markets. Henze, the
research objectives of this thesis are to examine the
risk return relationship in futures markets, the impact
of futures trading on the underlying spot market, the
efficiency of the market for the FTSE-100 futures
contract and the hedging effectiveness of this contract.
The analysis of these four issues will be of interest
and direct benefit to investors, regulators and the
general public.
Before going on to examine these four issues, the thesis
begins with an overview of financial futures markets and
the economics of futures trading in chapter 1. It is
shown in this chapter that stock index futures
introduce negative correlation, provide a cheap means of
buying into the payoff profile of a broadly diversified
portfolio and move an otherwise incomplete market
towards completeness. In addition, the chapter provides
a review of the literature relevant to the research
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questions addressed in this thesis, identifies the
weaknesses and limitations of previous research and
provides a rationale for undertaking the present
research and the methodologies adopted here.
The risk return relationship for futures can be seen to
be of central concern to investors, both individual and
institutional, since futures provide a means of
participating in market index movements at low cost, and
changing market position rapidly. Given that futures can
thus be seen as an alternative form of investment to
other financial assets, it is important to examine the
risk return relationship within an asset pricing
framework. In chapter 2, the Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM) framework is used to investigate the risk
return relationship for the FTSE-100 futures contract,
taking account of the time to maturity dimension of
futures trading. Both the Black, Jensen and Scholes and
the Fama and MacBeth methodologies are adopted. In
addition, the question of whether a day of the week
effect in futures returns exists is addressed. It is
shown that while before the stock market crash of
October 1987 the risk return relationship conforms to
the CAPM framework, post-crash the futures contracts
became a more risky asset, as shown by the higher beta
coefficients. In addition, there is evidence of abnormal
excess returns which may be taken as an indication of
inefficiency in the market. Excess returns appear to be
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higher for contracts further away from maturity. The
issue of efficiency is further questioned by the finding
of a day of the week effect.
The finding of excess returns may seem to give credence
to those opposing futures trading, in that it may
attract speculators into the market who have a
destabilising tendency on the market for the underlying
security. This raises the possibility that further
regulation of futures markets may be required. For this
reason, chapter 3 investigates the impact of the onset
of futures trading on the FTSE-100 index on the
underlying market. Unlike previous studies, the
Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticty
family of techniques is used to examine this issue. This
technique enables the connecting link betveen
information and price volatility to be assessed and
takes into account time dependence in returns. The
chapter demonstrates that while price volatility has
increased, this is due to the impounding of information
into prices more quickly, rather than being due to
destabilising speculation. It is also found that news
has a less persistent impact on price volatility. Thus,
by addressing the connecting links between information
and volatility, increased price volatility can be
reconciled with a refutation of the popular belief that
futures markets are destabilising.
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The results of chapters 2 and 3 provide the rationale
for the analysis carried out in chapter 4. In this
chapter the efficiency of the FTSE-100 futures market is
examined using both the Johansen cointegration procedure
and variance bounds tests. While cointegration has
previously been used to investigate futures markets
efficiency, the distinction between short-term and
long-term efficiency is not well documented. In this
chapter the distinction is analysed using Error
Correction Models. In addition, following Shiller's
methodology, variance bounds tests are developed and
tested to augment the cointegration analysis. Such tests
have not previously been applied to futures markets.
Results reveal that the market for futures contracts for
1, 2 and 4 months prior to maturity provide unbiased
estimates of future spot prices both in the long-term
and the short-term. For 5 months prior to maturity
long-term efficiency is established, but there are
substantial deviations in the short-term. For 3 and 6
months prior to maturity, the unbiasedness hypothesis is
rejected for both the long-term and the short-term.
Chapter 5 addresses what is seen to be the major
function of futures markets, namely providing a vehicle
for hedging the risk associated with the underlying
asset. Hedge ratios and hedging effectiveness are
investigated taking account of both the duration of
hedge effects and time to maturity effects. In addition,
5
the stability of the hedge ratio is examined. In
addressing these issues previous researchers have made
an implicit assumption of perfect foresight. In this
study hedging strategies and effectiveness based on
historical information are compared with the perfect
foresight equivalents. Clear evidence emerges that the
FTSE-100 futures contracts provide an effective means of
hedging the risk associated with holding a stock
portfolio. The findings suggest that hedge ratios and
hedging effectiveness increase with hedge duration, but
the evidence relating to expiration effects is less
clear cut. The finding of instability in hedge ratios
through time implies that dynamic hedging strategies may
be worth pursuing.
Finally, chapter 6 summarises the main findings in this
thesis and provides concluding remarks.
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Chapter 1: The Economics of Stock Index Futures 
Trading. 
A. An Introduction to Futures Trading. 
A1.1 Introduction. 
The undertaking of almost any economic activity results
in the participant in that activity facing a situation
of risk. When a course of action is followed, it is not
known with certainty what the outcome of that action
will be. 1 While there are occasions where individuals
display risk preferring behaviour (see, for example,
Friedman and Savage (1948)), for the vast majority of
economic actors any risk associated with major
consumption and investment decisions is a source of
disutility. It is this fact which provides the main
justification for the existence of markets in insurance.
A major source of risk for many producers relates to the
prices at which they will be able to sell the
commodities they produce and to the prices they will
have to pay for inputs into the production process. At
the time the production decision is taken it is not
known what the prevailing prices will be when buying and
selling takes place at some point in the future.
Traditionally, this price risk has been seen to be of
considerable importance to the producers and users of
agricultural commodities and, more recently, precious
metals. This led to the search for means by which risk
relating to future prices could be reduced and to the
7
introduction of futures contracts on agricultural
commodities at the Chicago Board of Trade in 1865.
Definition. 
A futures contract is an agreement to buy or sell a
standard quantity of a particular commodity or financial
instrument at a future date for a price which is agreed
at the time the contract is drawn up. A futures
contract involves an obligation on the part of both the
buyer and the seller to fulfil the conditions of the
contract2.
Until relatively recently futures contracts were limited
to agricultural commodities and metals. However, in the
late 1960s and early 1970s there was a breakdown in the
agreement on fixed exchange rates, which had been
reached at Bretton Woods in 1944. This led to a period
of floating exchange rates and to substantial volatility
in both exchange rates and interest rates. Such
volatility is a source of considerable risk for many
producers and the impact of this risk is, arguably, much
more pervasive than that associated with the prices of
agricultural and metal commodities. Once more, means
were sought by which risk could be hedged and the 1970s
saw the birth of futures contracts on financial
instruments. In 1972 financial futures contracts were
introduced, with the onset of futures trading in foreign
currencies at the International Money Market of the
8
Chicago Mercantile Exchange, and futures contracts on
fixed income securities (i.e. interest rate futures)
were introduced in 1975 at the Chicago Board of Trade.
In addition, there has been a growth in the availability
of other derivative securities, such as options and
swaps contracts.
As the effectiveness of financial futures became
evident, the range of instruments on which futures
contracts were traded increased and on 16 February 1982
trading began in the first stock index futures contract
at the Kansas City Board of Trade. This first contract
was the Value Line Composite Index (VLCI) futures. Stock
index futures contracts are futures contracts written on
stock indexes and as such they represent a futures
contract on the portfolio of shares which underlie the
stock index. Stock index futures contracts which are
held to maturity are not delivered but rather cash
settlement takes place. The reason why cash settlement
must take place is that the index itself is not an
actual asset and construction of a portfolio for
delivery which perfectly matches the index would involve
the purchase of, in the case of the FTSE-100 index, 100
shares in exact proportions to their weights in the
index.
In April 1982 the Chicago Mercantile Exchange began
trading another stock index futures contract, the
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Standard and Poor's 500 (S&P 500), and in May of 1982
the New York Futures Exchange introduced the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) Composite Index futures contract.
The first (and, to date, only) stock index futures
contract for an index in the UK began trading in May
1984, when the London International Financial Futures
Exchange (LIFFE) introduced contracts based on the
FTSE-100 stock index3 , 4 . This contract has proved very
popular, with the volume of trading now accounting for
approximately half of the turnover in the underlying
securities.
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show daily volume and daily open
interest for the FTSE-100 futures contract by days to
maturity for the September 1992 contract. As can be seen
from the diagrams, daily volume reached a peak of over
27,000 contracts and open interest a peak of 44,000
contracts. The unit of trading of the FTSE-100 futures
contract is £25 per full index point. For example, when
the stock index stands at 2600 the unit of trading and
the value of the contract will be £65000. The contract
is traded in a three month cycle, with contracts
maturing in March, June, September and December. The
last trading day for each contract is the last business
day in the delivery month s and trading ceases at 11.20
a.m. on that day. The delivery day, i.e. the day on
which settlement of the futures contract takes place, is
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the first business day following the last trading day.
The price of the futures contract is quoted as index
points (e.g. 2600) and the minimum price movement, also
known as the tick, is 0.5 of an index point. Thus the
tick has a value of £12.50. Finally, the initial margin
for the contract is £2500 which represents less than 5%
of the value of the contract when the index is above
2000.6
Financial futures in general, and stock index futures in
particular, have proved extremely popular. Indeed,
financial futures trading now dominates futures markets,
with the volume of transactions in financial futures far
outweighing that in the more traditional commodities.
In order to understand the reasons for the success of
this futures contract in terms of trading volume it is
necessary to examine the nature and economic role of
futures markets in general and stock index futures in
particular. In addition, the success of the contract
cannot simply be viewed in terms of trading volume. It
is necessary to consider whether the FTSE-100 stock
index futures contract has succeeded in fulfilling the
role expected of such a contract and whether it has had
any positive or adverse effects on the underlying spot
market. In the remainder of this section the nature and
role of futures markets are discussed. The issues which
are perceived by the author to be important in assessing
13
the impact, success and economic role of futures
contracts are examined in section B.
A1.2 The Role of Futures Trading. 
In the previous section it was noted that financial
futures markets were established with the prime
objective of enabling companies and individuals to
insure against the possible adverse effects of changes
in interest and exchange rates. Similarly, stock index
futures were established to enable portfolio managers
and other investors to insure against the possible
adverse effects of changes in stock prices. Thus the
main role of financial futures markets is the reduction
of risk or 'hedging'.
Futures markets can be shown to enhance the range of
risk management strategies available to investors. They
thus allow those investors who hold a particular
position in the spot market to reduce uncertainty with
regard to future price movements without altering the
composition of the spot portfolio. In doing this,
futures contracts reduce the disutility associated with
price uncertainty.
Modern portfolio theory has established that the risk
associated with any asset can be divided into two
component parts: systematic and unsystematic risk (see
Markowitz (1952)). While the latter component can be
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diversified away, the former exists in all assets except
those specifically designed to have zero beta. Broad
market portfolios, such as that which underlies the
FTSE-100 index, can reasonably be expected to have
removed almost all country specific diversifiable risk.
Further risk reduction can be achieved by international
diversification. However, while the correlations between
various stock and bond markets are less than unity,
internationally diversified portfolios are still subject
to systematic risk (see, for example, Jorion (1985),
Levy and Sarnat (1970) and Eun and Resnick (1984)).
Short sales provide one means by which market
participants can eliminate systematic risk, but such
sales are severely restricted with the result that they
are limited in the extent to which they can be used to
introduce negative correlation. Derivative securities,
such as futures contracts, are not subject to such
severe restrictions and are thus better able to allow
investors to reduce the risks which they face. Because
futures trading also introduces negative correlation not
found in assets in the spot market, they enable the
enhancement of investor utility.
To illustrate the way in which stock index futures can
be used for hedging, consider an investor who holds a
portfolio of stocks which exactly mirrors the FTSE-100
index. Let the current value of the portfolio be Vo, the
current level of the spot index So and the number of
15
spot index units held Ns. For example, the current value
of the stock portfolio may be £10 million and the
current level of the FTSE-100 index 2500. This means
that the investor holds the equivalent of four thousand
units of the index (i.e. N8=4000). The investor has the
opportunity of hedging some of the risk faced in the
spot market by purchasing or selling futures contracts.
Let Nf be the number of index units traded in the
futures market. Finally, we define the hedge ratio, la,
as the ratio of the number of units traded in the
futures market to the number of units held in the spot
market. Thus the hedge ratio is:
h = Nf/Ns
Clearly, as h changes so will the risk-return
combination offered by the portfolio of futures and spot
assets, as shown in figure 1.3. The expected return on
the hedged portfolio, (E(Rh)), is simply the weighted
average of the returns on the spot and futures
positions:
E(Rh) = E(Rs) + h.E(Rf )	 (1.1)
where E(Rs) is the expected return on the stock
portfolio and E(R f) is the expected return on the
futures contract.
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Figure 1.3
Portfolio Risk-Return Possibilities for Different
Values of h, The Hedge Ratio
E (Rh)
a 2 
Rh
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The variance of the return for the hedged portfolio is:
cr2Rh = 02Re + h202Rf + 2hCov(R81Rf)
	
(1.2)
With reference to figure 1.3, h=0 represents the
unhedged position where no futures contracts are
purchased or sold. Hence, the risk return combination is
simply that offered by the spot index. Points to the
left of h=0 involve selling futures contracts (a short
position in futures) and points to the right involve
buying futures (a long futures position). Given that the
stock portfolio held by the investor exactly mimics the
FTSE-100 index, the returns achieved from selling
futures will be perfectly negatively correlated with the
returns from the spot position (assuming no dividends
and the absence of arbitrage opportunities). Thus a rise
in the FTSE-100 index would be exactly matched by a fall
in the futures price and vice-versa. With a hedge ratio
of -1 the risk-free rate of return would be earned with
zero risk.
The investor can choose any value of h and can thus
achieve any of the points on the risk-return curve in
figure 1.3. A risk-averse utility maximizing investor
will choose h so that his/her indifference curve is
tangential to the upper part of the opportunity set
(i.e. a hedge ratio of -1 or greater).
3.8
In this example the value of h which minimises the
variance of returns is -1 because the spot index and the
futures contract are perfectly positively correlated.
However, in practice, there is unlikely to be perfect
correlation between the spot and futures prices and
hence the hedge ratio which minimises the variance of
returns will differ from -1 (see Figlewski (1984)). This
arises for two reasons: firstly, in practice the
underlying portfolio of assets which is to be hedged
will not exactly mirror the index on which the futures
contract is written; and secondly, basis 7 risk exists.
Basis risk relates to the uncertainty regarding how the
basis will change over the life of the hedge.
Figlewski (1984) identifies two main sources of basis
risk. Firstly, futures contracts do not yield dividend
income whereas the spot position will yield such income.
Secondly, while the activities of arbitrageurs will
ensure that the futures price must equal the spot price
at expiration, at other times the spot and futures
prices may diverge. Perfect arbitrage is not possible
for stock index futures, because in practice
arbitrageurs are only likely to hold some of the shares
in the underlying index. In order for there to be
perfect arbitrage it would be necessary for arbitrageurs
to buy or sell all stocks in the index whenever the
futures price deviates from its theoretical level. Since
this will not occur in practice, there will be a range
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in which futures prices can deviate from their
theoretical levels without inducing arbitrage
transactions. Thus, in practice, stock index futures do
not allow the elimination of risk, rather they replace
the risk associated with cash price changes with the
risk associated with changes in the basis.8
While futures do not eliminate price risk, they do allow
investors to greatly reduce the risks which they face
and thus to increase their utility. The above discussion
has considered the use of futures to hedge an
established spot position. Futures can also be used to
hedge the risk associated with an anticipated spot
position. For example, a fund manager may decide it is
appropriate to move out of UK equities and into, say,
Australian equities. In the absence of stock index
futures the fund manager has two options. Firstly, s/he
can make the move over a period of time, and thus expose
the fund to the risk of adverse price movements in the
two markets. Alternatively, the move can be made very
rapidly with the possibility that large buy and sell
orders move the markets unfavourably. However, stock
index futures enable the fund manager to establish the
desired positions rapidly without such an adverse effect
on the spot markets. A short futures position is
established in the UK, and a long futures position in
Australia. The spot and futures positions can then be
adjusted over time, with any adverse movements in spot
20
prices being offset by opposing movements in the futures
positions. As with the hedging of an established spot
position, such anticipatory hedging is also subject to
basis risk.
In addition, it can be seen from figure 1.3 that futures
can be used to expand the risk return opportunities
which investors face by taking a long position in
futures and moving to the right of the point where h=0.
In relation to stock index futures it has been argued
that
"With the advent of futures contracts on stock
indexes, active and offensively minded portfolio
risk management, in its broadest sense, became
practicable. In effect, the risk manager and the
individual investor gained new degrees of
freedom.... He or she can now consider
opportunistic strategies rather than only
defensive strategies." (Fabozzi and Kipnis,
1984, p1, emphasis added).
The prime reason for using stock index futures as an
investment vehicle is that they give investors the
opportunity to participate in market index movements at
relatively little cost and with a small cash commitment,
due to margin requirements. Transactions costs in
futures markets are typically in the range of 0.1% of
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the value of the contract, compared to a figure of 1-2%
for the spot market. In addition, as Carlton (1984)
points out, laws relating to cash and futures markets
differ not only in relation to margin requirements, but
also in terms of taxation and insider trading.
The above discussion clearly illustrates the fact that
futures provide investors with increased opportunities
both in terms of risk reduction and an expansion of the
risk return opportunity set. Indeed, given that
transactions costs will prevent investors from
establishing portfolios that exactly mirror a broad
stock index, stock index futures can be seen to be
moving the market towards completeness. The concept of
market completeness is very important in welfare
economics. As such, the way in which futures markets can
complete the market should be examined in order that
their role in increasing welfare is fully understood.
A market is said to be complete when investors can
establish portfolios to suit their own individual
preferences based only on existing securities. In such
markets there is no need to create additional securities
since all possible payoffs can be created and thus
uncertainty can be removed.
Ross (1976a) has demonstrated that options provide one
means by which markets can be completed. It can equally
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be shown that stock index futures can bring about market
completeness. Before going on to demonstrate the use of
futures contracts, it is important to understand the
significance of market completeness. In a two-period
world of certainty it can easily be shown that the
existence of perfect and complete capital markets leads
to a Pareto efficient position. This arises because
investors whose initial endowment does not conform to
their desired consumption pattern, can rearrange this
pattern by either borrowing or lending in capital
markets (see Hirshleifer (1958)).
Moving beyond a world of certainty, it can still be shown
that the existence of complete markets is necessarily
Pareto efficient. In contrast, while incomplete markets
may in some circumstances achieve Pareto efficiency,
there are other circumstances in which Pareto
inefficiency will result (see Arrow (1964) and Debreu
(1959)). Thus Arrow shows that insufficient markets in
contingent claims may be a source of inefficiency.
Following Ross (1976a) we will consider securities as
vectors of payoffs, with each possible state of the world
having an associated payoff from a particular security.
Hence, an asset x is simply a map from the state space a
to the line E:
x:
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With in possible states of the world and n securities
there will be a in by n state space tableau, denoted X. As
Ross argues, typically there will be more states than
primitives g , with the result that all states cannot be
spanned and competitive equilibrium is inefficient.
However, he points out that even though X fails to span
Q the rank of X can be augmented by forming options on
existing primitives. The same argument holds true for
futures. This can be demonstrated by the use of an
example.
Consider a situation where X contains three assets, xl,
x2, x3, which have payoffs (E) in four states
[xl x2 x3] =	 0 2 0
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Clearly, with four states of the world and three
securities X cannot span a. More formally, the rank of
X, p(X), is less than the number of states of the world,
m. By combining the three assets into an index it is
possible to generate a fourth asset. For example, if
equal weighting is given in the index to xl, x2, and x3
then the index, I, would have the following payoffs in
the four states:
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f (I)
—
[I] = [211
4
2
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However, while there are now as many assets as there are
states of the world, the market is not complete. This is
because the fourth asset is simply a linear combination
of the other three assets. However, by writing a futures
contract on any of the securities xl, x2, or x3 it is
possible to complete the market. For example, if a
futures contract is written on x2, where the agreed price
is £1, p(X) = in and the market is complete. The payoff
from buying the futures contract is:
f(x2) = [ 11
1
-1
1
and the rank is ful110.
In this example state space is spanned by writing a
futures contract on a single security. Equally it is
possible to write a futures contract on the index to
complete the market. A futures contract on the index,
with a price of, say, £3, has the following payoffs:
Once again the rank is full and the market is complete.
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In practice financial markets are not and cannot be
complete, with the result that Pareto efficiency cannot
be guaranteed. However, it is possible to move towards
completeness by the introduction of new securities, thus
making the achievement of Pareto efficiency more likely.
The use of derivative instruments is particularly
important in moving markets towards completeness, for, as
Ross states
"in general, it is less costly to market a
derived asset generated by a primitive than to
issue a new primitive." (Ross, 1976a, p76).
Thus in addition to introducing negative correlation and
providing a cheap means of buying into the payoff
profile of a broadly diversified portfolio, futures on
stock indexes can help to move the market towards
completeness.
A further important function of futures markets relates
to their price discovery role. Since futures contracts
are traded for delivery of an asset at various dates in
the future, futures prices will reflect current market
expectations concerning expected spot prices at the
maturity dates. Hence, futures trading expands the
information set available to market participants and
such expanded information enables fund managers and
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investors in general to anticipate changes in demand and
supply at some time in the future.
B. The Economics of Futures Trading. 
B1.1 Introduction. 
It has been shown in section A of this chapter that the
prime function of futures markets is to provide a means
by which risk can be hedged. In addition, it has been
argued that futures have an important role to play in
terms of price discovery. Finally, it has been seen that
stock index futures can be used as a means of
investment. While stock index futures may provide
important benefits in these regards, they have also been
heavily criticised for encouraging speculation and, the
argument goes, destabilising the market for the
underlying asset.
If the success of the FTSE-100 stock index futures
contract is to be assessed, it is necessary to examine
the way in which it performs in relation to the three
functions mentioned above. Assessing the performance of
the contract as a means of investment requires an
examination of the risk return relationship which it
offers. The price discovery role of the contract will be
determined in large part by the efficiency of the market
for the contract. As far as hedging is concerned, the
performance of the contract will depend upon its ability
to reduce the risk faced by investors. In addition, it
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is necessary to assess the impact, if any, of the onset
of trading in this contract on the market for the
underlying asset.
An assessment of these four issues in relation to the
FTSE-100 contract forms the main part of this thesis in
chapters 2 to 5. However, before going on to undertake
analysis of these issues it is appropriate to examine
previous work which addresses these questions. By doing
this, the work to be carried out later in the thesis can
build on the strengths of earlier studies and by
recognising and learning from the weaknesses of that
work, avoid the pitfalls. The following sections
therefore review previous work relating to the issues
identified above.
B1.2 The Risk Return Relationship in Futures Markets. 
For any financial asset investors are likely to be
crucially concerned with the risk return relationship
which characterises that asset. In addition, given the
central role of risk reduction in relation to futures
contracts, the risk return relationship has been both a
matter of considerable interest and of considerable
disagreement. The search for a risk premium in futures
prices in relation to expected spot prices has a long
history (see, for example, Gray, 1961). However, the
search has been inconclusive. For example, Telser (1958,
1960) and Cootner (1960) produced contradictory evidence
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regarding normal backwardation ll . Hence, a divergence of
opinion remains about the risks associated with futures
transactions and the returns which they generate.
However, the development of portfolio theory and the
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) provided a different
means by which the risk return relationship in futures
markets could be viewed. It is the fact that futures can
be used as a means of investing that led Dusak (1973) to
argue that futures could be viewed as a financial asset,
much the same as any other financial asset. Dusak
therefore argued that the risk return relationship
associated with futures contracts should be examined
within a CAPM framework.
Dusak's article has proved highly influential in the
futures literature and has led to many studies which
examine the futures risk return relationship within a
CAPM framework. Given the special role of stock index
futures in terms of investment opportunities and the
widespread acceptance and use of the notion of
systematic risk, it seems appropriate to consider these
studies more fully and to examine the futures risk
return relationship from the stand-point of
nondiversifiable risk.
The first paper in which futures contracts were analysed
within a CAPM framework was that by Dusak (1973). She
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estimated the market model, adapted for futures, using
the value-weighted Standard and Poor Index of 500 (S&P
500) Common Stocks as a proxy for the market portfolio.
Dusak estimated the equation for wheat, corn and soybean
contracts over the period 1952 - 1967 and found the Ps
to be close to zero. Since mean returns on these
contracts were also close to zero she concluded that
commodity futures returns conform to the CAPM, with the
contracts tested not being risky assets when held as
part of a well diversified portfolio of assets.
Carter, Rausser and Schmitz (1983) (hereafter CRS)
criticised Dusak for her choice of proxy for the market
portfolio. CRS used an alternative proxy which gives
equal weight to the S&P 500 stock index and the
Dow-Jones commodity futures index. In addition to
estimating the market model for corn, wheat and soybean
contracts (the same as those used by Dusak) the equation
is estimated for cotton and cattle futures markets.
Although Dusak presents the analysis in her paper as
different to the normal backwardation or contango
approaches to futures pricing, CRS refer to her approach
as the newer Dusak version of normal backwardation. Thus
they emphasise that while the measure of risk is
different from that discussed by Keynes, nonetheless the
principle underlying the two approaches is the same. In
contrast to the findings of Dusak the results of CRS
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"reveal significant and positive systematic
risk for a number of futures contracts" (1983 p.
330).
Thus futures contracts are seen by CRS as being risky
assets in systematic risk terms. In addition, they find
that the degree of systematic risk is conditioned by
whether speculators are net long or net short. They
conclude that their results support the Keynesian theory
of normal backwardation.
CRS were criticised by Marcus (1984) who argued that not
only should the market index exclude futures contracts
(since futures contracts have zero net aggregate
supply), but also that even where a cash commodity index
is included in the market proxy it should be given a
much smaller weight (Marcus suggested a weight of .1).
Following this criticism Baxter, Conine and Tamarkin
(1985, hereafter BCT) included the Dow-Jones Commodity
Cash Index in the market proxy, giving it a weight of
6.3% and the S&P 500 Index a weight of 93.7%. BCT
report
"As Marcus predicts, we obtain lower beta
estimates than CRS. Moreover, the beta
estimates we obtained are not significantly
3].
different from zero, which supports Dusak's
results" (1985, p. 124).
So (1987) used a random coefficient approach to estimate
the risk premium of commodity futures and obtained
results consistent with those of Dusak. He argued that
commodity futures are not risky assets in CAPM
terminology.
Elam and Vaught (1988) estimated the levels of
systematic risk for cattle and hog futures for the
period 1975 - 85, using the weighting for the market
proxy suggested by Marcus. Elam and Vaught's study is
the first in the CAPM, futures literature to address the
possibility of time to maturity influencing futures
returns. Given a fixed delivery date, the time to
maturity of each contract will change over time. As
Chang, Chen and Chen (hereafter CCC) argue
"Conceivably, failure to fix the maturity of
the return time series may reduce the
statistical significance of the beta estimates"
(1990, p. 32).
In order to try to deal with this issue Elam and Vaught
divide returns on cattle and hog futures contracts into
six groups based on the time to maturity of the
contract.
	 The estimates of beta are all positive and
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small (although only 5 out of 12 are significantly
different from zero). The average beta for cattle is
0.2 and for hogs 0.24.
CCC (1990) moved the analysis of futures returns within
a CAPM framework beyond returns on agricultural
commodities, by investigating returns on copper,
platinum and silver futures. Like Elam and Vaught they
try to deal with the problem of time to maturity.
However, they do this by generating time series price
data for artificial futures comprising a weighted
average of two futures quotations for each commodity.
The estimated betas are all positive and significant,
with longer maturity betas having lower systematic risk.
CCC therefore conclude that
"all three metal futures . . . can be viewed as
risky financial assets when they are held as
part of a large portfolio of assets" (1990, p.
36).
A number of important points emerge from the above
review of empirical work. Firstly, the choice of the
market proxy is particularly important, since it appears
that the proxy chosen can influence the estimated betas.
Secondly, the results, while differing in terms of
whether futures are risky in systematic risk terms,
nonetheless suggest that futures pricing is consistent
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with the CAPM. Those futures which have low systematic
risk offer low returns and those with higher systematic
risk offer higher returns. Indeed, the finding that
different futures have different levels of systematic
risk is consistent with the CAPM. Thirdly, the time to
maturity of a contract does appear to affect the extent
of systematic risk of a futures contract.
However, there do appear to be shortcomings associated
with these studies. Firstly, within the area of applying
the CAPM to futures contracts there has been a
concentration of research on commodity futures, rather
than on the risk return trade-off associated with
financial futures. Given that financial futures are more
obviously akin to other financial assets than are
commodity futures, this lack of research is surprising.
Secondly, all of the studies which have used this
methodology relate to futures markets in the USA.
Thirdly, there is now considerable evidence indicating
that there exists a day of the week effect, such that
returns differ depending on the day of the week that
they are realised. In particular, returns to Mondays and
Fridays appear to differ from those to midweek days
(see, for example, Dyl and Maberly (1986a, 1986b),
Cornell (1985), Phillips-Patrick and Schneeweis (1988)).
None of the studies applying the CAPM framework have
attempted to address this issue. Given that any test of
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efficiency involves a joint test with an asset pricing
model, and any test of an asset pricing model involves a
joint test with market efficiency, it is surprising that
this issue has not been addressed also. The final and
most important shortcoming concerning the studies
reviewed here relates to the methodology which has been
used to examine futures within a CAPM framework. By
estimating the market model for futures contracts and
examining the risk and return characteristics these
studies are essentially adopting the approach used first
by Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972) (hereafter BJS).
This approach has been subject to considerable criticism
by Roll (1977), who argued that the approach adopted by
BJS (and subsequently by many others) is essentially
tautological. This arises, argues Roll, because the same
sample period is used both for estimation and for
investigation and drawing inferences. This criticism
applies to all of the studies reviewed in this section.
Given that stock index futures clearly provide a means
by which investors can take up a position in the stock
market it is important to further extend the CAPM
framework beyond the bounds of agricultural and metal
commodity futures. In addition, the shortcomings
mentioned here need to be taken into account, as do the
issues raised by previous studies.
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B1.3 Futures Trading and the Underlying Spot Market. 
In section A it was established that futures can be used
as a means of investment and that the main advantages
which futures contracts offer in this regard arise
because of the low cost of participating in market index
movements using futures, and because changes in market
position can be implemented rapidly. While futures
markets can be seen to be enhancing economic welfare by
allowing investors to achieve higher indifference
curves, they have been criticised for encouraging
speculation. Goss and Yamey (1978b) point out that
futures markets make a distinctive contribution to
speculation since they allow individuals to undertake
speculative activity without them having to become
involved in the production, handling or processing of
the commodity or asset.
In addition to this distinctive contribution, futures
facilitate specialisation in speculation because of the
standardised nature of futures contracts, as opposed to,
for example, forward contracts. Further, transactions
costs and the amount of funds which have to be committed
are very low with futures. Due to the ease with which
market participants can engage in speculation in futures
markets, there has been considerable concern regarding
the impact that futures markets might have on prices in
the underlying spot market. Indeed, this concern dates
back almost to the inception of futures trading.
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One of the main reasons for this concern has been the
popular belief among participants in the spot market
that speculators in futures contracts will have a
destabilising impact on spot prices. In contrast there
have been a number of economists who have argued that
the activities of speculators will have a stabilising
impact on spot market prices. These arguments are
examined shortly. In addition to generating much
discussion at the theoretical level on the impact of
futures trading, the issue has also been the subject of
considerable empirical analysis and has received the
repeated attention of policymakers.
One of the results of this close scrutiny is that
futures markets in the USA have been subjected to
substantial regulation (including, for example, the
prohibition on trading in onion futures). In spite of
the volume of research into this issue and the long
history of conflict concerning the question of whether
futures trading destabilises or stabilises the cash
market, futures trading is still viewed with
considerable suspicion by spot market participants and
policymakers alike. For example, in the search for
explanations of the stock market crash of October 1987 a
number of culprits have been suggested. Among these have
been program trading and futures trading. For example,
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
acknowledged that futures trading and strategies
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involving the use of futures contracts were not the sole
cause of the crash, but argued that
"Nevertheless, the existence of futures on stock
indexes and the use of various strategies
involving 'program trading' (i.e. index
arbitrage, index substitution and portfolio
insurance) were a significant factor in
accelerating and exacerbating the decline."
(U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 1988,
p3-11).
Such suspicion has led to suggestions that futures
trading should be further regulated, including, for
example, higher margins. For example, the Brady
Commission argues
"...low futures margins allow investors to
control large positions with low initial
investments. The clear implication is that
margin requirements affect intermarket risk and
are not the private concern of a single market
place... To protect the intermarket system,
margins on stock index futures need to be
consistent with margins for professional market
participants in the stock market." (Report of
the Presidential Task Force, 1988, p65).
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Similarly, the SEC report on the crash called for higher
margins. However, further regulation may have a negative
impact on the working of financial markets and hence on
economic welfare and it is therefore important to
carefully consider whether such action is beneficial.
Concern over the impact of speculators on the volatility
of market prices predates the introduction of futures
trading. The classical view of the impact of speculators
is that they play a useful role and help to stabilise
prices. For example, John Stuart Mill, in discussing the
progress of society argues that
"The safety and cheapness of communications,
which enable a deficiency in one place to be
supplied from the surplus of another...render.
the fluctuations of prices much less extreme
than formerly...This effect is much promoted by
the existence of large capitals, belonging to
what are called speculative merchants...[T]he
tendency of this operation [by speculators] is
to equalise price, or at least to moderate its
inequalities. The prices of things are neither
so much depressed at one time, nor so much
raised at another, as they would be if
speculative dealers did not exist. Speculators,
therefore, have a highly useful office in the
economy of society" (1871 12 , p276-7).
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Mill goes on to suggest that this view of speculators is
'contrary to common opinion'.
Discussion of the impact of speculators intensified with
the arrival of futures trading. The main reason for this
is the fact that futures trading encourages speculation.
Indeed, it can be argued that futures markets require
speculators, to enable hedgers to transfer risks which
they wish to avoid. In futures markets, transactions
costs are low, capital requirements small (due to
trading on margin) and delivery of the underlying
commodity or instrument need not occur. Since futures
prices have a very close relationship to prices in the
underlying spot market, yet impose far fewer costs on
speculators than would trading in the spot market, they
are very attractive to those seeking to engage in
speculative activity.
The opposing views on the impact of speculators are
discussed by Kaldor (1960) 13 , and Friedman (1953). Kaldor
points out that traditionally speculation has been
viewed as a process which evens out price fluctuations.
This followed from the assumption that
"...speculators are people of better than
average foresight who step in as buyers whenever
there is a temporary excess of supply over
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demand, and thereby moderate the price-fall;
they step in as sellers, whenever there is a
temporary deficiency of supply, and thereby
moderate the price-rise." (Kaldor, 1960, p17-8).
This view of speculators clearly conforms to that of
Mill, discussed above. Kaldor goes on to state that the
idea that speculative activity might increase price
fluctuations was not considered in traditional theory
since this would require that speculative activity
resulted in losses; selling when prices are low and
buying when high. However, he argues that this view of
the impact of speculative activity implies that
speculative demand or supply accounts for only a small
part of total demand or supply. If this is not true then
while successful speculators must possess above average
foresight, success can be achieved by the speculator
forecasting the forecasts of other (less successful)
speculators.
"If the proportion of speculative transactions
in the total is large, it may become...more
profitable for the individual speculator to
concentrate on forecasting the psychology of
other speculators, rather than the trend of the
non-speculative elements...[T]he losses of a
floating population of unsuccessful speculators
will be sufficient to maintain permanently a
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small body of successful speculators". (Kaldor,
1960, p19).
Thus it is possible for speculative activity to produce
a net loss, with some speculators gaining, and at the
same time destabilise the market. While Friedman (1953)
accepts this point he argues that
"Despite the prevailing opinion to the contrary,
I am very dubious that in fact speculation...
would be destabilizing... People who argue that
speculation is generally destabilizing seldom
realize that this is largely equivalent to
saying that speculators lose money...[W]hile
this may happen, it is hard to see why there is
any presumption that it will; the presumption is
rather the opposite." (Friedman, 1953, p175).
In spite of this 'presumption' criticism continues to be
levelled at futures markets for encouraging speculation
and, therefore (the argument goes), destabilising prices
in the underlying spot market.
Given the situation as described above, it is necessary
to turn to empirical evidence to try to ascertain
whether futures trading stabilises or destabilises the
underlying spot market. We therefore now review previous
empirical studies examining the impact of futures
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trading on spot price volatility. The review is not
exhaustive, given the large volume of studies which have
been undertaken. Rather it seeks to identify the most
important work in this area, together with the main
techniques used to address the issue.
Literature exists which considers whether activity in
futures markets has any impact on spot price volatility
in periods of excessive price movements, such as the
1987 crash. However, in this thesis we are concerned
with the impact of futures trading on spot price
volatility for the whole period for which futures
trading has taken place and not with specific events. As
such comparisons are made of spot price volatility pre-
and post-futures trading. Hence, the review of previous
studies, in line with the review of theoretical issues
above, does not include any discussion of the impact of
futures trading on speculative bubbles, contagion, or
specific events such as the 1987 stock market crash.
Due to the relatively short time for which financial
futures have been available the earlier studies relate
to commodity futures trading. However, given the focus
of this thesis we will confine our review to financial
futures. In addition, it should be noted that the
attention of previous work in this area has been
focussed almost exclusively on US futures markets.
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The general approach which has been adopted when
addressing this issue is to examine spot price
volatility prior to the onset of futures trading and
then to make comparisons with the volatility of spot
prices post-futures. The general conclusion to emerge
from these studies is that futures trading has either
led to more stable spot prices or has had no discernable
impact on spot prices. Research into the impact on spot
price volatility of financial futures trading has
concentrated on two instruments: Government National
Mortgage Association (GNMA) certificates, and Stock
Index futures. We will deal with these in turn.
Froewiss (1978), in an early study of the GNMA market,
regressed the weekly percentage change in GNMA spot
prices on the weekly percentage changes of Government
bond prices to determine the variability of GNMA prices
relative to that of bond prices. He argues that a rise
in the coefficient after the beginning of futures
trading will suggest that futures destabilise spot
prices. The test for equality of coefficients suggests
no change after the introduction of futures trading
which Froewiss interprets as evidence of no change in
the stability of spot prices post-futures. Froewiss goes
on to use univariate Box-Jenkin analysis to further
analyse the issue. Again the results suggest that spot
price volatility had not been altered by the
introduction of futures.
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Figlewski (1981) constructs a monthly volatility series
and regresses these volatilities on four factors:
volatility in related markets (proxied by the 10-year
bond volatility), market liquidity, the level of prices
and futures market activity. In contrast to Froewiss,
Figlewski concludes that futures trading in GNMA
securities has led to increased price volatility in the
cash market.
Simpson and Ireland (1982) investigated the spot price
volatility of GNMA certificates before and after the
introduction of futures by using standard regression
analysis and a multivariate time series model with an
intervention term. The regression analysis was carried
out for both daily price changes and weekly price
changes, with a dummy variable for futures trading being
included in the equations. Tests of structural change
were employed to ascertain whether the onset of futures
trading had impacted on the dependent variable. The
results of the analysis suggested that futures trading
did not affect the volatility of spot prices either on a
daily or a weekly basis.
A time series-intervention approach was adopted by
Corgel and Gay (1984) to analyse the impact of futures
trading on the GNMA spot market volatility. Corgel and
Gay argue that intervention analysis is an appropriate
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technique for examining the impact of futures trading,
since it
"...allows direct focus on the dynamic
characteristics of the response to the
intervention [the introduction of futures
trading] , such as the speed of adjustment, as
well as the degree and nature of any over- or
under-reaction." (1984, p181).
The results are in line with those of Froewiss (1978)
and suggest that the introduction of futures trading has
had a long-run stabilising effect on the volatility of
the spot market.
Moriarty and Tosini (1985) use the same volatility
measure and regression model employed by Figlewski
(1981) to examine the validity of his results. Whereas
Figlewski examined the period up to February 1979,
Moriarty and Tosini extend the period of analysis to
July 1983. In contrast to Figlewski (whose findings they
refer to as 'unique in the futures literature') their
results suggest that there is no evidence that the
introduction of GNMA futures caused the volatility of
the cash market to increase. They conclude that
the	 GNMA	 cash	 and	 futures
markets...experienced fundamental change during
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this period (up to 1983) and that, as a
consequence, the strength and significance of
certain price relationships depend critically on
the subperiod analyzed" (Moriarty and Tosini,
1985, p634).
While Figlewski and Moriarty and Tosini used monthly
volatility measures, Bhattacharya et al (1986)
calculated weekly volatility series for spot and futures
prices. They sought to examine the influence of GNMA
futures volatility on spot volatility using Granger's
definition and methodology for testing for causality.
While their results suggest that futures market
volatility has some causal influence on cash market
volatility, they say nothing about the question of
whether futures trading has stabilised or destabilised
the spot market.
Edwards (1988a and 1988b) analysed the impact of stock
index futures trading on stock price volatility by
examining the volatility of the stock market before and
after the inception of futures trading. Volatility was
measured as the variance of close-to-close percentage
daily price changes. Edwards' results suggest that
volatility had decreased post-futures for the S&P 500
and was not significantly different post-futures for the
Value Line index, leading to the conclusion that there
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is no evidence that futures trading has had a long-run
destabilising effect on the stock market.
Aggarwal (1988) regressed the returns on the stock index
on the returns on the over the counter composite index
and dummies relating to 'early and mature' futures
periods. In addition, the regressions are repeated using
return squared deviations in place of returns. The
results suggest that while the post-futures period is
more volatile, this is true for all markets and hence
stock index futures may not be the primary cause of this
increase.
Cross-sectional analysis of covariance methods are used
by Harris (1989) to test for changes in stock index
volatility since the onset of index futures trading.
While the results are
li ...consistent with the hypothesis that trade in
index futures...markets increases cash market
volatility [s]upport for this conclusion...is
circumstantial" (Harris, 1989, p1170-3).
Harris argues that other index related phenomena, such
as the growth in foreign ownership of American equities
and the growth in index funds, could account for the
results.
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A statistical method designed to highlight potential
outliers is used by Becketti and Roberts (1990) to
determine whether stock index futures have led to an
increase in the frequency of jumps in daily stock
returns. They find little or no relationship between
stock market volatility and either the existence of, or
the level of activity in, the stock index futures
market.
Brorsen (1991) argues that stock price autocorrelation
should be reduced by the introduction of futures
trading, since such trading reduces market friction
leading to prices adjusting more rapidly to new
information. Using the Ljung-Box Q statistic results are
obtained which are consistent with this argument. In
addition, Brorsen argues that reducing market frictions
increase the variance of short-run price changes.
Homogeneity of variance for time periods before and
after futures trading is tested. While the variance of
daily price changes are significantly different, there
is no significant difference in the variances of 5 and
20 day price changes.
Baldauf and Santoni (1991) have used an Autoregressive
Conditional Heteroskedastic (ARCH) model to test for
increased volatility in the stock index following the
introduction of futures trading and program trading.
They model the squared differences in the log of daily
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price changes as an ARCH process for periods before and
after the onset of futures trading and test for changes
in the parameters of the model. No evidence is found of
a shift in the model's parameters suggesting that the
inception of futures trading and program trading had no
significant effect on volatility.
A number of serious problems relate to the studies
reviewed above. Firstly and most importantly, the
studies have tended to view the question about the
impact of futures trading on spot price volatility from
a narrow stabilising/destabilising stand-point.
Crucially, with rare exceptions, these studies have not
attempted to question why futures trading might impact
on spot market price volatility and, in particular, have
not examined the link between information and
volatility. Indeed, while a number of different
methodologies have been adopted to examine this
stabilisation/destabilisation issue, it is questionable
whether any of them are capable of addressing the link
between information and volatility.
Another problem which emerges from the work of Figlewski
(1981) and Moriarty and Tosini (1985), is that when
using certain techniques to analyse the issue, the
choice of time period for analysis may affect the
results obtained. This arises due to problems of
heteroskedasticity. It is therefore necessary to use a
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technique for analysing the impact of futures trading on
spot price volatility which explicitly takes account of
this problem.
Finally it is evident from the above review that it is
necessary to filter out any market wide factors which
might impact on spot market volatility in order that the
impact of futures can be clearly identified. It is
therefore necessary to adopt an approach which is
capable of fulfilling this requirement.
B1.4 Price Discovery and Futures Market Efficiency. 
It was argued earlier that futures markets have a
crucial role to play in regard to price discovery.
Prices in futures markets impart information regarding
expected future spot prices. In addition, we have seen
in the previous discussion that information is important
in relation to spot market volatility.
If futures markets are to play a useful role in price
discovery, in that they provide forecasts of future spot
prices, then two conditions must hold. Firstly, market
participants must, in aggregate, be risk neutral. If
this condition holds then futures prices would be
expected to provide unbiased estimates of future spot
prices. If it does not hold then prices may follow a
pattern of either normal backwardation or contango.
Secondly, it is necessary that futures markets are
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efficient in that futures prices incorporate all
relevant information. If they are not efficient, then
even if the futures price does provide a market forecast
of the expected future spot price, that forecast could
be biased. Hence, in order to be able to assess the
price discovery role of futures markets it is necessary
to examine the question of futures market efficiency14.
The issue of unbiasedness in futures prices and the
efficiency of futures markets has been widely addressed
for commodity futures and for foreign exchange forward
contracts. However, there has been limited investigation
of these issues for financial futures and, to the
knowledge of the author, none of the
efficiency/unbiasedness of stock index futures. Even for
those markets which have received considerable
attention, the question of efficiency remains unresolved
due to differences in methodology and time periods
examined. In addition, recent advances in econometrics
have called into question the findings and implications
of many of the previous studies. Nonetheless, in order
to understand these problems and the issues which they
raise it is necessary to briefly review previous
studies.
A standard test of futures market efficiency involves
regressing the spot price at maturity on the futures
price some time prior to maturity, as in equation 1.3:
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t+n + etSt+n = a + bFt, (1.3)
The joint test of market efficiency and the unbiasedness
hypothesis implies that a=0 and b=1 in equation 1.3.
Traditionally, this test of market efficiency and the
unbiasedness hypothesis has been carried out using
standard regression procedures, ordinary least squares.
However, there are problems associated with using these
tests due to the non-reliability of standard statistical
tests in the presence of nonstationary data. These
problems will be discussed more fully in chapter 4 when
describing the approach to be used in this thesis for
testing for the efficiency of the FTSE-100 stock index
futures contract. The result of these problems is that
more recently the cointegration procedure has been used
to test for futures markets efficiency. This procedure
will also be discussed in detail in chapter 4.
The joint test of market efficiency and the unbiasedness
hypothesis applies equally to forward markets as well as
to futures markets. Many studies of this joint
hypothesis have been carried out with respect to forward
foreign exchange rates. In addition, many of the early
studies of both forward and futures markets efficiency
were conducted using standard regression analysis (see,
for example, Frenkel (1977, 1979), Geweke and Feige
(1979), and Huang (1984)). Given the problems associated
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with standard regression analysis and the focus of this
thesis on futures markets, the review of previous
studies of the unbiasedness hypothesis and efficiency
will concentrate on tests that fall into one or both of
two categories: firstly, more recent studies which
examine the joint hypothesis for futures markets will be
reviewed, even when OLS has been used and; secondly,
studies of forward market efficiency which use the
cointegration procedure will be covered.
Goss (1981, 1986a) 15 explores the hypothesis that futures
and spot prices are unbiased predictors of subsequent
spot prices for four non-ferrous metals (copper, tin
zinc and lead) traded on the London Metal Exchange
(LME). The periods covered are 1971 - 1978 (in the 1981
paper) and 1966 - 1984 (1986a). He uses OLS and, in the
case of serial correlation, instrumental variables
estimation procedures. In the earlier paper he finds
that the hypothesis of efficiency is accepted for the
tin, copper and zinc markets, but not for the lead
market. However, in the later paper for the longer
period he finds that the unbiasedness hypothesis should
only be rejected for the zinc market, at the 5% level of
significance. At the 1% level the unbiasedness
hypothesis is accepted for all four markets. Goss
concludes
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"The implications of this result are that agents
using London Metal Exchange copper, tin and lead
futures prices for decision purposes are as well
off on average as if they had known the
subsequent cash price in advance." (Goss, 1986a,
p168).
Canarella and Pollard (1986) also examine the efficiency
of the London Metal exchange. The period covered by the
analysis is 1975 - 1983. Three approaches are adopted to
test for market efficiency. Firstly, they use standard
OLS to test the unbiasedness hypothesis. Secondly, using
overlapping data they explicitly model the moving
average process in the error structure using
autoregressive moving average (ARMA) procedures.
Thirdly, they use the full information maximum
likelihood technique. The analysis is carried out in
relation to the same metals as those studied by Goss.
The results from all tests are consistent. Canarella and
Pollard state
"The findings point to a convergence of
empirical results, in that each separate test
indicates that for all the commodity markets
considered the hypothesis of speculative
efficiency is not statistically rejected by the
data. This suggests that any other
variables...used to forecast spot prices contain
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no additional information beyond that contained
in the value of the futures price." (Canarella
and Pollard, 1986, p592).
Elam and Dixon (1988) argue that the standard OLS
procedure is inappropriate for testing the joint
hypothesis of efficiency and unbiasedness. The reason
for this is that the time series used to test the
hypothesis is non-stationary. This leads to the standard
F-test of the restrictions a=0 and b=1 being
inappropriate. They support their suggestions with
evidence from Monte Carlo simulations. The issue of OLS
being an inappropriate technique for carrying out the
test of the joint hypothesis is discussed further in
chapter 4. However, the points raised by Elam and Dixon
are important and subsequently considerable work on the
joint hypothesis has been undertaken using the
cointegration technique. Use of this technique avoids
the problems identified by Elam and Dixon.
MacDonald and Taylor (1989) investigate the presence of
time-varying risk premia in the price series of the four
metals traded on the LME which were investigated by
Goss, conditional on the assumption of rationality. They
argue that the problem of testing the standard joint
hypothesis is that rejection of the hypothesis does not
enable researchers to identify which part of the joint
hypothesis is rejected. They argue that
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"Given that typical market participants in
commodity markets are highly motivated, highly
professional individuals with instant access to
potentially vast information sets, it is perhaps
natural to question the assumption of
risk-neutrality rather than non-
rationality....[However,] the evidence for the
presence of time-varying premia was found to be
weak, although some support was found for the
presence of time-varying premia for tin and
zinc." (MacDonald and Taylor, 1989, p151).
With the exception of Elam and Dixon (1988) all of the
studies reviewed so far suffer from the fact that they
use traditional hypothesis-testing procedures and do not
test for stationarity of the data, a crucial assumption
underlying the standard OLS procedure. However, the
criticisms raised by Elam and Dixon have been addressed
in more recent studies of the joint test of efficiency
and the unbiasedness hypothesis.
Hakkio and Rush (1989) use the cointegration procedure
to test the joint hypothesis of risk neutrality and the
rational use of all available information in foreign
exchange markets. They test to see if the series of spot
prices at time t+1 cointegrates with the series of
forward prices at time t. They point out that if the two
series are not cointegrated then with probability one
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they will drift apart. The data used relates to spot and
forward rates for the British pound and the German mark
over the period July 1975 to October 1986. The authors
report that the results of the tests
"...generally lead us to believe that the spot
and forward rates are cointegrated, which is
consistent with the market being efficient."
(Hakkio and Rush, 1989, p81).
However, by using error-correction equations they reject
the joint hypothesis of no risk premium combined with
efficient use of information for both the United Kingdom
and Germany.
Barnhart and Szakmary (1991) also test the joint
hypothesis using the cointegration procedure. They
demonstrate that the conflicting results found in the
literature depend upon the econometric specification
used. The finding that spot and forward exchange rates
for the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan and Canada over
the period 1974 to 1988 have unit roots and are
cointegrated rules out the use of certain standard
econometric procedures. While the spot and forward
series are found to cointegrate Barnhart and Szakmary
reject the unbiasedness hypothesis on the basis of error
correction models.
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Lai and Lai (1991) also use the cointegration procedure
to test for market efficiency in forward foreign
exchange markets. However, unlike the two previous
studies which have been reviewed, Lai and Lai utilise
the Johansen approach to cointegration. This has the
substantial advantage over the Engle and Granger
procedure, which had previously been used, in that it
allows formal testing of restrictions in the
cointegrating regression. Thus unlike Hakkio and Rush
and Barnhart and Szakmary, Lai and Lai are able to
formally test the restriction that a=0 and b=1 in the
cointegrating relationship.
Tests are carried out in respect of five currencies: the
British pound, the Deutsche mark, the Swiss franc, the
Canadian dollar and the Japanese yen. The period under
analysis is July 1973 to December 1989. For all five
currencies for which analysis is undertaken, the results
suggest that the spot price at time t+1 and the futures
price at time t are cointegrated. However, tests of the
hypothesis that a=0 and b=1 indicate that the hypothesis
is rejected for all five currencies at the 5%
significance level. Thus, Lai and Lai report that the
forward rate appears to be a biased predictor of the
future spot rate.
Chowdhury (1991) addresses the hypothesis that the
markets for copper, lead, tin and zinc in the LME are
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efficient by using the cointegration procedure. The
sample period is July 1971 to June 1988. The empirical
results indicate the presence of unit roots in the spot
and futures prices for all four metals. Chowdhury points
out that this raises serious concern regarding most of
the previous studies of market efficiency for the LME
which have used levels price series. The hypothesis that
a=0 and b=1 in the cointegrating equation is rejected in
each of the four markets. The futures price thus appears
to be a biased predictor of the future spot price. These
results are in sharp contrast to the findings of Goss
and illustrate the need to account for non-stationarity
in time series.
Antoniou and Foster (1992a) carry out tests of the
unbiasedness hypothesis for coffee and cocoa futures
using the Johansen cointegration procedure. Unlike
previous studies they use three tests of market
efficiency for different values of t-i for the futures
contracts. The first test involves determining whether
the spot and futures price series cointegrate, for the
spot series at time t and the futures series at time
t-i, where i=1, 2, 3, 6, and 8. For all values of i used
and for both commodities tested the series cointegrate.
They then test to see if b=1 in the cointegrating
relationship. This second test of market efficiency is
also accepted.
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Antoniou and Foster argue that while these two findings
suggest that futures prices are unbiased predictors of
future spot prices in the long-term, this ignores the
possibility of there being substantial deviations from
this relationship in the short-term. They therefore
argue that it is necessary to use error correction
models to determine whether there is short-term
efficiency. When restrictions on parameters of the error
correction models are tested, the efficiency/
unbiasedness hypothesis is only accepted for one and two
months prior to maturity for coffee and one month from
maturity for cocoa. Antoniou and Foster argue on the
basis of these results that all three tests of the joint
hypothesis need to be carried out to determine whether
futures prices provide unbiased predictors of future
spot prices. They argue that previous studies, such as
those by Chowdhury and Lai and Lai are deficient in that
they miss out an important test of market efficiency.
This review of the empirical literature testing the
efficiency of futures markets highlights a number of
important points. Firstly, it is essential that the
stationarity or otherwise of the price series is
established before determining the estimation procedure
to be used in analysing the issue of market efficiency.
Secondly, if the price series are non-stationary then
cointegration provides an appropriate technique by which
to test for market efficiency. However, it is also
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evident from the above discussion that a finding of
cointegration between the futures and spot price series,
while being a necessary condition for market efficiency,
is not a sufficient condition. It is also necessary to
test for the restriction of the parameters in the
cointegrating relationship to determine whether a=0 and
b=1. This condition is also a necessary condition for
futures market efficiency. However, Antoniou and Foster
have also demonstrated the need to test for short-term
efficiency by testing restrictions of the parameters in
the error correction model. Failure to test for such
restrictions may lead to the acceptance of efficiency
and unbiasedness when there are in fact substantial
deviations in the short-term.
Another point to emerge from the literature review of
market efficiency and the unbiasedness hypothesis is
that the approach to testing this joint hypothesis has
been rather narrow. Emphasis has almost exclusively
focussed on the question of whether a=0 and b=1 in
equation 1.3. In recent years considerable attention has
been given to price volatility in examining market
efficiency (see, for example, Shiller (1979, 1981a,
1981b) LeRoy and Porter (1981), Kleidon (1986) and
Mankiw, Romer and Shapiro (1985, 1991)). Evidence on
price volatility has been used to reject the notion of
market efficiency. For example, Shiller (1981a) argues
that
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"measures of stock price volatility over the
past century appear to be far too high... to be
attributed to new information about future real
dividends... The failure of the efficient
markets model is thus so dramatic that it would
seem impossible to attribute the failure to such
things as data errors, price index problems, or
changes in tax laws." (Shiller, 1981a, p433-4).
Given	 the	 widespread	 use	 of	 volatility	 or
variance-bounds tests to examine stock market
efficiency, it is surprising that similar tests have not
been employed to examine the spot price - futures price
relationship. Such tests would appear to offer an
important additional means by which to examine the joint
hypothesis of market efficiency and unbiasedness in
futures markets. Therefore, in examining the joint
hypothesis in relation to the FTSE-100 stock index
futures contract in chapter 4, two approaches are
adopted. Firstly, the cointegration procedure is
employed to examine efficiency in both the long-term and
the short-term. Secondly, variance-bounds tests are
developed in relation to futures prices and used to test
the joint hypothesis. This second means of testing the
joint hypothesis will bring a new dimension to the
testing of futures market efficiency in that it enables
the important link between information and price
volatility to be examined.
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B1.5 Hedging with Stock Index Futures. 
We now turn to an examination of the primary role of
futures contracts, namely hedging. It was demonstrated
in section A that hedging is the main reason for the
existence of futures trading. Given this, it is not
surprising to find that much research has been
undertaken concerning the hedging performance of
commodity futures and financial futures contracts.
However, given the large volume of work in this area,
this review will focus on studies of the hedging
performance of stock index futures. All of these studies
relate to stock index futures traded in the USA,
reflecting the fact that stock index futures have been
traded for a longer period in the USA than elsewhere and
that the USA offers the largest market for these
contracts.
Figlewski (1984) provides the starting point for
research into the hedging performance of stock index
futures. He is concerned with the issue of how
effectively the Standard and Poor's 500 futures contract
could be in hedging the risk associated with portfolios
underlying five major stock indexes. The holding period
of the hedges is one week and the period analysed is
from 1 June 1982 to 30 September 1983. The five indexes
differ in that while they all represent diversified
portfolios, two include only the largest capitalization
stocks, two include smaller companies and one is much
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less diversified than the other four, containing only 30
stocks of very large firms.
Figlewski constructs series of weekly returns for the
five portfolios. Unlike many subsequent studies he
includes dividends in these returns. The futures
contract nearest to expiration was used in the analysis.
This is common practice amongst researchers examining
hedging performance due to this contract being the most
liquid of the contracts traded. The minimum variance
hedge ratio and the beta hedge ratio are calculated for
hedging each of the five stock indexes.
For all five indexes, hedge performance is less good
using the beta hedge ratio than the minimum variance
hedge ratio, with mean return being smaller and residual
risk larger. For the three indexes which have underlying
portfolios of large capitalization stocks, risk is
reduced by between seventy and eighty percent as a
result of using a minimum variance hedging strategy.
Returns using this hedging strategy are in the region of
the risk free rate. For the indexes which include
smaller stocks, and hence more unsystematic risk,
hedging effectiveness is considerably reduced.
Figlewski also examines whether the exclusion of
dividends from the returns data affects hedging
performance, whether the holding period of the hedge is
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important and whether the time to expiration of the
futures contract influences hedging performance. He
finds that dividend risk is of little significance,
probably due to dividends being relatively stable. As
far as hedge duration is concerned, hedging performance
is less good for overnight hedges than for one week and
four week hedges. However, four week hedges are not
noticeably more effective than one week hedges. For
times to expiration of the futures contract of between
zero and one month and one and two months hedging
performance changes little. However, for hedges where
time to expiration is between two and three months
hedging effectiveness is reduced.
The issue of hedging with stock index futures is also
examined in Figlewski (1985). In this paper he examines
the hedging performance of three stock index futures
contracts (those relating to the Value Line Composite
Index, the S&P 500 Index and the NYSE Composite Index)
over holding periods varying from one day to three
weeks. The portfolios to be hedged are the same as those
in Figlewski (1984), but the time period covered only
relates to the last seven months of 1982, thus
eliminating the very earliest time period in which the
futures contracts were being traded. While there are 153
observations for overnight hedges, for the analysis of
three week hedges there are only 10 observations.
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Figlewski finds that for the two major index portfolios
beta hedges of very short durations (1, 2, and 3 days)
were not very effective, but that risk reduction
improved as the holding period extended to a number of
weeks. Interestingly, there was no clear advantage
between futures contracts as regards hedging the
indexes. In other words, the contract underlying its own
index was no better at hedging than was the contract
underlying another index. For both beta and minimum
variance hedges three-week hedges perform less Yell thax\
two-week hedges. Figleyski attributes this finding to
sampling error due to the small number of observations.
As in his earlier paper the hedging effectiveness of the
futures relating to the indexes including smaller stocks
is less good and the futures for the portfolio of only
30 stocks was most effective. Figlewski also finds that
the risk minimising hedge ratio is well below the beta.
Hedge ratios tended to increase and unhedgeable risk to
decrease with longer duration hedges.
Junkus and Lee (1985) test the applicability of four
traditional commodity hedging models to stock index
futures contracts for three exchanges in the USA. The
models tested are: the classic 'one-to-one' hedge; the
Working hedge strategy; the Johnson minimum variance
strategy and; the Rutledge utility hedge strategy 16. The
period examined is 31 May 1982 to 1 March 1983. Hedge
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ratios were estimated using three different contract
maturities: the closest to maturity, the farthest from
maturity and an intermediate contract. The portfolio to
be hedged is assumed to be the index portfolio
underlying the futures contract. Considerable
differences were found between the four hedging
strategies, with some of the behaviour resembling
speculation. Indeed, the classic hedge sometimes
resulted in a larger variance position than the unhedged
portfolio. While Junkus and Lee argue that hedging
motivation is of crucial importance in determining
hedging strategies and hence hedge ratios, they find
that the Johnson strategy is the most effective of the
four examined in reducing the variance of the long
portfolio position.
Peters (1986) derives risk-return equations for hedged
portfolios by combining the single-index market model
for the spot market with the cost of carry model for the
futures position. He finds that the minimum variance
hedge ratio minimises overall risk, in contrast to the
beta hedge ratio which maintains full exposure to basis
risk. As in the paper by Figlewski (1984) the hedging
performance of the minimum variance hedge ratio is
examined, using the S&P 500 futures contracts. The three
portfolios with the stocks with largest capitalisation
used in the Figlewski study are used here, for the
period 15 March 1984 to 31 March 1985. Peters points out
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that this period is one of lower volatility than the
period analysed by Figlewski. Daily returns are used,
rather than weekly returns. The theoretical argument
concerning the superiority of the minimum variance hedge
ratio over the beta hedge is confirmed by the empirical
results. Peters argues that the results imply that for
practitioners who want to hedge an equity portfolio the
beta is not a true hedge ratio.
Graham and Jennings (1987) examine the hedging
performance of the S&P 500 futures contract when used to
hedge equity portfolios of ten stocks. Random sampling
techniques are used to form portfolios which differ in
terms of systematic risk and dividend yield. The data
relates to the period from April 1982 to December 1983,
yielding 87 weekly observations. Three hedging
strategies are compared: the one-to-one hedge, the beta
hedge, and the minimum variance hedge. Hedge durations
of 1, 2, and 4 weeks are examined for 90 cash equity
portfolios.
As far as return retention is concerned, the minimum
variance hedging strategy dominates for all hedge
periods for all portfolios, i.e more of the unhedged
return is retained using this hedge strategy. The 4 week
hedge retains more of the returns than the shorter
hedges. In relation to risk reduction, the minimum
variance hedge ratio is best for 1 week hedges in all
69
beta/dividend yield categories. For 2 week hedges the
minimum variance hedge is again superior except for high
beta portfolios, where the one-to-one hedge dominates.
The results for the 4 week hedge are similar to those
for the 1 week hedges. The other main findings of the
study are that stock index futures are less than half as
effective at hedging nonindex portfolios as they are at
hedging indexes and that the hedge ratios vary
considerably depending upon the level of systematic risk
and dividend yield.
Malliaris and Urrutia (1991) argue that previous studies
of the hedging performance of futures markets are
subject to criticism because they implicitly assume that
the estimated hedge ratio is stable over the period
analysed. They suggest that there is evidence that
foreign currency futures hedge ratios are unstable and
therefore believe that the stationarity of both hedge
ratios and measures of hedging effectiveness needs
further investigation. To achieve this end they test the
hypothesis that hedge ratios and measures of hedging
effectiveness for futures contracts follow a random
walk. The hypothesis is tested for the S&P 500 futures
contract and five foreign currency futures contracts. In
order to test for random walk it is first of all
necessary to estimate series of hedge ratios and
measures of hedging effectiveness. This is done by
running OLS regressions of the change in the spot price
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on the change in the futures price using the moving
window regression procedure. Estimates of hedge ratios
and measures of hedging effectiveness (R21 s) are
estimated initially for a one year period and
subsequently reestimated every quarter using the moving
window procedure. For the stock index futures the time
period under investigation is 1 January 1984 to 27
December 1988. The holding period of the hedges are two
weeks. Having thus obtained the series, they are tested
for random walk using both the Dickey-Fuller methodology
and the variance ratio test of Lo and MacKinlay.
The authors find that for stock index futures the hedge
ratios and measures of hedging effectiveness estimated
by means of the moving window regression procedure,
deviate substantially from the averages estimated for
the whole sample period. They argue that this is
indicative of instability over time. Both tests of
random walk confirm this impression, suggesting that
both hedge ratios and measures of hedging effectiveness
follow a random walk. (This is true for the stock index
and foreign currency futures tested.) Malliaris and
Urrutia argue that the major implication of their
results is that it is not possible to place perfect
hedges and therefore hedgers need to continuously
readjust their positions. However, they point out that
such a dynamic hedging strategy may actually be more
costly than traditional hedging because continual
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readjustment of the futures position will lead to higher
transactions costs. Hence, it is necessary to compare
the increased transactions costs with the costs of
non-perfect hedging due to the use of static hedge
ratios.
Lindahl (1992) also addresses the question of the
stability of the hedge ratio. She examines hedge ratio
stability for the MMI and S&P 500 stock index futures
contracts with respect to hedge durations and the time
to contract expiration. Hedge durations of 1, 2 and 4
weeks are compared and these are further broken down by
the number of weeks remaining to contract expiration.
Hedges lifted between 0 and 12 weeks prior to expiration
are examined. As in other studies, minimum variance
hedge ratios are estimated by regressing spot price
changes against futures price changes. The hedges are
nonoverlapping and the data relates to 1985 - 1989 for
the MMI futures and to 1983 - 1989 for the S&P 500.
Lindahl's results suggest that both the hedge ratios and
the measures of hedging effectiveness increase as
duration increases. In addition, the hedge ratios
increase towards one (the beta hedge ratio) as hedges are
lifted closer to expiration. However, the values of R2
show no increasing pattern as expiration approaches.
Multiple regression results confirm the pattern
demonstrated in the simple regressions, with lower
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values of the minimum variance hedge ratio the farther
away the hedge is from expiration. The results hold for
both the MMI and the S&P 500 futures contracts.
Previous empirical studies illustrate a number of issues
of interest in examining the hedging performance of
stock index futures contracts. Firstly, there is no
evidence that dividends play an important part in the
risk associated with a hedged position. Hence, it is now
accepted practice to estimate hedge ratios without
including dividends. Secondly, it has been established
that the minimum variance hedge ratio is superior to the
beta hedge ratio in terms of risk reduction and returns
retention. In addition, there is clear evidence that
hedge ratios are not stable over time. Of particular
importance in this regard is the duration of the hedge
and the time left between lifting the hedge and the
expiration of the futures contract.
While these issues have been examined in relation to
stock index futures traded in the USA, similar analysis
has not been carried out in relation to the FTSE-100
stock index contract. In addition, a major shortcoming
can be identified in relation to all of the previous
studies. In every study which examines the hedging
performance of stock index futures, the effectiveness of
the optimal hedge (in terms of minimising risk) is
evaluated. In doing this it is implicitly assumed that
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the hedger has perfect foresight with respect to the
spot and futures prices (and thus the basis) and can
thus estimate the optimal hedge for the coming period.
However, as Malliaris and Urrutia (1991) show, hedge
ratios change over time. In deciding upon the hedge
strategy to implement in the coming period, the decision
maker only has historical information. It is therefore
important to consider how a hedger might choose a
hedging strategy for the coming period in the absence of
perfect foresight. In addition, it is of considerable
interest to compare the hedging effectiveness of a
hedging strategy based on historical information, with
the performance of the optimal (perfect foresight) hedge
strategy. Unlike all previous studies, this issue is
examined and comparisons made in chapter 5.
B1.6 Conclusion. 
In this chapter we have examined the main economic
functions of futures markets and identified issues
relating to those functions which require further
investigation. The functions have been examined in terms
of both the theoretical issues and previous empirical
research in the area. Futures markets have been shown to
introduce negative correlation, reduce uncertainty, move
markets towards completeness and enable investors and
speculators to increase their utility and thus attain
higher indifference curves. In none of the areas of
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interest which have been identified has there been
research undertaken on the FTSE-100 stock index futures
contract. In addition, the issues identified are of
direct relevance to investors, regulators, the
government and the general public.
One of the major functions of futures contracts relates
to risk reduction. In addition, it has been demonstrated
that stock index futures play an important role as a
means of investment and changing market timing. It is
therefore evident that the
of central importance when
The CAPM approach has been
relationship for commodity
risk return relationship is
examining futures contracts.
adopted to investigate this
futures traded in the USA.
However, no such work has been carried out in relation
to financial futures and none for futures traded in the
UK. It therefore appears worthwhile to examine the
FTSE-100 stock index futures contract within a CAPM
framework. This is done in chapter 2. In addition, there
is evidence of a day of the week effect in futures
prices. We therefore also investigate this phenomenon
within the CAPM approach in chapter 2. This issue has
not previously been addressed in this manner. Finally,
the methodology adopted in previous studies has been
called into question by Roll (1977). In addition to
carrying out work along similar lines to that carried
out for commodity futures in the USA, an alternative
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methodology which overcomes this criticism is also
employed in chapter 2.
The question of the impact of the onset of futures
trading on the underlying spot market is a matter of
considerable concern and conflict with a long history.
The concern emanates from the belief by some that
futures trading affects the volatility of spot prices.
The debate about this issue is characterised in terms of
futures trading either stabilising or destabilising spot
prices. Previous studies of this issue have failed to
use techniques which can deal with problems of
heteroskedasticity in the data. More importantly,
however, they have failed to take account of the link
between information and volatility. In chapter 3 we
investigate the impact of the onset of trading in the
FTSE-100 futures contract on the underlying spot market,
a market which has not previously been examined in this
regard. In doing this a technique is employed which is
capable of dealing with the problems caused by
heteroskedasticity, and more importantly which allows
direct consideration of the link between information and
volatility. In view of the controversy surrounding the
impact of futures trading and the calls for further
regulation following the crash of 1987, this issue is of
direct concern to policymakers and market participants
alike.
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The efficiency of futures markets has been shown to be
of crucial importance to the price discovery role which
futures play. In addition, it has implications for the
confidence of investors in using the instruments to
hedge the risks they face. In this regard, a number of
studies have been undertaken to examine the joint
hypothesis of efficiency and unbiasedness. However, many
of these studies can be criticised for using techniques
which fail to take account of non-stationarity in the
price series data and as a consequence the results of
these studies are unreliable. More recently,
investigations of the joint hypothesis have been
undertaken using the cointegration technique which does
allow reliable results to be obtained in the presence of
non-stationary data. However, these studies do not test
all of the implications of the joint hypothesis and as
such do not tell the whole story.
In chapter 4 we investigate the joint hypothesis for the
FTSE-100 contract, using the Johansen cointegration
technique. This joint hypothesis has not previously been
tested for this contract. In addition, we extend the
tests of the joint hypothesis by developing and
utilising variance-bounds tests which have not
previously been applied to futures contracts.
Arguably the most important function of futures
contracts relates to the reduction of risk through the
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adoption	 of	 hedging	 strategies.	 The	 hedging
effectiveness of futures is therefore of central concern
to the question of whether a particular contract is a
success. This is an issue which has been widely examined
for stock index futures in the USA. However, the hedging
performance of the FTSE-100 contract has not been
examined. In chapter 5 the hedging performance of this
contract is evaluated. The impact of time to maturity
and hedge duration on hedging effectiveness is examined,
as is the stability of hedge ratios through time.
However, in addition, we examine the effectiveness of
hedging strategies based on historical information and
compare these with the performance of optimal hedges.
This is an issue which has not been examined in any
earlier study.
It is evident from the above discussion that the
investigation carried out in the next four chapters
makes a significant original contribution to the
literature. In addition to undertaking research which
has not previously been carried out in relation to the
FTSE-100 stock index futures contract, where previous
research forms the base for the work carried out here,
the problems relating to that research are addressed.
The work in this thesis uses techniques which overcome
many of the problems associated with previous work.
Furthermore, for each issue addressed significant
developments are made in relation to earlier work.
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Footnotes. 
1. Knight (1921) distinguishes between risk and
uncertainty on the basis of whether or not the
probability of each possible outcome is known. If
the probabilities are known, this describes a
situation of risk. If they are not known, then a
situation of uncertainty is said to exist. However,
in the economics literature in general, and the
finance literature in particular, this distinction
is ignored and the terms risk and uncertainty are
used interchangeably.
2. Futures contracts and forward contracts have strong
similarities. Essentially, a forward contract is a
'made to measure' contract, whereas a futures
contract is 'off the peg'. Unlike forward contracts,
futures are characterised by:
(a) standardised contracts;
(b) trading through organised exchanges;
(c) the existence of a clearing house; and
(d) specific margin requirements.
All of these characteristics assist the liquidity
of futures markets. These distinguishing
characteristics are discussed in many good texts.
See, for example, Kolb (1988) and Tucker (1991).
3. A futures contract on the FTSE Eurotrack index was
introduced in 1991. However, this contract relates
to a portfolio of major european securities.
4. The FTSE-100 index is a weighted arithmetic index
of the 100 largest listed firms by capitalisation.
It has been specifically designed to mirror real
investment portfolios and to this end includes
service and manufacturing companies. The FTSE-100
was introduced in January 1984 specifically to
enable futures and options contracts on a stock
index to be established in the UK. The FTSE-100 is
officially updated every minute and some security
houses update the index continuously. The FTSE-100
index is now the most widely used benchmark of the
UK equity market.
5. The month in which the contract expires or matures
is known as the delivery month, even though with
stock index futures cash settlement takes place,
rather than delivery of the underlying asset.
6. For an index value of 2600 the initial margin
represents 3.8%, i.e. 2500/(25x2600).
7. The basis is the difference between the price of
the futures contract and the price of the instrument
in the spot market.
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8. The arbitrage arguments concerning stock index
futures and the reasons why futures prices might
deviate from their theoretical level, thus creating
an arbitrage window, are explained in detail in
Yadav and Pope (1990).
9. Ross refers to marketed capital assets such as
shares of stock and bonds as primitives (1976a,
p76).
10. The market is complete when the rank is full. This
requires that there be as many linearly independent
securities as there are states of the world. Linear
independence can be established by examination of
the determinant of the matrix. Given that the
determinant of this matrix is not equal to zero, the
matrix is nonsingular and hence there is linear
independence.
11. If a risk premium has to be paid to speculators to
encourage them to go net long then the futures price
will be below the expected future spot price. This
is known as normal backwardation and is associated
with the view of Keynes (1930) and Hicks (1946). In
contrast, if a risk premium has to be paid to
encourage speculators to go net short, the futures
price will be above the expected future spot price.
This is referred to as contango. These patterns of
prices are demonstrated in figure 1.4.
12. This passage is unchanged from the first edition
published in 1848.
13. Chapter 1 of this book was first published in the
Review of Economic Studies, 1939.
14. For a thorough and extremely interesting discussion
of the issues of market efficiency and the efficient
markets hypothesis see Fama (1970, 1991).
15. The 1986 paper by Goss is an updated version of
that of 1981, including an extended sample period.
Otherwise the two papers are very similar.
16. The Rutledge hedge is explained on page 276.
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Chapter 2: Risk and Return in Stock Index Futures. 
2.1 Introduction. 
In chapter 1 it was seen that the risk return
relationship in futures markets is of considerable
interest, and that, following Dusak (1973), the CAPM
framework has provided a means by which to investigate
this relationship in a manner which is compatible with
modern finance theory. The literature review of CAPM
studies of commodity futures highlighted a number of
important points and also demonstrated that there are a
number of shortcomings associated with previous studies.
In this chapter we investigate the risk return
characteristics of the FTSE-100 stock index futures
contract over the period 1985 to 1990, taking account of
the major shortcomings of previous studies. The main
purpose of this analysis is to establish whether this
contract can be viewed as a risky asset within a CAPM
framework by estimating the market model, as adapted for
futures. If it is found that such a relationship does
exist then the FTSE-100 stock index contract can be
viewed as a risky asset in systematic risk terms and it
would suggest that the unbiasedness hypothesis may not
hold. 1 If on the other hand, no such relationship is
found, then it is more likely that the unbiasedness
hypothesis will hold. Black (1976) makes this point
arguing that if the covariance of returns on the futures
contract with returns on the market portfolio is zero,
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the expected change in the futures price will be zero
and the futures price will be an unbiased predictor of
the future spot price. However, Black goes on to argue
that even if there is a non-zero beta, investment
decisions could be taken as if beta were zero. While
acknowledging that with a non-zero beta it is necessary
to know the value of beta (p*) to estimate futures price
changes, and thus spot prices at maturity, he argues
that
"A farmer may not want to know the mean of the
distribution of possible spot prices at time t*
[contract maturity]. He may be interested in the
discounted value of the distribution of possible
spot prices. In fact, it seems plausible that he
can make his investment decisions as if p* were
zero, even if it is not zero. He can assume that
the p* is zero and that the futures price is the
expected spot price." (Black, 1976, p174,
emphasis added).
The reason for this is that by taking up an appropriate
offsetting position in the futures market the farmer (or
indeed, an investor) can establish an overall portfolio
with a beta of zero. Hence, evidence of a non-zero beta
is not evidence of normal backwardation or contango. For
that reason, following on from the findings of this
chapter, a direct test of the expectations approach and
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market efficiency is presented in chapter 4.
Given the evidence relating to possible day of the week
effects in futures markets, this chapter estimates the
market model for weekly returns to Monday, Wednesday and
Friday. By doing so it is hoped to identify any
differences in the returns to the stock index futures
contract relating to day of the week. In addition, the
market model is estimated for futures contracts with
different times to maturity to see if there are any
differences between contracts which differ in terms of
this characteristic. The sample period is also
partitioned into sub-periods relating to before and
after October 1987 to investigate whether there are
differences resulting from the stock market crash of
that time. Finally, Roll's (1977) criticism of the
Black, Jensen and Scholes (BJS) approach to empirical
tests of the CAPM is addressed. In addition to following
the procedure for testing the CAPM which has been used
in all previous studies of futures markets, an
alternative methodology is also adopted. This
methodology follows that of Fama and MacBeth (1973).
Such an approach has not previously been employed for
studying the risk return relationship in futures
contracts.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section
discusses the CAPM as appropriate to futures markets.
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Section 2.3 presents the data used in this analysis, and
section 2.4 sets out the methodology and the reasons for
employing the approach used. Section 2.5 examines
preliminary results relating to returns, risk and time
to maturity. This is followed by the major empirical
results in section 2.6. A conclusion follows which also
details issues raised in this chapter to be discussed
later in the thesis.
2.2 The Capital Asset Pricing Model and Futures Markets. 
In a seminal article published in 1964 Sharpe developed
a model for pricing assets held as part of a widely
diversified portfolio. Sharpe argued that
"Through diversification, some of the risk
inherent in an asset can be avoided so that its
total risk is obviously not the relevant
influence on its price; unfortunately little has
been said concerning the particular risk
component which is relevant." (Sharpe, 1964,
p426).
Sharpe addresses this lack of theory and puts forward a
model of the determination of capital asset prices. The
CAPM was subsequently developed further by Lintner
(1965), Mossin (1966) and Black (1972). Sharpe derives a
linear relationship between the expected return of an
asset and the systematic (non-diversifiable) risk
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associated with that asset. That linear relationship is
known as the CAPM and can be written as:
E(R) = Rf + [E(R) - Rf ]fi i 	( 2.1)
where Ri is the return on asset i, E(R) is the expected
value of that return, Rf is the risk-free rate of
interest, Rm is the return on the market portfolio which
contains all assets, E(R) is its expected value and pi
is a measure of the systematic or non-diversifiable risk
and is measured as Cov(Ri,Rm)/Var(Rm).
The CAPM says that the return on any capital asset is
made up of a risk-free rate of return plus an additional
return to compensate for risk. This additional return
comprises the risk premium (E(Rm) - Rf ) multiplied by the
level of systematic risk,. In terms of futures
markets the CAPM implies that holders of futures
contracts will only earn above the risk-free rate of
return if there is positive systematic risk associated
with those contracts, i.e. if there is positive
covariance between the returns on futures and the
returns on the market portfolio.
Dusak (1973) was the first to recognise this arguing
that
"...futures markets are no different in
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principle from the markets for other risky
portfolio assets... differences in form should
not obscure the fundamental properties that
futures market assets share with other
investment instruments: in particular, they are
all candidates for inclusion in the investor's
portfolio." (Dusak, 1973, p1388).
Dusak therefore set out to examine whether futures
markets provide a risk premium within the context of the
CAPM. However, she points out that
"One difficulty in applying the Sharpe model of
capital asset pricing to the risk-return
relation on futures contracts is that of
defining the appropriate capital asset and its
rate of return." (Dusak, 1973, p1390-1391).
This difficulty arises because futures are traded on
margin, meaning that the purchaser of a futures contract
will typically only have to provide 5 to 10 per cent of
the value of the contract as a deposit. However, this
deposit is not a down payment, but rather it is
'good-faith' money to demonstrate that the contractual
obligations will be adhered to. In addition, the margin
can be deposited in the form of interest-bearing assets.
Consequently, at the time the contract is entered into,
the party to the contract is not having to put up
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capital in the normal sense of the phrase and hence is
not forgoing any risk-free rate of return. As a result
equation 2.1 needs to be modified before it can be
applied to futures. Equation 2.2 presents the
appropriate form for the CAPM as applied to futures:
E(R) = Pi [E(Rm) - Rf ]	 (2.2)
As can be seen, the only difference between equations
2.1 and 2.2 is that the latter does not have the
intercept term Rf.2
However, equation 2.2 cannot be estimated directly.
Rather it is necessary to transform equation 2.2 from
an ex ante model to a model which is capable of
determining Ps through empirical estimation. This is
achieved by firstly taking the market model, adapted for
futures:
Rit = ai + P i (Rmt - Rft ) + et	(2.3)
Where Rit is the return for futures contracts. Note that
this is equivalent to the normal market model except
that the left hand side of equation 2.3 has total
returns rather than returns in excess of the risk free
rate.
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Taking expectations of equation 2.3 yields:
E(R) = ai + PiE ( Rmt	 Rft)
Thus:
E(R) - ai - PiE(Rmt - Rft ) = 0
Adding this equation to the right hand side of 2.3 and
rearranging yields:
Rit = E(R) "1" Pi[( Rmt -Rft)	 E(Rmt	 Rft)]	 eit
Substituting for E(R) from equation 2.2 and rearranging
yields:
Rit = a i + p i (Rmt - Rft ) + et	(2.3)
which is an ex post form of the CAPM model.
Within a CAPM framework the finding of a p value
significantly positive and different from zero suggests
that futures are a risky asset in systematic risk terms.
Therefore if CAPM is correct, assets with a significant
positive p should offer a positive return. In other
words, it would be expected that futures prices, on
average, rise over the life of a contract. Clearly,
although the CAPM framework approaches the question from
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a different stand-point, if significant systematic risk
is found, then this would appear to be consistent with
the concept of normal backwardation. However, it should
be noted that when Keynes considered rising futures
prices as a result of futures being risky assets he was
considering total risk, rather than nondiversifiable
risk.
It is equation 2.3 which has been estimated by the
studies reviewed in the previous chapter, with
inferences being drawn on the basis of the estimated
beta values. However, this approach is subject to the
criticism put forward by Roll (1977) that tests based on
the approaches of Black, Jensen and Scholes (1973,) and
Fama and MacBeth (1974, hereafter FM) are tautological.
However, the FM approach has been defended against this
criticism. To understand these arguments it is important
to distinguish between the two methodologies.
With the BJS approach betas and average rates of return
are computed in the same periods of time. This is
consistent with the approach adopted by Dusak and
others. 3 However, with the FM approach betas and returns
are computed for different sample periods. Betas are
estimated for one period and these estimated values are
then used to predict rates of return in a subsequent
period. While Roll's criticism that tests are
tautological may be relevant to the BJS approach, it is
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not true of the FM methodology. The reason for this is
that tautologies are definitional and as such will have
no predictive ability. In contrast, the FM approach
tests the CAPM by using estimated betas from one period
to predict future returns. In this study both the BJS
and the FM approach are therefore adopted.
2.3 Data. 
In this study betas are estimated for the LIFFE FTSE-100
stock index futures contract using the market model
adjusted for futures (equation 2.3). There are three
stages in the analysis in this chapter. These are
discussed in the next section. Here we set out and
discuss the data used in these three stages.
In all three stages the model is estimated for weekly
returns. The CAPM provides no insight into what the
appropriate interval for analysis should be. It
therefore becomes a matter of practicality. It is
clearly possible to use any interval for which data is
available. Thus, for the analysis carried out here, it
would have been possible to use daily, weekly, biweekly,
triweekly, monthly or even longer intervals. There has
been considerable discussion of whether the length of
intervals affects the beta estimates. 4 Levhari and Levy
(1977) calculated betas for stocks over the period 1948
to 1968 using intervals of between one and thirty
months. They found very considerable differences in
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estimated betas as the interval varied. Hawawini (1983)
carried out estimates of betas for shorter intervals,
ranging from one day to one month. The period analysed
was 1970 to 1973. He similarly found considerable
differences in the estimated betas. Thus, it is clear
that beta estimates may be sensitive to the interval
used in the analysis.
Monthly intervals have frequently been used in studies
of stocks. However, given that one of the concerns in
this chapter is to investigate the possibility of day of
the week effects, the use of monthly (or longer) returns
is inappropriate. As far as daily returns are concerned,
these too seem inappropriate given the fact that hedgers
would not typically hold their position for periods of
less than one week. Weekly returns therefore appear to
be the most appropriate for the analysis to be carried
out here. One of the main reasons for not using weekly
(or shorter interval) data in studies of individual
stocks has been that some stocks are not widely traded
and thus week end data can therefore be an inappropriate
measure of true price. This is not a problem with the
data to be used here.
There are four FTSE-100 Index futures contracts traded
in each year with settlement taking place in March,
June, September and December. Closing prices for
Monday, Wednesday and Friday were obtained for these
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contracts over the period January 1985 to December 1990.
This data was then used to construct three series of
weekly returns relating to the three days of the week
under consideration. The closing futures prices were
transformed into returns data according to equation 2.4:
Rit = ln(Pit/Pit-i)	 (2.4)
where Pit and Pit_l are the closing futures prices for
contract i at times t and t-1, respectively. Thus, R it is
the log relative weekly return for futures contracts.
In addition to the interval used for estimating betas
being of potential impact on the values estimated, other
factors can influence the values obtained. In
particular, there are potential problems relating to the
proxy for the risk free rate, the measurement period
and, most importantly in this case, the proxy for the
market portfolio. Each of these is now considered in
turn.
As far as the risk-free rate is concerned Harrington
(1987) states
"The risk-free rate (R f ) is the least discussed
of the three CAPM factors. Whether in academic
research or in practical applications of the
CAPM, the 90-day Treasury bill rate has been
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virtually the only proxy used for the risk-free
asset. Remember that this rate is only a proxy
for the risk-free rate, which must be estimated,
just as beta and the market return must be."
(p149).
Harrington goes on to argue that there are both
theoretical and practical problems associated with using
the Treasury bill as a proxy. With regard to theoretical
problems she points out that the risk-free proxy should
have no variance and no covariance with returns from the
market. Zero variance can, however, only exist for a
one-period world. With more than one time period, there
will be variances in risk-free returns and there will
thus be some reinvestment risk. As far as practical
problems are concerned the Treasury bill rate is not a
pure market rate (it is partly influenced by the
government through control of either interest rates
directly or the money supply) and rates are volatile,
partly due to changes in inflation.
In spite of these criticisms, Harrington acknowledges
that there is no clear answer to the question relating
to which proxy to use. She points out that the 30- and
90-day Treasury bill rates are the most widely used
proxies and that the choice of proxy is up to the
practitioner.
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While acknowledging the problems of using short-term
Treasury bill rates, there does not appear to be a
superior alternative to be used. For this reason, in
this study we use the UK Treasury bill one-month middle
rate adjusted to a weekly figure as a proxy for the
risk-free interest rate. By choosing the one-month rate,
an interest rate for an interval closest to that over
which betas are being estimated is obtained.
As far as the measurement period is concerned, it is
necessary to ensure that enough observations are
available to allow a statistically significant sample.
In addition, the period should not be too long as this
might mask significant changes throughout the period.
The period for which analysis is carried out in this
study is from 4 January 1985 to 28 December 1990. The
first eight months for which futures on this contract
were traded (May 1984 - December 1984) are excluded from
the analysis to ensure that there is no bias due to
possible mispricing in the early months of the contract.
With the exception of these eight months of data, all
the data available at the time the analysis was carried
out is used. This yields approximately 300 observations.
In addition, following tests for structural breaks, the
data is partitioned at the crash of October 1987, to
allow for differences in betas in different time
periods. This sub-period analysis is undertaken with
sample sizes of at least one hundred and forty.
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The final problem to be considered here relates to the
market proxy. Roll (1977) has demonstrated the
considerable problems associated with choosing a proxy
for the market portfolio. The market portfolio is a
portfolio comprising all risky assets, both marketable
and nonmarketable. In practice not only do market
indexes, such as the FT All Share index, fail to
incorporate all risky assets, but it is impossible to
establish a measure which would incorporate all such
assets and hence would be a true reflection of the
market portfolio. Indeed, it is impossible to observe
the true market portfolio.
In spite of this criticism estimates of betas and tests
of CAPM have continued. CAPM has proved to be a very
influential model both academically and amongst
practitioners, and in order to operationalise the notion
of systematic risk a proxy has to be found. For this
reason, while stock market indexes do have shortcomings,
they probably represent the best set from which a proxy
can be drawn. Given the nature of the market portfolio,
of those stock market indexes available the one with the
widest coverage is the most appropriate. In this study
we therefore use the FT All Share index.
This is comparable with the market proxy used by Dusak
(1973), namely the value-weighted S&P 500 Index. In the
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previous chapter it was seen that this proxy was
criticised by Carter, Rausser and Schmitz (1983) who
suggested an alternative proxy giving equal weight to
the S&P 500 stock index and the Dow-Jones commodity
futures index and that, in turn, Marcus (1984)
criticised this choice. The main point of contention
related to the inclusion or otherwise of commodities in
the market proxy. However, even giving a small weight to
commodities, as suggested by Marcus and used by BCT, may
be misleading. Black argues that
"To the extent that stocks of commodities are
held by corporations, they are implicitly
included in the market portfolio." (Black, 1976,
p172)
By using the FT All Share index we avoid the potential
problem of double-counting and also avoid problems of
possible under-representation of certain assets,
including commodities, from using a restricted index
such as the FT30 or FTSE-100.
There is one other very important point regarding the
market portfolio proxy in relation to this study.
Previous studies of futures contracts within a CAPM
framework have examined agricultural and metal
commodities. Thus they are focusing on futures on
individual nondiversified assets. The futures contract
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under investigation in this study is that written on the
FTSE-100, which is itself a broadly diversified
portfolio. Thus, the underlying asset is likely to have
little diversifiable risk, and, more importantly here,
is likely to be highly correlated with the chosen market
proxy. Unfortunately, this problem cannot be overcome,
since this correlation is likely for any suitable market
proxy. However, it does suggest that a beta in the
region of unity is to be expected. Given that current
futures prices are believed to be more volatile than are
current spot prices, and that the market proxy is likely
to be highly correlated with the spot asset, a beta in
excess of unity may be expected. In addition, given the
correlation between the asset underlying the futures
contract and the market proxy, any results must be
interpreted with caution.
For the risk-free proxy and for the market portfolio
proxy, data relates to Monday, Wednesday and Friday
closing figures, as appropriate. Returns data for the
market portfolio is constructed along similar lines to
the returns on futures and all returns data are in logs.
All data were obtained from Datastream.
2.4 Methodology. 
As stated in the previous section, there are three
stages to the analysis undertaken. The first two are
comparable in approach to previous studies (i.e. the BJS
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approach). However, additional factors to those examined
in previous studies are analysed. The third stage adopts
the FM methodology.
2.4.1 The standard (BJS) approach. 
In the first part of the analysis using this approach,
data relating to contracts with settlement in June and
December only are utilised. The market model (equation
2.3) is estimated using the ordinary least squares
method for the three series of weekly returns: to
Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays. In this part of the
analysis no account is taken of time to maturity. The
data comprise weekly returns over the last six months of
each June and December contract. Thus it includes
returns in the last week before contract expiration and
returns in the week up to six months prior to
expiration. In addition to undertaking analysis for the
whole period (1985-1990) each category of estimate was
carried out on two sub-periods, up to October 1987 and
from November 1987. Data relating to the month around
the 1987 crash was omitted from this sub-period
analysis.
The second part of the study uses data on the four
futures contracts for each year (i.e. with settlement in
March, June, September and December). For reasons set
out in section 2.6 closing prices for Wednesdays only
are used. In this part of the analysis the data were
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partitioned along similar lines to that used by Elam and
Vaught. Two time-series were created; one relating to
weekly returns on contracts with less than 3 months to
maturity and the other to weekly returns on contracts
with between 3 and 6 months to maturity. Thus. for
example, for January 1986 Wednesday closing prices for
the March 1986 and June 1986 contracts are used. Those
relating to the March contract are utilised for the
time-series for contracts having less than 3 months to
maturity and those to the June contract, for contracts
having between 3 and 6 months to run. For April 1986,
the relevant data are prices on the June contract for
the first time-series and the September contract for the
second. By comparing the results of the second part of
the analysis to those of the first part, the impact of
time to maturity on futures returns should be
established, something which has not previously been
done.
There are good grounds for believing that there may be
differences in the risk return relationship with respect
to time to maturity. Firstly, as was noted in chapter 1
the hedging performance of futures may be influenced by
time to maturity. In addition, it is to be expected that
the vast majority of hedging activity takes place using
the nearby contract. As a result, futures contracts with
more than three months to maturity may have different
risk return characteristics to those for the nearby
100
contract. Similarly, it is likely that futures prices
further from maturity will be less good predictors of
future spot prices.
More importantly, however, the volume of futures trading
in any contract varies substantially throughout the life
of the contract. In particular, since most hedging
activity is carried out using the nearby contract,
trading in contracts with substantially more than three
months to maturity is typically very thin. It is only as
investors move out of the nearby contract close to
maturity of that contract, that activity in the contract
next nearest to maturity picks up. So, for example, in
late March as the maturity of the March contract
approaches, market participants will close out their
positions in the March contract. At the same time those,
wishing to maintain an open futures position are likely
to move into the June contract. As a result both trading
volume and open interest change markedly over the life
of a futures contract.
This view is borne out by figures 2.1 to 2.10. Figures
2.1 to 2.5 show the pattern of trading volume over the
life of the FTSE-100 stock index futures contracts.
Figure 2.1 relates to average trading volume for up to
120 days 6 prior to maturity for all FTSE-100 stock index
futures contracts traded over the period December 1984
to September 1992 6 . Figures 2.2 - 2.5 show the same
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information for each contract month. Thus, for example,
figure 2.2 relates to volume of trading for March
contracts and figure 2.3 to that for June contracts.
Figures 2.6 - 2.10 provides information on open interest
on the same basis.
A clear pattern emerges from these diagrams. For the
period relating to between approximately 120 to 80
trading days prior to maturity trading volume and open
interest are very low. In the period from about 80 to
60 days prior to maturity both volume and open interest
increase as one contract matures. There is then a
substantial rise in both of these variables as the
contract comes to dominate for the remaining months to
maturity. Figures 2.2 - 2.5 and 2.7 - 2.10 demonstrate
that there is no discernible difference in these
patterns between contracts maturing in different months.
These patterns clearly give grounds for the view that
the risk return relationship should be examined
separately for contracts with differing times to
maturity. Ideally, it would be interesting to carry out
analysis for more sets of data based on time to
maturity. For example, it would be desirable to examine
the risk return relationship for contracts with less
than one month to maturity, between one and two months,
etc. However, given that the futures for this contract
only mature quarterly such analysis could only be
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carried out by using noncontinuous or artificially
constructed data. It was therefore decided to carry out
analysis based on the nearby contract (0-3 months to
maturity) and the next but one contract to maturity (3-6
months from maturity). Once again, analysis is carried
out for the whole period and for the two-sub-periods.
In all of the analysis which adopts this methodology the
hypothesis to be tested is that returns on the stock
index futures contract will be systematically linked to
the returns on the market portfolio. In addition, if the
CAPM adequately explains returns on the futures contract
then the intercept term (alpha in equation 2.3)) will be
insignificantly different from zero.
2.4.2 The predictive (FM) approach. 
The third stage of the analysis involves further
partitioning of the data. The two sub-periods relating
to before and after the October 1987 crash are
investigated separately. In this stage the market model
is estimated for the first seventy observations (weeks)
for the first sub-period and the first eighty
observations for the second sub-period. The estimated
betas are then used to predict weekly returns for the
remaining weeks of the sub-periods. The predicted
returns are then compared with the actual returns for
the period and inferences drawn. This comparison is made
by subtracting the predicted returns from actual returns
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to yield 'excess returns'. The hypothesis that excess
returns are equal to zero is then tested.
In testing for returns predictability on the basis of
beta estimates, only data relating to weekly returns to
Wednesdays for the nearby contract are utilised (i.e.
with less than three months to maturity). The reason for
restricting the data set to Wednesdays is the same as
that for the analysis of time to maturity. Given that
the vast majority of trading takes place in the nearby
futures and that the purpose of this analysis is not to
explicitly examine the time to maturity effect, only the
nearby contract data is utilised.
2.5 Preliminary Results. 
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 present the mean and standard
deviation of weekly returns, together with the number of
observations used in the analysis for the whole period
and for the two sub-periods. In addition, t statistics
relating to the test of whether the mean returns are
significantly different from zero are also included.
Table 2.1 relates to weekly returns to Monday, Wednesday
and Friday, taking no account of time to maturity.
Table 2.2 presents information for weekly returns to
Wednesday, for contracts with less than 3 months and 3-6
months to maturity. In all cases returns for the whole
period and for the second sub-period are considerably
smaller than for the first sub-period, reflecting the
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Table 2.1: Means and standard deviations of weekly
returns to Mondays. Wednesdays and Fridays. 
Mean SD t
statistic
n
Week to: 1985 - 1990
Monday 0.0008 0.0287 0.4848 301
Wednesday 0.0006 0.0261 0.4167 301
Friday 0.0010 0.0287 0.5921 304
1985 - Oct.	 1987
Monday 0.0037 0.0202 2.1659 140
Wednesday 0.0035 0.0192 2.1830 140
Friday 0.0039 0.0204 2.2569 141
Nov.	 1987 - 1990
Monday 0.0004 0.0277 0.1972 157
Wednesday 0.0006 0.0228 0.3513 157
Friday 0.0011 0.0240 0.5542 159
t statistics relate to the test of whether mean
returns are significantly different from zero
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Table 2.2: Means and standard deviations of weekly
returns according to time to maturity. 
Mean	 SD	 t	 n
statistic
Months to
maturity:
1985 - 1990
< 3 months 0.0006 0.0257	 0.3971 302
3-6 months 0.0009 0.0261	 0.6037 279
1985 - Oct.	 1987
< 3 months 0.0039 0.0191	 2.3593 135
3-6 months 0.0047 0.0191	 2.7875 130
Nov. 1987 - 1990
< 3 months 0.0004 0.0218	 0.2206 163
3-6 months 0.0004 0.0219	 0.2070 145
t statistics relate to the test of whether mean
returns are significantly different from zero
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impact of the October 1987 crash and relatively low
returns thereafter. There is evidence of differences in
returns to different days of the week, although all
returns are relatively low. For the whole period the
weekly returns correspond to annual returns of only
4.2%, 3.1% and 5.2% to Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays
respectively. Indeed, mean returns for the whole period
and for the period after the crash are insignificantly
different from zero at the 5% confidence level.
As	 is	 to be expected, the standard deviation of
returns are also greater for the whole period and for
the second sub-period. In contrast to CCC (1990) there
is no clear evidence of contract maturity impacting on
the standard deviation of returns. As far as a day of
the week effect is concerned weekly returns to a
Wednesday have a lower standard deviation than do those
to Mondays and Fridays and the mean return is also less
(with the exception of weekly returns to Monday post
October 1987).
2.6 Empirical Results. 
In table 2.3 we present the results of the estimation of
the market model for weekly returns to Monday, Wednesday
and Friday.	 The first set of results in table 2.3
relates to the whole period and the other results to the
two sub-periods. Strong similarities are evident across
the	 estimations.	 All of the R2 s are high. The
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Table 2.3: Estimated market model coefficients for
weekly returns to Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays 
Week a i 	 SE(al)	 pi	 SE()	 R2	 FscX
to:
1985 - 1990
M .0013+ .0005 1.0607* .0203 .9140
W .0013* .0004 1.0660* .0188 .9151
F .0013* .0004 1.1104* .0179 .9272
1985 - Oct.	 1987
M .0006 .0006 1.0652 .0432 .8754
W .0006 .0005 1.0459 .0293 .9142
F .0007 .0005 1.0170 .0261 .9160
Nov.	 1987 - 1990
M .0019* .0005 1.1175* .0229 .9389
W .0019* .0007 1.0971* .0359 .8575
F .0019* .0005 1.1328* .0258 .9246
11.7503@
2.7359
18.9690
19.1193@
2.4507
6.4762$
8.5827@
3.5997
5.2705$
* Denotes a significantly different from 0 or p
significantly different from 1 at 1% level
+ Denotes a significantly different from 0 or p
significantly different from 1 at 5% level
x FBc denotes the F-statistic for the test of serial
correlation
@ denotes significant at the 1% level
$ denotes significant at the 5% level
M, W, F relate to Monday, Wednesday and Friday
respectively.
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estimated Ps are all significantly different from zero
at the 1% level and all fall within the range 1.01 to
1.14. Given the nature of the futures contract under
consideration and the market proxy used it was to be
expected that Ps would approximate unity. However,
there is a difference in the values of the estimated
betas for the periods before and after the crash of
1987. For the period up to October 1987 the betas are
insignificantly different from unity at the 5% level of
confidence. However, for the period post-October 1987
the estimated betas are significantly different from
unity. This suggests that the FTSE-100 stock index
futures contract has become a riskier asset in
systematic risk terms following the stock market crash.
The estimated values of alpha are also worthy of note.
For the three estimations within each period there is
evidence of consistent values of alpha. However, while
the values of a for the whole period and for the second
sub-period are positive and significantly different from
zero, they are not significant for the first
sub-period. Thus it appears that prior to the crash of
1987 the market model is adequately specified and that
systematic risk explained returns to the futures index
contract, but that post-October 1987 the futures index
offered excess profits. This result could be explained
by the fact that in the wake of the crash, a number of
smaller brokers and analysts ceased business, resulting
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in a reduction in the search for information. This in
turn could lead to pricing inefficiency with the
consequence that unexploited arbitrage opportunities led
to abnormal returns being earned. While the question of
efficiency is beyond the scope of this chapter, this
finding does suggest that the efficiency of the market
for the futures index contract does need to be
addressed. It is therefore examined in chapter 4.
The final column in table 2.3 presents the statistic for
the test of serial correlation. The test statistic is F
distributed and shows that for Mondays and Fridays there
is evidence of serial correlation. However, for
Wednesdays the test statistic reveals no evidence of
serial correlation. Clearly, there are a number of
reasons why serial correlation may be observed.
However, given the above findings, a reasonable
interpretation would appear to be that a day of the week
effect is in evidence with some misspecification being
evident for the estimations for Mondays and Fridays.
This may be related to higher volumes of activity in
futures trading taking place on Mondays and Fridays as
fund managers adjust their portfolios to avoid any
possible beginning and end of week effects. Again,
further investigation of this issue is beyond the scope
of this chapter, but the findings again call into
question the efficiency of trading in the futures index.
120
Table 2.4 presents the results of estimations taking
account of time to maturity. In the light of results
presented above, estimations were only carried out for
weekly returns to Wednesday. In terms of the size and
significance of the betas the results are consistent
with the findings presented in table 2.3. The betas for
contracts with three or more months to maturity are
marginally lower than for those with less than three
months to maturity. While this might suggest that
contracts with longer time to maturity are less risky in
terms of systematic risk, the differences are very
small. However, they do conform to the findings of CCC
(1990) for metal futures. In all cases the beta
estimates are significantly different from unity at the
5% level, with the exception of the beta for contracts
with between three and six months to maturity
pre-October 1987.
The general pattern of alpha coefficients is not
affected by the partitioning, with significant values
for the whole period and the latter sub-period, but not
for the first sub-period. However, the extent of excess
returns appears to be higher for contracts with longer
time to maturity. Nonetheless, these findings of little
difference between contracts with different times to
maturity is surprising given the evidence presented
above of very thin trading in contracts with more than
three months to maturity.
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Table 2.4: Estimated market model coefficients for
Wednesday weekly returns according to time to maturity. 
Months ai	 SE(a)	 Pi	 SE(Pi)	 R2	 Fscx
to
maturity:
1985 - 1990
<3 .0010* .0003 1.0705* .0149 .9451 1.1040
3-6 .0014 * .0004 1.0624* .0153 .9459 0.4713
1985-Oct. 1987
<3 .0004 .0004 1.0632+ .0268 .9220 3.2473
3-6 .0009 .0005 1.0533 .0280 .9173 4.0598$
Nov 87-90
<3 .0014* .0005 1.0973* .0245 .9259 2.8931
3-6 .0018 * .0004 1.0931* .0248 .9314 1.6283
Footnotes as table 2.3
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Table 2.5 presents the results of analysis using the FM
approach. The first two columns show beta values and the
standard error of the beta values estimated for the
first part of each of the two sub-periods. The other
columns relate to the second part of each sub-period.
For these periods returns are predicted on the basis of
the estimated beta values from the earlier period. The
difference between actual returns in the second part of
each sub-period and the predicted returns are referred
to as excess returns. The three columns show the mean
value of these excess returns, the standard deviations
of the returns and the t statistic relating to the
hypothesis that mean excess returns are zero.
The results presented in table 2.5 from the analysis
using the FM approach confirm the findings of the
analysis using the BJS approach. Before the October 1987
crash the excess returns to the stock index futures
contract are not significantly different from zero. Thus
futures returns compensate for the systematic risk and
are as predicted by the CAPM. This evidence of no excess
returns suggests that pre-crash the contract is priced
efficiently. However, post-crash there is evidence of
excess returns. The mean of the excess returns is
significantly different from zero for this period. In
particular, actual returns post October 1987 are higher
than those predicted by the CAPM, suggesting that the
market may be inefficient.
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Table 2.5 Estimated beta values, and mean and standard
deviation of excess returns for Wednesday weekly
returns. 
Sample
Period	 Pi	 SE(Pi)	 Excess returns
(weeks)	 Mean	 a	 t+
1 - 70	 1.0354	 .0332
71 - 135	 -.00036	 .00623 -.0462
140 - 219	 1.0571	 .03867
220 - 302	 .00182 * .00557 2.9690
* Denotes mean excess returns significantly different
from zero at the 1% level.
+ t statistic relates to the null hypothesis mean excess
returns are zero.
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2.7 Conclusions and Implications for Further Research. 
This chapter has considered the risk and return
associated with the LIFFE FTSE-100 stock index futures
contract within a CAPM framework over the period
1985-90. This has been done against a background of a
lack of study in this area in terms of using UK data and
analysing financial futures. In order to examine the
possibility of a day of the week effect, weekly returns
to Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays have been examined.
In addition, although the issue of a possible impact on
returns of the time to maturity has been acknowledged,
previous studies had failed to analyse returns when both
accounting for time to maturity and making no allowance
for time to maturity. This study has sought to rectify
this position. In addition, previous studies suffer from
only using the BJS approach to testing the CAPM. This
approach has been strongly criticised by Roll (1977). In
this study we not only adopt the BJS approach, but also
employ the FM methodology for testing the CAPM.
A number of interesting results have emerged from this
analysis:
(1) In all of the analysis carried out the beta values
were found to be in the range 1.01-1.14. This relative
closeness to unity (even given that post-October 1987
betas were statistically different from unity) conforms
to expectations about beta values on a stock index
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futures contract. Indeed, the results suggest that a
portfolio comprising the market portfolio and selling
the futures index in approximately equal proportions
would lead to a situation of near zero systematic risk.
(2) While the findings suggest that futures index
returns are adequately explained by the CAPM up to
October 1987, after the crash returns in excess of those
due to systematic risk could be earned from the futures
index. In addition, for weekly returns to Mondays and
Fridays there	 are serious problems	 of serial
correlation. These results raise doubts regarding the
efficiency of trading in the futures index. Clearly,
this issue is worthy of further examination.
(3) As far as the time to maturity of a contract is
concerned, it does appear to have some impact on futures
returns. In particular, contracts further from maturity
appear to be associated with less systematic risk and
offer higher excess returns. Given the evidence on
trading volume and open interest presented in figures
2.1 - 2.10 this finding is not surprising. Indeed, a
finding of excess returns in thinly traded markets is
consistent with findings for stock markets (see, for
example, Butler and Malaikah (1992) and Wong, Hui and
Chan (1992)).
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(4) The results of the analysis using the FM methodology
are broadly in line with those using the BJS approach.
This suggests that the criticism raised by Roll
concerning the tautological nature of tests of the CAPM
may not be of great practical significance7.
There are various implications of the analysis carried
out and reported in this chapter. Firstly, there is
clear evidence that the stock index contract is a risky
asset in systematic risk terms. This would suggest that
the asset should offer a risk premium. However, as was
noted earlier, there will be strong correlation between
the returns on the market portfolio used in this study
and the asset which underlies the futures contract under
investigation. It is to be expected that the futures
price will be systematically related to the spot price.
Thus while there is evidence of a systematic
relationship between futures returns and market returns,
this may be due more to a relationship between changes
in spot and futures prices. Thus the finding that
returns on the FTSE-100 futures contract vary
systematically with returns on the market must be
interpreted with caution. This finding may be due to
futures being treated as any other investment instrument
within a CAPM framework. On the other hand, as the
market index is not substantially different from the
spot asset underlying the futures contract, the finding
does not necessarily imply such a conclusion. Further,
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as Black (1976) points out, a positive beta does not
necessarily imply that investors will treat the asset as
if it has a positive beta. In this case evidence of
systematic risk is not evidence of a risk premium.
For these reasons, further investigation is necessary
before conclusions about the applicability of CAPM to
this futures contract can be drawn. In particular, it is
necessary to explicitly test for the existence of a risk
premium. This is undertaken in chapter 4 by testing the
unbiasedness hypothesis. If the unbiasedness hypothesis
is found to hold, then it would suggest that a risk
premium does not exist for this asset and the CAPM may
not be an appropriate framework within which to examine
the FTSE-100 stock index futures contract.
A second issue to emerge from this investigation is that
the market for the FTSE-100 stock index futures contract
may be inefficient. This point is raised by the finding
of serial correlation in returns for Monday and Friday
weekly returns and by the finding of positive alpha
values. Since any test of a pricing model is a joint
test of that model and efficiency, the test of the
unbiasedness hypothesis to be carried out in chapter 4
is therefore also a test of efficiency.
However, before going on to examine the unbiasedness
hypothesis and market efficiency in chapter 4, another
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issue arises from this analysis which is also of
considerable importance. In particular, given the
evidence from this chapter of excess returns on futures
over the period investigated, it is possible that
speculators were encouraged into the market. As was
demonstrated in chapter 1, there is considerable concern
among spot market participants that the activities of
this group of market participants could have an impact
on the market for the underlying asset and it is
therefore important to investigate the volatility of the
spot market pre- and post-futures trading. This
investigation is undertaken in the next chapter.
Finally, the evidence of betas near to unity suggests
that futures on the stock index will allow market
participants to achieve a zero beta portfolio. Given
that the underlying asset has practically no
diversifiable risk, this suggests that this futures
contract will be extremely useful in hedging risk faced
in the stock market. The hedging effectiveness of
futures is investigated in chapter 5.
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Footnotes. 
1. The unbiasedness hypothesis was mentioned 	 in
chapter 1 and is discussed in detail in chapter 4.
2. The concept of a rate of return is somewhat
problematic when no actual investment has been made.
Dusak views the rate of return as the change in
price over the period as a proportion of the price
at the beginning of the period (i.e. (Pt+i - PO/PO-
3. While the approach adopted by Dusak and others to
examine futures within a CAPM framework is not
identical with that adopted by BJS, the two
approaches are consistent in that in both cases
betas and average rates of return are computed for
the same period.
4. At one level the actual beta estimates found
in this study are not particularly important.
Rather, what is important is whether the futures
contract under consideration is a risky asset in
systematic risk terms. Nonetheless, the sizes of the
betas estimated will be of interest
5. There are approximately 60 to 65 trading days
between contract maturities. Thus a 120 trading day
period represents slightly less than a six month
period.
6. The period for which volume data is shown is
greater than that used in the analysis in this
chapter. This is because analysis carried out in
later chapters uses data for longer periods than
that used here. The evidence on volume presented
here is relevant to some of that later analysis.
7. It is recognised that the concern over previous
tests of the CAPM being a tautology represents only
a minor strand of his critique of tests of the CAPM.
Nonetheless, it is a criticism which subsequent
studies have sought to address and the finding here
suggests that this may not be a major source of
problems.
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Chapter 3: Futures Trading, Information and Spot Price 
Volatility. 
3.1 Introduction. 
In chapter 1 it was shown that the impact of futures
trading on the volatility of prices in the spot market
has been an area of concern from the earliest days of
futures trading. This concern stems from the belief of
spot market participants that the activities of
speculators in futures markets will destabilise spot
prices. It was argued that previous studies suffer from
having taken too narrow a focus. In particular, previous
studies have failed to recognise the link between
information and volatility.
The question of the volatility of market prices has also
been an area of active concern in the efficient markets
literature in recent years. For example, DeBondt and
Thaler (1985, 1987) have argued that stock markets
overreact to information, with the implication that
those markets are inefficient. The results of DeBondt
and Thaler suggest that those stocks which generate high
returns (they refer to these stocks as winners) in one
period tend to underperform in a subsequent period, and
those which underperform in one period (losers)
outperform in a subsequent period. The implication of
these results is that stock prices which overshoot will
have a reversal which is predictable from past return
data alone, violating the weak form of the efficient
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markets hypothesis.
The results of DeBondt and Thaler have been questioned
by, among others, Chan (1988) and Ball and Kothari
(1989). They argue that the results obtained by DeBondt
and Thaler are due to a failure to adjust returns for
the level of risk. Nonetheless, the issue of stock
market volatility is still of active concern to
researchers. The volatility of prices also lies at the
heart of the variance bounds literature discussed in
chapter 1 and examined more fully in chapter 4. It is
therefore important, in examining the role of stock
index futures, to analyse the impact on the underlying
market of the introduction of futures trading on the
FTSE-100 stock index contract. In doing this, however,
it is essential that the methodology adopted allows
examination of the link between information and
volatility.
The impact of futures trading on spot price volatility
is the subject of this chapter and the link between
information and volatility is examined here by use of
the	 generalised	 autoregressive	 conditional
heteroskedasticity (GARCH) family of statistical
techniques. In the next section theoretical issues
relating to the link between information and volatility
are discussed. The methodology adopted in this chapter
is set out in section 3.3. This is followed in section
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3.4 by a description of the data used in the study.
Section 3.5 presents and discusses the empirical results
emerging from the study and the final section presents
concluding remarks.
3.2 Theoretical Considerations. 
The past debate about the role of speculators and the
impact of futures trading on spot price volatility,
discussed in chapter 1, has characterised increased
volatility as undesirable, or 'bad', and a reduction in
volatility as desirable. However, this view is
misleading in that it fails to take account of the
connecting link between information and volatility. The
debate about the impact of speculators and futures
trading on price volatility can more fruitfully be
examined within the context of the efficient markets
hypothesis (EMH). The EMH tells us that prices in a
market depend upon the information which is currently
available in that market. When new information becomes
available in an efficient market, prices will adjust to
reflect that new information l . Thus price movements, and
hence price volatility, are directly related to
information in an efficient market.
Cox (1976) argues that there are two reasons why futures
trading can alter the amount of available information.
Firstly, futures trading attracts an additional group of
traders to a market, namely speculators, who might
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otherwise not participate in the market. Marshall (1923)
argued that it was in the interests of speculators to be
well informed. Hence, in pursuing their own interest
they are bringing good quality information to the
market. However, the link between this information and
volatility is not made. On the contrary, Marshall argues
in relation to speculators in futures that
"Their influence certainly tends to lessen the
amplitude of price variations from place to
place and from year to year." (Marshall, 1923,
p262).
Clearly, this is in contrast to the view of the impact
of information within the EMH literature.
The second reason why futures trading can alter the
amount of available information is that since futures
trading incurs less transactions costs than does trading
in the spot market, when new information does become
available it may be transmitted to the market more
quickly. This is the standard argument of operational
efficiency (low transactions costs) assisting
allocational efficiency.
From the point of view of the efficiency of financial
markets it is reasonable to argue that if futures
trading does increase the amount of information
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available, then spot price volatility will increase. As
Stoll and Whaley argue
"...we must distinguish between message and
messenger. Financial markets are the economy's
messenger... Competing markets play an important
role in determining that the messenger does not
manipulate, distort, or delay the message...
[F]utures and other recent financial innovations
expand the routes over which messages may
travel, which increases the likelihood that the
correct message gets through." (1988, p20).
However, Cox argues that while the additional traders
brought to the market by the introduction of futures
contracts may be better informed about future prices
than are traders in the spot market, equally they may be
less well informed. Hence, again from a theoretical
point of view the impact of futures trading is not
unambiguous. Indeed, Goss and Yamey state
"In principle, futures markets are neutral as to
the effects of speculation on prices and price
movements. Careful analysis and examination of
the evidence are necessary to establish its
effects in particular markets." (1978b, p30)
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Similarly, Marshall argues that
"...the power of selling the future command of a
thing, not yet in possession, is liable to
abuse. But, when used by able and honest men, it
is beneficial: as is shown by the havoc, caused
by unorganized speculation". (Marshall, 1923,
p264).
However, in well developed markets such as the London
Stock Exchange and LIFFE, which are largely dominated by
institutional investors, it is difficult to believe that
speculators will be ill-informed. Indeed, the
description by MacDonald and Taylor (1989) of commodity
market participants as highly motivated, highly
professional individuals with instant access to vast
information sets (see quotation on page 57 in chapter 1)
seems equally, if not more, applicable to those
participating in the market for stock index futures.
If the view that the additional traders brought to the
market by the introduction of futures trading are well
informed is accepted, then a direct link between
information and volatility can be established. The
arguments of Cox that futures trading might increase
available information does not necessarily imply that
information becomes available which would not otherwise.
Rather, it may simply be that information becomes
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available earlier. Thus the rate of flow of information
increases, as does the rate at which the information is
impounded into prices. Hence, volatility of prices will
increase.
The above argument is essentially intuitive. Ross (1989)
presents a formal theoretical connection between
information and volatility. He is concerned with the
relationship between the timing of the release of
information and price volatility. Ross uses the no
arbitrage methodology developed by Ross (1976b) and Cox
and Ross (1976), and subsequently extended by Ross
(1978), Harrison and Kreps (1979) and others.
Ross (1989) begins by assuming an arbitrage-free
economy, with prices generated by a martingale process
and a pricing standard (or asset pricing model), q. By
letting:
Lip = ppdt + adz p	(3.1)
P
where p is price, a two parameter random variable, with
mean pp and standard deviation a p , and z is unit normal.
Ross demonstrates (theorem 1) that expected returns
satisfy the following generalised security market line
equation:
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Pp - r = - cov(p,q)	 (3.2)
where r is the rate of interest.
He then assumes that information is generated by a
process of the form:
ds = psdt + asdzs	 (3.3)
s
where this process is used to predict the value of s at
a future time T, ST. Equation 3.3 describes the change
in the rate of flow of information, s. By further
assuming that s follows a lognormal process and that an
asset exists with a value at time T which is given by
ST:
PT = ST
	 (3.4)
the following pricing relation is obtained:
p = se(Pi s - r + cov(q, ․ ))(T-t)	 (3.5)
From this we have:
dp = ds - [ps - r + cov(q, ․ )]dt	 (3.6)
P	 s
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Substituting in from equations 3.1 and 3.3 gives:
ppdt + adzp
 = [r - cov(q, ․ )]dt + asdzs
which, from equation 3.2, implies:
adzp = asdzs
and:
ap = as	 (3.7)
Equation 3.7 corresponds to Ross's theorem 2 which
states that the variance of price change equals the rate
(or variance) of information flow. This theorem implies
that if the volatility of prices is not equal to the
rate at which information arrives then arbitrage is
possible. Thus Ross formally demonstrates the intuitive
argument discussed above and concludes that
"In an arbitrage-free economy, the volatility of
prices is directly related to the rate of flow
of information to the market." (Ross, 1989,
p16).
In the context of the impact of futures markets on spot
market volatility, if futures trading does increase the
rate of flow of information, then we would expect spot
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prices to exhibit increased volatility. Thus, in
examining spot price volatility pre- and post-futures,
it is important to use a technique which is capable of
examining this link.
3.3 Methodology. 
3.3.1 Introduction. 
This chapter examines the impact of the introduction of
futures trading on the FTSE-100 stock index contract on
the volatility of prices in the underlying spot market.
By examining this issue it will be seen whether the
introduction of futures trading has increased or
decreased spot price volatility or had no discernible
impact on volatility. However, the central theme of this
chapter is not whether futures trading has stabilised or
destabilised spot prices (although this will be made
clear). Rather, the concern here is to investigate the
extent to which the introduction of futures contracts on
the FTSE-100 index affected the nature of volatility in
the underlying spot market. It will thus be possible to
draw inferences concerning the link between information
and volatility.
It has been shown in chapter 1 that there is
disagreement between different researchers as to whether
the introduction of futures markets can be expected to
stabilise or destabilise the underlying spot markets.
The theoretical debate fails to provide a definitive
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answer concerning this issue and it is therefore a
matter for empirical investigation. However, empirical
research has also led to disagreement amongst
researchers about the impact of futures on spot prices.
Three factors are important in explaining this
disagreement:
1. differences exist in the methodologies used to
examine the issue;
2. researchers have used different sample periods; and
3. the markets analysed have been different.
The first of these points is of particular importance.
Most previous empirical studies have analysed the
question of whether futures stabilise or destabilise the
underlying spot market by using constructed measures of
volatility in a time series analysis. However, Board and
Sutcliffe (1991) have shown that studies of volatility
are sensitive to the measures of volatility used. In
addition, studies based on constructed measures of
volatility make the implicit assumption that price
changes in spot markets are serially uncorrelated and
homoskedastic.
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Figure 3.1 shows the log of daily price changes (daily
returns) for the FT 500 stock index for the period
November 1980 to October 1991 (the period investigated
in this chapter) 2 . As can be seen from figure 3.1 large
changes in returns appear to be followed by large
changes, and small changes by small changes3
 and hence,
the assumption of homoskedasticity may well be violated.
This causes a problem for analysing such data since
inferences drawn from studies which fail to control for
such dependence are unreliable. In particular, while
observed differences in volatility may be due to the
introduction of futures contracts, it is possible that
they are simply the result of return dependence and have
nothing to do with the introduction of futures. In other
words, the time period chosen for investigation may
significantly alter the results (compare, for example,
the results of Figlewski 1981 and Moriarty and Tosini,
1985). If the time period analysed is one where there
are a predominance of small price changes prior to the
introduction of futures trading and large price changes
after, the impression will be given that futures trading
has led to an increase in volatility. However, by
extending the period analysed it is possible that
different results will emerge.
More importantly, however, previous studies which
investigate the impact of futures trading on spot price
volatility have failed to recognise the connecting link
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between information and volatility. In order to address
this issue it is necessary to utilise techniques which
allow examination of both the structure and
characteristics of volatility. To this end this chapter
employs the GARCH family of statistical techniques in
modelling the conditional variance. As well as allowing
examination of the structure and characteristics of
volatility, this approach has the additional advantage
that it explicitly addresses the issue of time
dependence in the variance and therefore overcomes
problems associated with heteroskedasticity in the data.
Traditional regression techniques require that the error
term, e, be homoskedastic. The assumption of
homoskedasticity states that the error term, e, is a
random variable with a probability distribution that
remains the same over all observations of the
explanatory variable. In particular, homoskedasticity
requires that the variance of each e i is the same for all
values of the independent variable:
var (E) = E[ (c - E(e)] 2 = E(c) 2 . ae2	 (3.8)
Equation 3.8 states the assumption of the traditional
regression technique that the error term has a constant
variance. If this assumption is violated then the ei's
are said to be heteroskedastic and we have:
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var (ei ) = 0ei2	(3.9)
where the subscript i denotes the fact that the
individual variances may be different. Figure 3.1 above
suggests that equation 3.9 might be a more appropriate
representation of the error term for daily price changes
than equation 3.8.
Engle and Rothschild argue that
"Scholars and practitioners have long recognized
that asset returns exhibit volatility
clustering; only in the last decade have we had
statistical models which can accomodate and
account for this dependence...the ARCH (or
AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity)
model rests on the presumption that forecasts of
the variance at some future point in time can...
be improved by using recent information. In
particular, volatility clustering implies that
big surprises of either sign will increase the
probability of future volatility." (1992, pl).
Thus ARCH and GARCH models are ideally suited to the
study of volatility in a time series which is
heteroskedastic. This point has been demonstrated by
Engle (1982), Engle and Bollerslev (1986) and Bollerslev
(1986, 1987). In order to understand why this is the
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case it is necessary to have an understanding of the
ARCH and GARCH processes.
3.3.2 ARCH and GARCH.4
The ARCH model of Engle (1982) and subsequent extensions
have proved to be extremely useful tools by which to
characterise the time varying variance associated with
speculative prices. Following Engle (1982) an ARCH model
is any discrete time stochastic process (et) of the
form:
et = ztat	 (3.10)
zt
	i.i.d.,
	
E(zt) = 0,	 var(zt) = 1	 (3.11)
where at is a time-varying, positive and measurable
function of the information set at time t-1. By
definition, et is serially uncorrelated, with zero mean.
However, the conditional variance of e t is equal to at2,
which may change over time. et corresponds to the
disturbance term for some other stochastic process, say
Yt:
Yt = f ( xt-1; b )	 et	 (3.12)
where f(xt_ i ;b) denotes a function of xt_i and the
parameter vector b. This is known as the mean equation.
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Where f(zt ) is the density function for z t and 6 is the
vector of all the unknown parameters in the model, the
log-likelihood for the sample et,et_1,...,e1 is:
L(e) = t. lET [log f (etat-l ) - log at ]	 (3.13)
The form of equations 3.10 and 3.11 is very general,
allowing for a wide variety of models. However, the most
popular representations of these equations are in a
linear form. The earliest suggested parameterisation of
at was that of Engle (1982) who proposed the variance
could be modelled as a linear function of past squared
values of the process. This is the simple linear ARCH
(q) model, shown in equation 3.14.
crt2 = co + i=iEga iet _ 12 = co + a(L)c 2 	 (3.14)
where w>0 and a 1>0 or a i=0, and L denotes the lag
operator. The advantage of the linear ARCH (q) model is
that it captures the tendency in financial data for
volatility clustering.
For zt
 normally distributed, the conditional density
entering the likelihood function in 3.13 takes the form:
log f(etat- 1 ) = -0.5log2n - 0.5ct2 at-2
	(3.15)
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Engle (1982) suggests maximum likelihood based inference
procedures for the ARCH class of models under this
distributional assumption. Several tests of the
hypothesis that the alpha values equal zero have been
proposed, as have alternative means of estimating ARCH
models (see Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner (1992) for
details in relation to both of these issues).
Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner (1992) point out that
"In many of the applications with the linear
ARCH(q) model a long lag length of q is called
for. An alternative and more flexible lag
structure is often provided by the Generalized
ARCH, or GARCH(p,q), model" (1992, p9).
The GARCH model was proposed by Bollerslev (1986) and is
of the form:
0t 2 . 0 + i=lEcia ict_ i2 + j=lEppjat_j2
= 0 + a(L)c 2 + P(L)at2
	(3.16)
While p and q can be of any order, in most applications
p = q = 1 is found to be satisfactory. For a GARCH (1,1)
process to be well-defined it is necessary that both al
and pl are nonnegative.
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GARCH explicitly allows for heteroskedasticity of the
error term, with the variance of the error term being
modelled as a linear function of the lagged squared
errors and the past residual variances.
Engle et al (1987), proposed the GARCH-in-mean (GARCH-M)
as an extension of the GARCH model, while the integrated
GARCH (I-GARCH) was put forward by Engle and Bollerslev
(1986). Both of these are examined here. GARCH-M extends
GARCH by including the conditional variance (a t2 ) as an
explanatory variable in the mean equation. Hence, the
conditional variance may directly explain the dependent
variable:
Yt = f ( xt-i, at2 ; b ) + Et	 (3.17)
With I-GARCH the model specification is characterised by
nonstationary variables, such that any shock to the
variance of a process is permanent. For a process to be
identified as I-GARCH the parameters a i and pj in
equation 3.16 must together sum to unity. This implies
that there is present an approximate unit root in the
autoregressive polynomial. Where an approximate unit
root is present, current information remains important
for forecasts of the conditional variances for all
horizons.
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3.3.3 GARCH, Volatility and the FTSE-100 Stock Index
Futures Contract. 
In this chapter the impact of futures trading in the
FTSE-100 contract on the volatility of the underlying
market is investigated by estimating a model for a
period which covers the time before and after the
introduction of futures, in line with previous studies.
However, unlike previous studies a GARCH model is used
here. 5 Using GARCH, the impact of the onset of futures
trading is captured by the introduction of a dummy
variable in the variance equation 3.16, representing the
time period before and after futures trading.
As was seen in chapter 1, in order to isolate the impact
of futures trading on the volatility of spot price
changes, it is necessary to account for market wide
influences as far as is possible. For this purpose a
proxy variable for which there is no related futures
contract is included in the mean equation. Specifically,
the mean equation (generalised as 3.12 above) for the
analysis carried out here is:
SPCt = a + bUPCt + et	where et - N(0,ht )	 (3.18)
where SPCt is the natural logarithm of the daily spot
price change, UPCt is the natural logarithm of the daily
price change for the proxy variable for market wide
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influences and ht
 is the variance of the error term
(previously referred to as at2).
The variance equation for the analysis carried out here
(generalised as 3.16 above) is:
ht = co + i= 1Ega igt_ 1 2 + j = lzi,p ;ht_l + yiDF	 (3.19)
where DF is a dummy variable with value 0 for the
pre-futures period and 1 for the post-futures period,
and all other variables are as previously defined.
Thus spot price changes are regressed on a proxy
variable which is intended to capture market wide
influences on price changes (for example, changes in
interest rates) in equation 3.18. What is left
unexplained in this model will be spot price changes
which are due to influences specific to this market.
Remember that the proxy variable relates to a market for
which there is no futures trading, while the dependent
variable relates to a market for which there is (at some
point in the period analysed) futures trading. Hence,
one of the influences specific to the spot market for
which price changes are being analysed relates to the
existence of futures trading. This influence is clearly
not captured by the mean equation, but rather by the
GARCH equation, equation 3.19. If, in this functional
form, the futures dummy is found to be statistically
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significant, it can be inferred that the introduction of
futures trading has impacted on spot market volatility.
However, as explained above, the central issue of
concern in this chapter is the relationship between
information and volatility, and not simply whether
futures trading has led to an increase or decrease in
volatility in the spot market. To address this issue the
period under investigation is partitioned into two
sub-periods relating to before and after futures trading
began. GARCH models are estimated for both sub-periods.
The GARCH models estimated in this analysis are
identical to equations 3.18 and 3.19 except that the
dummy variable for the existence of futures trading is
not included.
Comparisons are then made of the order of the GARCH
models and of the estimated coefficients, and inferences
drawn. By proceeding in this manner it is possible to
examine not just the impact of futures trading in terms
of increasing or decreasing spot price volatility, but
also the impact of futures trading on the nature of
volatility. In examining these issues using GARCH it is
the GARCH equation 3.19 which is of central interest,
because this relates to spot price changes unrelated to
market wide influences. Specifically, we are concerned
with whether the order of GARCH or the magnitude of the
GARCH coefficients changes post-futures. In addition,
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the persistence of market specific factors which cause
spot price changes is examined by testing for unit roots
in the autoregressive polynomial, i.e whether the
estimated alphas and betas sum to unity. This test is
carried out both for the pre-futures period and the
post-futures period and comparisons made.
3.4 Data. 
The data used in this study consists of daily closing
price indices for the period November 1980 to October
1991.	 The FTSE-100 stock index was introduced in
January 1984 to support the futures contract on its
introduction in May of that year. Hence, data is not
available for a sufficiently long period on the FTSE-100
index for the purposes of comparing the volatility of
spot market prices before and after futures trading
began. It is therefore necessary to use a proxy variable
for the FTSE-100 index in order for this comparison to
be made in the analysis presented in this chapter.
The possible candidates to be used as a proxy for the
FTSE-100 are the FT All Share index, the FT 500 index
and the FT30 index. The construction of the FT30 is
different in nature from that of the FTSE-100. In
addition, it clearly does not cover such a range of
stocks as does the FTSE-100 and is thus not such a good
proxy for the market. The use of the FT30 as a proxy is,
therefore, inappropriate. The two indexes based on a
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wider range of stocks must therefore be considered. Both
are potentially appropriate as proxies for the FTSE-100.
However, the non-synchronous trading problem is most
severe for the FT All Share index. In addition, the
correlation coefficient between it and the FTSE-100 was
lower than that for the FT 500 and the FTSE-100 over the
period analysed in this study since the introduction of
the FTSE-100. For these reasons the FT 500 was used as a
proxy in this analysis.
As stated in the previous section it is necessary to
remove market wide influences on spot price changes by
incorporating a proxy variable in the mean equation.
None of the FT share indexes are suitable for this
purpose since they are all highly correlated with the
FTSE-100 and it is necessary to have a proxy which is
not associated with a futures contract. Therefore, to
capture market wide influences on price volatility the
index on the Unlisted Securities Market (USM), as
provided by Datastream, was used6.
After the exclusion of non-trading days the daily time
series for the whole sample consists of 2709
observations. Of these 883 related to the period prior
to the introduction of futures trading on the FTSE-100
stock index and 1826 to the period following its
introduction.
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3.5 Empirical Results. 
Table 3.1 presents the means and standard deviations of
the first differences of the log of the FT 500 and the
USM indexes. The period for which figures are given is
November 1980 to October 1991. In addition to presenting
the figures for the whole period, the means and standard
deviations are also shown for the two sub-periods within
the whole period, relating to before and after the onset
of futures trading in the FTSE-100 stock index contract.
Given that the second sub-period includes the time of
the stock market crash of October 1987, it is not
surprising to find that the mean returns for the first
sub-period are greater than those for the second.
Indeed, for the USM the second sub-period generated
negative returns 7 . However, it is volatility of price
changes which is of central concern here. In relation to
this, table 3.1 shows that the standard deviation of
daily price changes for the FT 500 is higher for the
post-futures trading period. However, in contrast, the
standard deviation for the price changes for the USM
index is lower for this period. Hence, while volatility
in the market without futures trading is lower in the
later period, the volatility of the spot market
underlying the futures contract has increased. While
this presents prima facie evidence of changes in
volatility resulting from futures trading, further
analysis is required. Of particular concern in
interpreting this higher standard deviation for the FT
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Table 3.1: Means and Standard Deviations of First
Differences of the Log of the FT 500 and the USM Indexes. 
Daily Data: November 1980 - October 1991
Periodl n
FT
Mean
500
Standard
Deviation
USM
Mean	 Standard
Deviation
1980- 2709 .00054 .00950 -.00011 '.01129
1991
1980- 883 .00072 .00935 .00008 .01376
May '84
May '84- 1826 .00045 .00958 -.00019 .00987
1991
1. Excluding Bank Holidays and other non-trading days.
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500 as being the result of the introduction of futures
trading, is the fact that the latter period includes the
1987 crash. Thus it is possible that the greater
volatility in the latter period is simply the result of
the time period chosen for analysis. This problem can be
addressed by use of GARCH.
GARCH (p,q) and GARCH-M (p,q) equations were estimated
for all combinations of p=1,2,3,4,5 and q=1,2,3,4,5. On
the basis of log likelihood tests the GARCH (1,1) was
found to be the most appropriate representation for the
sample period and sub-periods considered 8 . Table 3.2
shows the equations estimated and the results for the
whole period (pre- and post-futures). The model was
estimated both with and without a dummy variable
accounting for the October 1987 crash in the mean
equation8 . The dummy relating to the crash was included
in the mean equation because the purpose of this dummy
is to account for market wide influences on price
changes. In addition, a dummy variable relating to Big
Bang was included, but found to be insignificantly
different from zero. It was therefore excluded from the
final estimations. All parameters included are
statistically significant at the 5% level.
The coefficient, yl, on the futures dummy is
statistically significant and positive. This appears to
suggest that the onset of futures trading has resulted
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Table 3.2: GARCH Estimations with Futures Dummy. 
SPCt = a + buPct + CDc + et
2
ht = w + a1et-1 + Piht-1 + Y1DF
SPCt =	 the natural logarithm of the daily price change for the FT 500
index.
UPCt =	 the natural logarithm of the daily price change for the USM
index.
DF	 =	 a dummy with value 0 for the pre-futures period and 1 for the
post-futures period.
Dc	 =	 a dummy with value 1 for the period immediately following the
October 1987 crash and 0 otherwise.	
.
a b c w al Pi Yl
.775 * .3384 - .3969+ .0862 .8423 .107+
(5.32) (25.70) (5.49) (9.44) (54.97) (2.70)
.963 * .3276 -.0504 .4350+ .0991 .8190 .117+
(6.52) (25.30) (-43.15) (5.56) (13.13) (50.57) (2.39)
* Coefficients multiplied by 10 3 for readability
+ Coefficients multiplied by 10 5 for readability
All parameters are statistically significant at the 5% level
Figures in parentheses are t-statistics
n = 2709
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in an increase in the volatility of prices in the
underlying stock market. This finding is in contrast to
the majority of findings relating to the impact of stock
index futures trading in the USA. However, while spot
price volatility may have increased as a result of the
onset of futures trading, the analysis thus far does not
enable us to examine the reasons for this change.
Table 3.3 reports the results for the two sub-periods,
relating to before and after the introduction of futures
trading. Once again, for the post-futures sample the
model was estimated both with and without a dummy
variable relating to the crash. For both pre- and
post-futures trading the GARCH parameters are all
significantly different from zero at the 5% level, with
the exception of the constant term, w, pre-futures. We
are able to investigate further the increase in
volatility suggested in table 3.2 by examining the
behaviour of the parameters in the GARCH equation for
the two sub-periods.
The first point to note in comparing results for before
and after the onset of futures trading is that the onset
of futures trading has not led to a change in the nature
of volatility. For the periods before and after the
onset of futures trading a GARCH (1,1) representation is
the most appropriate form of the model. The large
increase in w	 post-futures (indeed w is not
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significantly different from zero pre-futures) together
with the changes in a l and pl indicate that there has
been an increase in the unconditional variance. The
unconditional variance, given by w/(1-a1-p1), is
.0000543 pre-futures and .0000756 post-futures (.0000706
with the crash dummy). This finding is consistent with
the view that more information is being transmitted to
the market as a result of the onset of futures trading.
Similarly, the value of a l has increased post-futures,
again suggesting an increase in volatility as a result
of futures trading. a l
 is the coefficient relating to
the lagged squared error term. In the context of this
analysis the lagged error term relates to changes in the
spot price on the previous day which are attributable to
market specific factors, i.e. non-market wide factors.
Assuming that markets are efficient, then these price
changes are due to the arrival in the market of items of
information which are specific to the pricing of the FT
500. Hence, a l relates to the impact of yesterday's
market specific price changes on price changes today.
Given that this relates to the arrival of information
yesterday, a l can thus be viewed as a "news"
coefficient, with a higher value implying that recent
news has a greater impact on price changes. Thus the
increase in a l post futures suggests that information is
being impounded in prices more quickly due to the
introduction of futures trading.
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Just as a l reflects the impact of recent news, 13 1 can be
thought of as reflecting the impact of 'old news'. pl is
the coefficient on the lagged variance term and as such
is picking up the impact of price changes relating to
days prior to the previous day and thus to news which
arrived before yesterday. The increase in the rate of
information flow to be anticipated from the onset of
futures trading is expected to lead to a reduction in
uncertainty regarding previous news. This in turn will
lead to a fall in the persistence of information. In
other words, 'old news' will have less impact on today's
price changes. This view is confirmed by the fall in the
value of pl post-futures.
This interpretation of the changes in the GARCH
parameters is given further support by the fact that the
pre-futures model is a candidate for I-GARCH, whereas
the post-futures model is not obviously so. Pre-futures
a l and pi sum to .98, compared to .92 post-futures.
Dickey-Fuller tests were carried out for an I-GARCH
specification and revealed that while the pre-futures
sample was integrated at the 1% level, the post-futures
model is stationary. These results are also reported in
table 3.3. This implies that the persistence of shocks
has decreased since the onset of derivative trading.
Hence, all of the findings regarding the changes in the
parameters of the GARCH equation suggest that the spot
market has become more volatile after the introduction
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of futures trading, but that this is the result of an
increase in the rate of flow of information to the
market and is not due to the 'destructive' activities of
speculators as suggested in earlier studies. These
results are consistent with the theoretical arguments of
Ross (1989) and the view that futures trading increases
the flow of information to the spot market.
The results presented in this chapter are in contrast to
many of the results relating to the volatility of the
stock index and GNMA spot markets in the USA
post-futures. A likely reason for this relates to the
frequency of the data used in the analysis. This study
has shown that increased volatility is the result of the
more rapid impounding of information into spot prices.
Given that most financial markets in developed economies
impound information into prices rapidly, the impact of
the onset of futures trading in terms of the speed of
the price change, while significant, is likely to be at
the margin. Thus, prices which were already adjusting
rapidly, adjust more rapidly with the onset of futures
trading. If this change is to be identified, it is
necessary to utilise data at short time intervals.
Ideally, we would want data collected at very short
intervals, perhaps in terms of hours or even minutes. In
this study the most frequent data available to the
author was used, namely daily data. This proved
sufficiently frequent to identify the changes resulting
163
from the onset of futures trading. However, it is
unlikely that such changes would be identified if weekly
or monthly data were used. Therefore, the findings in
some previous studies that futures trading had no
discernible impact on spot price volatility may well be
due to the frequency of the data used.
3.6 Summary and conclusions. 
There has long been a debate on the impact which
speculation has on price volatility. While this debate
preceded the introduction of futures markets, trading in
derivative securities led to an intensification in
concern over the role of speculators. The main concern
about the impact of futures trading emanates from the
belief among spot market participants that the
activities of speculators will destabilise prices in the
spot market. Previous studies have sought to examine the
impact of futures trading by modelling the volatility of
prices for periods before and after the introduction of
futures. However, these earlier studies have not
accounted for the interdependence of the time series of
returns in speculative markets i.e. large changes in
prices are followed by large changes, and small by
small. For this reason it is more appropriate to analyse
volatility using GARCH which allows for time varying
variance in a process.
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More importantly, however, previous studies have largely
ignored the relationship between information and
volatility. Thus increasing volatility has been seen as
a 'bad thing' and the fact that it may be a direct
result of an increase in the rate of flow of information
has received little acknowledgement in this literature.
Hence, previous studies have failed to distinguish
between message and messenger. In addition to dealing
with the problem of heteroskedasticity, the use of the
GARCH technique also allows consideration of the link
between information and volatility directly.
The results presented here for the impact of the
introduction of the FTSE-100 stock index futures
contract suggest that there has been an impact on spot
price volatility. In particular, the variance in price
changes for the pre-futures sample was integrated,
suggesting that shocks (i.e. items of news) have a
permanent effect on price changes, whereas the
post-futures sample was found to be stationary. The
results suggest that trading in futures markets has led
to an improvement in the quality and speed of
information flowing to spot markets. This is confirmed
by the increase in the "news" coefficient (a 1 ) of the
GARCH equation and the reduction in the "persistence"
coefficient (p1).
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Hence the evidence presented here suggests that there
has been an increase in spot price volatility on a daily
basis, but that this increase has arisen due to
increased information in the market and is not due to
speculators having an adverse destabilising effect.
Indeed, this increased volatility appears to be the
result of futures trading expanding the routes over
which information can be conveyed to the market.
This finding has important implications for the way in
which futures markets are viewed. Rather than seeing
increased volatility as undesirable and necessitating
further regulation of futures markets, the evidence
presented here suggests that futures trading is
improving the operation of the underlying spot market.
In particular, by attracting more, and possibly better
informed, participants into the market, futures lead to
the incorporation of information into spot prices more
quickly. This suggests that the increased volatility of
prices in spot markets are the result of the impounding
of more information as a result of the onset of futures
trading. Thus even those market participants who do not
directly use futures markets, may benefit from this
knock on effect of the introduction of futures trading.
As far as policy implications are concerned, the
evidence of the analysis in this chapter suggests that
findings of increased volatility post-futures should not
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automatically lead to increased regulation. Indeed,
increased regulation is likely to slow down the rate at
which information is impounded into spot prices, making
them a less accurate measure of the true value of the
asset.
Furthermore, it has been argued in this chapter that in
order to identify the impact of futures trading on spot
price volatility it is necessary to use data collected
at short time intervals. If information is continually
flowing into financial markets then the fact that
futures speed up this flow may not be identified if the
data used is weekly or monthly. The speed at which
information is impounded into prices as a result of the
onset of futures trading might increase by a matter of
hours or, even days, but it is unlikely that, in what
are already broadly efficient markets, the increase can
be measured in terms of weeks.
In this chapter the relationship between information and
price volatility has been examined. The finding that the
rate of flow of information to the underlying spot
market has increased post-futures, suggests that futures
trading has improved the efficiency of that market. This
strongly suggests that the futures market itself will be
efficient. However, while the role of information has
been investigated in this chapter, this has not been in
relation to the efficiency of the FTSE-100 futures
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market. Given that the efficiency or otherwise of this
market has important implications in terms of the price
discovery role and hedging effectiveness of futures,
this issue is the subject of the next chapter.
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Footnotes
1. See Fama (1970, 1991) for excellent discussions
of the EMH and for an interesting comparison of how
the debate regarding efficiency has developed over
the last two decades.
2. The reason for showing returns on the FT 500 rather
than the FTSE-100 is explained below.
3. This conforms with the well established findings of
Mandelbrot (1963) and Fama (1965) and, more
recently, by Akgiray (1989).
4. This section draws on the excellent exposition of
Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner (1992).
5. A similar approach has been adopted for the oil
market by Antoniou and Foster (1992b).
6. It is recognised that there are problems associated
with choosing a proxy which captures market wide
volatility. However, it is felt that the USM index
is the most appropriate available in this case.
7. Strictly speaking the values are not returns as
they only relate to price changes and therefore
exclude dividend income.
8. This is in line with the findings of many other
studies, see for example Akgiray (1989) and Antoniou
and Foster (1992b).
9. The dummy variable relates to the four weeks
following the 19 October 1987. This length of time
was chosen on the basis of a visual examination of
the closing values of the stock index. Over this
four week period there was excessive volatility. The
equations were also estimated using dummies relating
to differing lengths of time after the crash.
Periods of between two and six weeks were tried. The
pattern of results was unchanged with the differing
lengths.
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Chapter 4: Futures Markets Efficiency and the
Unbiasedness Hypothesis. 
4.1 Introduction. 
We have seen in chapter 1 that the price discovery role
of futures markets crucially depends on the efficiency
of those markets. If futures markets are not efficient
then they will not necessarily provide unbiased
estimates of the expected future spot price. In chapter
2 the risk return relationship for the FTSE-100 stock
index futures contract was examined and doubts were
raised about the efficiency of the market for this
contract. Chapter 3 has demonstrated the importance of
information in relation to price volatility. The use of
information is central to the issue of efficiency.
Furthermore, efficiency impinges on hedging, the primary
role of futures markets, which is the subject of the
next chapter. Investors seeking to hedge risk in an
efficient market will be able to accept market prices as
correct. Hence, it will not be worthwhile incurring
additional costs in an attempt to seek out information
not already incorporated in prices. However, if futures
markets are inefficient then hedgers will face an
additional cost of using the markets.
Clearly then, market efficiency is of central concern to
the question of whether a futures contract is successful
in fulfilling the economic role ascribed to futures. In
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this chapter we examine the efficiency of the FTSE-100
stock index futures contracts using the cointegration
procedure and variance bounds tests. In chapter 1 it was
noted that the OLS procedure used in many previous
studies is inappropriate when price series are
nonstationary. The cointegration technique overcomes the
methodological problems associated with many of these
earlier studies. Variance bounds tests, while widely
used to examine stock market efficiency, have not
previously been employed to examine the efficiency of
futures markets.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section
discusses market efficiency and the way in which it
relates to futures contracts. Section 4.3 explains the
cointegration procedure and the way in which it can be
used to examine futures market efficiency. In section
4.4 there is a discussion of variance bounds tests and
an alternative test of futures market efficiency based
on these tests is developed. Section 4.5 discusses the
methodology adopted in this chapter, and the data used
to test for efficiency is set out in section 4.6.
Sections 4.7 and 4.8 present the empirical results
relating to tests based on cointegration and variance
bounds respectively. Finally, section 4.9 presents a
summary and conclusions.
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4.2 Market Efficiency and Futures Markets. 
According to the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH)
financial markets are efficient if security prices fully
reflect all relevant information as soon as that
information becomes available. If they do then the
prices of securities are accurate signals for the
allocation of resources.
Fama (1970, 1991) has done much to operationalise the
notion of market efficiency. His definition of the EMH
is in line with that given above
"I take the market efficiency hypothesis to be
the simple statement that security prices fully
reflect all available information. A
precondition for this strong version of the
hypothesis is that information and trading
costs, the costs of getting prices to reflect
information, are always 0... A weaker and
economically more sensible version of the
efficiency hypothesis says that prices reflect
information to the point where the marginal
benefits of acting on information (the profits
to be made) do not exceed the marginal costs...
Since there are surely positive information and
trading costs, the extreme version of the market
efficiency hypothesis is surely false. Its
advantage, however, is that it is a clean
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benchmark that allows me to sidestep the messy
problem of deciding what are reasonable
information and trading costs." (Fama, 1991,
p1575).
In this thesis the view will be taken that a financial
market is efficient if prices 'fully reflect' all the
available information which is relevant to valuation. In
other words, the set of prices arrived at in the market
reflects all that is known about the securities.
When it comes to testing efficiency in any market the
problem of the existence of trading costs and positive
information clearly arises. However, Fama argues
"The joint-hypothesis problem is more serious.
Thus, market efficiency per se is not testable.
It must be tested jointly with some model of
equilibrium, an asset-pricing model. This
point.., says that we can only test whether
information is properly reflected in prices in
the context of a pricing model that defines the
meaning of 'properly.' As a result, when we find
anomalous evidence on the behavior of returns,
the way it should be split between market
inefficiency or a bad model of market
equilibrium	 is	 ambiguous."	 (Fama,
	 1991,
p1575-1576).
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Hence, in testing for the efficiency of futures markets,
it is necessary to consider the way in which futures are
priced. More formally, Hansen and Hodrick argue
"Any discussion of the efficiency of a market
requires a specification of the preferences and
information sets of economic agents, the
technology available for production, and the
costs inherent in transactions." (1980, p830).
With reference to futures markets, Koppenhaver (1983)
defined a market equilibrium in terms of price
expectations and the existence of a risk premium greater
than or equal to zero. The relationship between the
current futures price and the expected value of the
futures price at expiration of the contract is given in
equation 4.1:
Ft, t+ = E [Ft+n,t+n I 4)t - Rt	 (4.1)
where Ft , t41.1 is the futures price quoted at time t for
delivery at time t+n (i.e. n periods later), Ft+n ,t+n is
the futures price at maturity, 4 is the information set
at time t, E is the mathematical expectations operator
and Rt is the risk premium which is nonnegative and
depends on the systematic risk of holding a futures
contract.
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In the absence of arbitrage opportunities at expiration,
the maturity basis will be zero and hence the spot
price, St+n, at maturity will equal the futures price at
maturity. Thus St+11 = P
- t+n, t+n • Market efficiency is
commonly defined in terms of the futures price being a
fair game with respect to the information set. Hence,
equation 4.1 can be rewritten as:
E ( St+n) = Ft , t+n + Rt	 (4.2)
Equation 4.2 implies that at time t the expected spot
price at futures contract maturity (i.e. time t+n) will
be greater than or equal to the futures price at time t
for delivery at time t+n. With a zero risk premium
equation 4.2 is a martingale process and the expected
spot price at contract expiration is the current futures
price for future delivery. This implies that :
E ( St+n - Ft t+n I cl)t) = 0	 (4.3)
Hansen and Hodrick point out that
"If economic agents are risk neutral, costs of
transactions are zero, information is used
rationally, and the market is competitive, the
... market will be efficient in the sense that
the expected rate of return to speculation...
will be zero." (1980, p830).
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Where this is the case then equation 4.3 will hold.
Assuming that on average the expected spot price equals
the actual spot price then we have the following:
St+n=E ( St+nlk) + et+n	 where E(et+nlk) = 0	 (4.4)
Equations 4.3 and 4.4 imply that the future spot price
is given by:
St+n = Ft,t+n + et
	 (4.5)
Equation 4.5 states that the futures price quoted at
time t for delivery at time t+n is an unbiased predictor
of the future spot price at contract expiration, given
the information set available at time t. Note that this
unbiasedness hypothesis relies crucially on the
assumption of their being no risk premia in futures
markets, or that there is a zero net risk premium.
Empirical analysis of equation 4.5 allows the joint
hypothesis of market efficiency and unbiasedness in
futures prices to be examined.
It is common in the literature to test the implications
of equation 4.5 by regressing the spot price at maturity
on the futures price some time prior to maturity:
St+n = a + bFt, t+n 
-1- et
	 (4.6)
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Equation 4.6 is the same as equation 1.3 and from this
equation market efficiency implies that a=0 and b=1.
This unbiasedness hypothesis is also known as the
'simple efficiency' hypothesis (see Hansen and Hodrick
(1980)) and the 'speculative efficiency' hypothesis (see
Bilson (1981)). In testing for futures market efficiency
it is normal to assume that, due to the nature of the
information set, futures prices closer to the expiration
date will provide better estimates of the future spat
price, than do those further away. Thus tests are
carried out for futures prices with different values of
t in equation 4.6. Rejection of the restrictions on the
parameters a and b has been interpreted as either the
market is inefficient or there exists a non-zero risk
premium in futures markets. Hence, tests of equation 4.6
are a joint test of the unbiasedness hypothesis and
market efficiency and, therefore, provide a means of
examining the price discovery role of futures markets.
However, while the implications of equation 4.5 are
typically investigated by examining the values of a and
b in equation 4.6, the variance bounds literature
provides another means of examining equation 4.5. Both
approaches are adopted in this chapter.
Before going on to set out the techniques used to test
the joint hypothesis in this chapter it should be noted
that investigation of equation 4.5 is not the only means
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by which futures market efficiency can be examined.
Clearly, if a different pricing model were adopted then
the joint hypothesis to be tested would be different. In
addition, efficiency could be tested by examination of
whether arbitrage opportunities exist in the markets.
The approach adopted in this chapter has been chosen
because of the central role of price discovery in
futures markets and hence the considerable importance
which is attached to the notion of futures prices being
unbiased predictors of future spot prices.
4.3 Cointegration and futures market efficiency. 
It has been established that a common test of market
efficiency involves regressing the spot price at
maturity on the futures price some time prior to
maturity, as in equation 4.6. However, it was mentioned
In chapter 1 that there were problems associated with
testing the restrictions. The reasons for this are now
discussed.
In recent years a major area of interest in relation to
the analysis of financial price data has been the issue
of the stationarity of a price series. In circumstances
where data is nonstationary, standard statistical tests
of parameter restrictions such as those discussed in
relation to equation 4.6 are not reliable. This lack of
reliability arises from the fact that the asymptotic
distribution theory on which hypothesis tests are
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constructed relies critically on the assumption of
stationarity. In particular, Elam and Dixon (1988) point
out that financial price series are typically
nonstationary, having a unit root, with the implication
that the standard F-test of the null hypothesis that a=0
and b=1 is inappropriate. They point out that on the
basis of Monte Carlo simulations the F-test is biased
towards rejecting market efficiency incorrectly. Hence,
the F-test is not a reliable test for pricing efficiency
given the existence of nonstationary variables. Elam and
Dixon state that
"Fuller (1976) provides a table of tabulated
values for testing the hypothesis that b=1 for a
random walk. However, testing that b=1 is not a
sufficient test for pricing efficiency...To our
knowledge, the distribution of the F statistic
for the hypothesis that a=0 and b=1...has not
been derived." (1988, p369).
They go on to say that the development of an appropriate
statistical procedure to test this hypothesis is an
important issue for future research. Fortunately for the
purposes of testing the efficiency of futures markets,
such a statistical procedure has now been developed in
the form of cointegration. Before going on to discuss
this technique, it is appropriate to firstly discuss the
concept of stationarity.
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A series which achieves stationarity after differencing
that series d times is said to be integrated of order d,
denoted I(d). A series which is integrated of order
zero, i.e. is I(0), is therefore stationary and one
which is integrated of order 1, I(1), achieves
stationarity after first differencing. An I(1) series is
said to contain a unit root. When two price series, such
as the spot and futures price series, are both
integrated of the same order d, then a linear
combination, Zt , of the two series will generally also
be integrated of order d, where:
It+a = St+n - a - bF t , t-o-n
	 Zt-1(d)	 (4.7)
However, as Engle and Granger (1987) point out, a linear
combination of two I(d) series, although generally I(d),
can be integrated of an order lower than d. For example,
it is possible that two series which are nonstationary
and contain a unit root, i.e. are I(1), can generate a
linear combination, Z t , which is stationary, i.e I(0).
Such a series is said to be cointegrated and the
cointegrating relationship is defined in equation 4.8a:
St+n - a - bFt,t+n = 0	 (4.8a)
Stationarity of Zt is established by testing for and
rejecting the null hypothesis of a unit root in the
residuals
	
of	 the	 cointegrating
	
relationship.
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Rearrangement of equation 4.8a and introduction of an
error term makes the cointegrating relationship more
clear:
St+n = a + bFt,t+n + et
	 (4.8b)
Since the market efficiency hypothesis implies that the
futures price is an unbiased predictor of the future
spot price, cointegration of the two price series is a
necessary condition for market efficiency. If the two
series were not cointegrated, with Zt being
nonstationary, St+n and Ft , t+n do not move together and
will tend to drift apart over time. If this is the case
then Ft , t+n cannot be an unbiased predictor of
However, cointegration, while being a necessary
condition for market efficiency, is not a sufficient
condition, as demonstrated by Hakkio and Rush (1989). It
is also necessary to consider the values of the
parameters a and b in the cointegrating relationship. In
particular, for the futures price to be an unbiased
predictor of the future spot price we require that a=0
and b=1 in equation 4.8b. The procedure developed by
Engle and Granger did not allow formal testing of these
restrictions, as implied by Elam and Dixon (1988).
However, the procedure developed by Johansen (1988) and
Johansen and Juselius (1990) does allow specific testing
of restrictions on the cointegrating parameters.
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The acceptance of the restrictions on the values of a
and b in the cointegrating relationship is a second
necessary condition for market efficiency. However, the
two conditions so far discussed only imply that the
futures price is an unbiased predictor of the spot price
in the long-run. In the short-run it is possible that
there will be considerable departures from this
equilibrium relationship. The short-run efficiency of
the futures market can be tested by considering the
dynamic relationship between spot and futures prices
using an error correction model (ECM). If the spot and
futures prices are cointegrated then an ECM can be
specified as:
ASt+n =
+ YAFt,t+n + eAS t+n_i + p[st+n_i - E•Ft-i,t+n-1]	 et+n
(4.9)
where [St+n-1 - OFt-1,t+n-i] is the error-correction term.
Efficiency can be tested by testing the following
restrictions on the ECM in equation 4.9; -p	 y = 8 = 1
and a and all lagged values, 6, are zero. If these
conditions hold, then equation 4.9 collapses to equation
4.5 as follows. Equation 4.9 can be rewritten as:
St+n	 St+n-1 =
+ YFt,t+n
	 YFt-1,t+n-1	 eASt+n-1	 P[ St+n-i - OFt-1,t+n-1]
et+n
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If -p =y=8=landa=0= 0 then
St+n =
Ft,t+n - Ft-1,t+n-1 - St+n-1 + Ft-1,t+_1 + St+n-1 + et+n
= Ft,t+n + et+n
Acceptance of these restrictions constitutes the third
condition for efficiency.
Tests of these three restrictions are proposed by
Antoniou and Foster (1992a). Prior to this work, tests
of efficiency using the Johansen cointegration procedure
had not considered the short-term dynamics using ECMs.
Since tests on the parameters in the cointegrating
relationship were not possible prior to Johansen,
Antoniou and Foster provide the only example where all
three tests of market efficiency are undertaken.
This chapter uses the three tests discussed above.
However, unlike previous studies which have tested for
efficiency using error correction models, in this study
the diagnostic statistics relating to the ECMs are
considered. Previous studies have ignored these
diagnostic tests, and as a result inferences drawn on
the basis of t and F tests may be unreliable. Without
considering the diagnostic statistics it is possible
that the standard errors are biased, leading to an
increase in the possibility of a type 1 error. Thus,
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while a sufficient condition for market efficiency is
that the restrictions on the ECM hold, it is essential
that the ECM is correctly specified. Given that previous
studies have not addressed this issue, the inferences
drawn may be suspect.
4.4 Variance Bounds Tests of Futures Market Efficiency. 
The theory relating to the use of variance bounds tests
for testing market efficiency was put forward by Shiller
(1979, 1981a) and LeRoy and Porter (1981), who were also
the first to undertake empirical work using this
approach. Although there are different versions of the
variance bounds tests with some based on asset prices
and others on dividends, they are all the result of the
present value relation.
The idea underlying these tests can be understood by
reference to the simplest of the inequalities tested by
Shiller (1981a). This inequality puts limits on the
standard deviation of the asset's price. Shiller argues
that the efficient markets model asserts that pt =
Et (Pt * ) I where pt is the asset price and pt* is the
present discounted value of the actual subsequent real
dividends. This states that pt is the mathematical
expectation conditional on all information available at
time t of pt* and implies that pt is the optimal forecast
of pt*.
Shiller defines the forecast error as u t = pt* - pt.
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Thus:
Pt* = Pt ± ut
	 (4.10)
The forecast error must be uncorrelated with the
forecast, otherwise the forecast could be improved. The
covariance between pt and ut must, therefore, be zero.
Elementary statistics states that the variance of the
sum of two uncorrelated variables is the sum of their
variances. Thus:
var (p*) = var (u) + var (p)
	
(4.11)
Shiller points out that since variances cannot be
negative, equation 4.11 implies that var (p) must be
less than or equal to var (p*). It is this inequality
that Shiller examines to test for market efficiency. As
stated in chapter 1, Shiller concludes that price
volatility cannot be explained by information and
therefore, he believes markets to be inefficient.
Subsequent tests have similarly found evidence of excess
volatility.
In spite of the widespread use of such variance bounds
tests, they have not been applied to futures markets to
examine the issue of futures markets efficiency.
However, just as equation 4.10 can be used to establish
bounds on the variance of prices, so too can equation
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4.5, which is presented again for convenience:
St+n = Ft,t+n + et	 (4.5)
Given that in an efficient market and under the
assumption of risk neutrality Ft,t411 will be an optimal
forecast of St+n, it follows that et must be uncorrelated
with Ft ,t+ .
 
The covariance between Ft ,t411 and et must,
therefore, be zero and an equation equivalent to 4.11
can be derived. We now have:
var (St+n) = var (Ft,t+n) + var (et )	 (4.12)
As Shiller pointed out variances cannot be negative.
Equation 4.12 therefore implies that if the market is
efficient:
var (Ft,t4. 11 ) <= var (St+n)	 (4.13)
where <= implies less than or equal to. A test of this
inequality will therefore provide a test of market
efficiency. If the inequality in 4.13 does not hold then
this implies that equation 4.5 does not hold and that
either the futures market is inefficient or market
participants are not risk neutral.
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4.5 Methodology. 
In this chapter the efficiency of the market for the
FTSE-100 futures contract is examined using the
cointegration procedure and variance bounds tests. We
will discuss how these two approaches are implemented in
turn. As stated above, the error based methods of
cointegration, such as that developed by Engle and
Granger, do not allow the testing of restrictions on
parameters in the cointegrating relationship. However,
the Johansen procedure does allow such tests to be
carried out.
The Johansen procedure is set out in Johansen (1988) and
Johansen and Juselius (1990), and in a form directly
applicable to futures in Lai and Lai (1991). The
procedure is in contrast to that of Engle and Granger
(1987) which estimates the cointegrating relationship
using regression. Rather, Johansen
"derive[s] maximum likelihood estimators of the
cointegration vectors for an autoregressive
process with independent Gaussian errors, and...
derive[s] a likelihood ratio test for the
hypothesis that there is a given number of
these." (1988, p231).
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The Johansen approach is based on the multivariate
technique of canonical correlations, which involves
finding a linear combination of a set of variables such
that the correlation among the variables is maximised.
Lai and Lai note that using Johansen, the hypothesis of
cointegration can be formulated as the hypothesis of
reduced rank of a regression coefficient matrix. This
can be estimated consistently from two vector regression
equations. Based on these regressions, the likelihood
ratio test for cointegration involves computing the
squared canonical correlations between the regression
residuals. This requires the calculation of eigenvalues.
Johansen (1988) begins by considering a process X which
is of the form:
xt = llixt-i + • • • + llkxt-k + ti + et
	 (4.14)
However, he reparameterises this equation so that it
becomes a general vector autoregressive (VAR) model:
AXt=r1AXt-1 4-• • • 4" rk-1AXt-k+1 ± rkXt-k + P + et	 (4.15)
where Xt is an n x 1 time series vector, A = 1 - L,
where L is the lag operator, p is some constant vector
and et is a vector of white Gaussian noises with mean
zero and finite variance. Johansen shows that the rank
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of the matrix rk indicates the number of cointegrating
relationships existing between the variables in Xt . Lai
and Lai point out that the hypothesis of cointegration
between St+n and Ft,t+n is equivalent to the hypothesis
that the rank of rk = 1 and that if the rank is zero,
then the two variables are not cointegrated.
Once cointegration is established, the maximum
likelihood estimate of the cointegrating vector, a, can
be computed on the basis of eigenvalues. As far as the
spot price - futures price relationship is concerned
this involves estimating a' = (1, -b, -a) for the
cointegrating relationship:
a i Xt* = 0
	 (4.16)
where Xt * = ( St+n,Ft,t+ 11 ,1). A test of market efficiency
involves testing the linear restriction a' = (1, -1, 0)
on the cointegrating vector.
Given that testing restrictions on the cointegrating
relationship is necessary for the establishment of
futures markets efficiency, the Johansen procedure is
adopted here'. We begin by testing for unit roots in the
spot price series, St , and the futures price series,
Ft-n,t2 , for different values of n. The Johansen
procedure is used to test for the existence of unit
roots (i.e. nonstationarity) in the data. Tests are
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first of all carried out on the levels of the spot and
futures price series. If unit roots are found then the
tests are repeated for the first differenced price
series.
The Johansen procedure for testing for the presence of
unit roots involves testing for cointegration between
one variable and a constant, i.e. testing for
integration. The null hypothesis is for no
cointegration, which is equivalent to the variable being
not I(0). If the null is rejected then the alternative
hypothesis of cointegration in one variable is accepted
implying a stationary I(0) series.
If the variables are candidates for cointegration the
Johansen maximum likelihood technique will be used to
test for cointegration. Hall makes the point that
"The Johansen procedure begins by constructing a
general vector auto regressive (VAR) model and
the estimation procedure is then contingent on
the specification of the VAR....In application
this raises two questions: first, what criteria
should be chosen for the length of the VAR
model; and second, are the results of the
procedure sensitive to this choice." (1991,
p318).
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Hall goes on to establish that while the maximum
likelihood estimates of the parameters are robust to the
choice of VAR length the same is not true of the test
statistics. These appear to be sensitive to the choice
of VAR. It is therefore necessary to examine the effect
of changes in the VAR when using the Johansen technique
or to use the VAR length which has the minimum test
statistic.
In applying the Johansen procedure we therefore begin by
selecting the appropriate VAR length. Hall suggests that
to choose the appropriate VAR length, k, an arbitrarily
high value of k should be chosen and then likelihood
ratio tests should be used to test for the implications
of reductions in the VAR length. The correct value of k
is established when a restriction on lag length is
rejected. In this study likelihood ratio tests on VAR
lengths of 4 to 1 are carried out.
Once the order of integration and the appropriate VAR
length has been established, the Johansen procedure is
used to test for cointegration between the spot price
series and the futures price series. This is the first
test of market efficiency mentioned above. If the series
are cointegrated then tests of the restrictions in
equation 4.8b are undertaken. As stated above, market
efficiency requires that we do not reject the
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restrictions that a=0 and b=1.
Finally, if this test of efficiency is passed, we test
restrictions on the parameters of the error correction
model with a moving average component to account for
overlapping data. Specifically, we test that a equals
zero and -p = y = 1. Testing of these restrictions
constitutes the third test of market efficiency.
In undertaking the variance bounds tests we begin by
calculating the variance of spot prices over the period
t to t-i and the variance of futures prices over t-n to
t-n-i, for each t in the sample. Different values of i
are used to ensure that results are not dependent on
the time period over which the variance is calculated.
Having calculated two series of variances, VS and VF, we
define the ratio of these variances as Xsf:
Xsf = VS/VF	 (4.17)
From equation 4.13, Xs f must be greater than or equal to
unity if the market is efficient. We therefore test for
this by regressing Xsf on a constant term and testing to
see if the estimated constant is less than unity.
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4.6. Data. 
The data used in this study consist of quarterly spot
values of the FTSE-100 stock index (hereafter referred
to as the spot price) and the quarterly prices for the
FTSE-100 futures contract. For the purposes of the
analysis, the log of the spot and futures prices are
used.
Two types of data are used in the cointegration
analysis. For the first type of data the spot price
relates to the closing values of the index for the day
relating to the last day of futures trading for each
contract. Futures contracts on the FTSE-100 stock index
expire in March, June, September and December of each
year. Hence, there are four observations per annum. The
futures prices relate to the closing prices on the last
trading day of the month for various months prior to
expiration (i.e various values of n). The observations
relating to futures prices are divided into subsets
according to their time to expiration. The first subset
comprises futures prices one month prior to expiration
of the contract, i.e. those relating to February, May,
August and November. Similarly, subsets relating to two,
three, four, five and six months prior to expiration are
created. Thus n varies from 1 to 6. The data relate to
the period covering the futures contracts expiring
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between September 1984 and June 1992. Hence, there are
thirty-two observations for the spot series and for each
futures subset, with the exception of six months prior
to expiration for which there are only thirty-one
observations.3
The analysis carried out in chapter 2 suggested that
there was a possible day of the week effect in relation
to futures returns. If such an effect is in existence
then clearly this may bias the futures prices on
particular days of the week. Hence, to avoid any
problems relating to a possible day of the week effect a
second data set was used in this analysis. The second
data set is comprised of closing prices averaged over
the last five trading days of each month for the series
outlined above.
For the variance bounds tests only the first of these
two data sets is employed. Variances are calculated
using closing prices and values of i of 1, 4 and 20.
Thus variances are calculated for the last trading day,
the last week of trading and the last month of trading.
In this analysis tests were carried out using futures
prices from 1 to 5 months prior to maturity.
The sample size of thirty-two is undoubtedly small and
as a consequence any results emerging from the analysis
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need to be interpreted with caution. However, all
available relevant data relating to the FTSE-100 stock
index futures contract has been used in order to test
for efficiency in this study.
4.7 Results of Tests for Futures Market Efficiency using
Cointegration. 
In order to determine the level of integration of the
time series, unit root tests were carried out on the
spot price series and the six futures price series for
both the last trading day data (hereafter referred to as
daily data) and the five day averaged data. The results
for the tests for unit roots for the levels and first
differences of the daily data are presented in table
4.1a and for the five day average data in table 4.1b.
For all seven level price series for both daily and five
day average data the null of no cointegration cannot be
rejected. Similarly for all first differenced price
series the null hypothesis is rejected. These results
indicate that the series in levels are all 1(1). Since
spot and futures price series for all values of t-n
tested are integrated of the same order, the spot and
futures series are candidates for cointegration for all
values of t-n.
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Table 4.1a: Johansen tests for unit roots; Daily data.
Price Series	 Levels	 First differences
LSt 5.5633 20.9136
LFt_i 6.0052 23.8282
LFt_2 7.7191 29.9792
LFt_3 6.5038 21.6896
LFt_4 7.0967 23.3229
LFt_ 5 4.1971 32.1645
LFt_ 6 6.3365 20.7948
The critical value for the test at the 5% level is
9.2430.
In all cases the value of the test statistic was the
same for the likelihood ratio test based on the maximal
eigenvalue of the stochastic matrix and for that based
on the trace of the stochastic matrix.
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Table 4.1b: Johansen tests for unit roots; Five day
average data. 
Price Series	 Levels	 First differences
LSAt 	5.7945	 19.4375
LFAt_ i 	6.8791	 22.1395
LFAt_ 2	7.2953	 30.6265
LFAt_ 3 	6.9367	 19.4729
LFAt_ 4 	7.6541	 21.4574
LFAt_s 	 4.3123	 32.5078
LFAt_ 6 	 .9144	 18.1525
The critical value for the test at the 5% level is
9.2430.
In all cases the value of the test statistic was the
same for the likelihood ratio test based on the maximal
eigenvalue of the stochastic matrix and for that based
on the trace of the stochastic matrix.
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Given that the price series are candidates for
cointegration it is necessary to carry out tests to
establish the appropriate VAR length. The results of
these tests are reported in tables 4.2a and 4.2b. For
both daily and the five day average data VAR lengths of
1 are appropriate for futures prices of 1, 2, and 4
months prior to maturity. For 3 and 5 months before
maturity a VAR length of 2 is appropriate and for 6
months the VAR length is 3.
Having established the order of integration of each
price series and the appropriate VAR length we can now
proceed to test for futures markets efficiency. In order
to do this it must first of all be established whether
the spot and futures prices cointegrate. 4 As outlined
above, linear combinations of the spot and futures price
series which have a cointegrating vector of one indicate
that their differences are stationary and satisfy the
first condition for futures prices being an unbiased
predictor of the future spot price.
The Johansen cointegration procedure has a null
hypothesis of zero cointegrating vectors between the
spot and futures price series. Rejection of the null
hypothesis implies there is one cointegrating vector.
Results of the tests for daily and five day average data
are presented in tables 4.3a and 4.3b 5 . The tables show
that in all cases the spot and futures prices
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Table 4.2a: Likelihood ratio tests for appropriate VAR
length; Daily data. 
Restrictions
	 LF1	 LF2	 LF3	 LF4	 LF5	 LF6
on Var length
	
4-3	 3.68	 1.94	 3.14	 3.26	 3.12	 1.98
	
3-2	 3.94	 3.90	 2.58	 1.38
	 1.36 20.36
	
2-1	 2.40	 7.60 10.14	 3.26 17.54 115.12
The critical value for the test at the 5% level is
X2 ( 4 ) = 9.49
The subscript on LF refers to months prior to maturity.
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Table 4.2b: Likelihood ratio tests for appropriate VAR
length; Five day average data. 
Restrictions	 LFAl LFA2 LFA3 LFA4 LFA5 LFA6
on Var length
4-3 3.59 2.70 6.12 4.24 5.00 5.56
3-2 5.98 7.44 3.90 3.26 1.66 29.32
2-1 5.10 5.44 13.98 5.70 14.52 109.20
The critical value for the test at the 5% level is
X2 ( 4 ) = 9-49
The subscript on LFA refers to months prior to
maturity.
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Table 4.3a: Johansen tests for cointectration of spot
and futures prices; Daily data. 
LSt = a + bLFt_n ,t + et
Futures'	 Test for cointegration based on:
Maturity Maximal eigenvalue	 Trace	 a=0, b=1
Ft-1
	
19.4391	 25.3669	 1.61
Ft-2
	
34.7632	 41.2299
	 0.46
Ft-3	 16.2129	 24.2245	 7.54
Ft-4
	
55.0052	 64.3494	 2.82
Ft-5
	
40.0670	 50.0396	 ' 3.25
Ft-6
	
17.9205	 26.7342	 9.62
The null hypothesis is that there is no cointegrating
relationship between the spot and the futures prices.
The critical values for the test based on maximal
eigenvalues are 15.67 at 5% and 13.75 at 10%. For the
tests based on the trace the values are 19.96 at 5% and
17.85 at 10%.
The column labelled (a=0,b=1) is the Johansen test of
the restriction that a=0 and b=1 in the cointegrating
regressions. The test is chi-squared distributed with a
critical value at 5% of 5.99.
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Table 4.3b: Johansen tests for cointegration of spot
and futures prices; Five day average data. 
LSAt = a + bLFAt_n,t + et
Futures'	 Test for cointegration based on:
Maturity Maximal eigenvalue	 Trace a=0,b=1
FAt_i 16.5078 23.3802 0.87
FAt-2 30.7180 36.9554 0.44
FAt_3 14.1381 21.5038 7.87
FAt-4 60.6726 69.6273 2.78
FAt-5 33.5604 44.4628 '2.53
FAt-6 31.1996 38.5137 23.44
The null hypothesis is that there is no cointegrating
relationship between the spot and the futures prices.
The critical values for the test based on maximal
eigenvalues are 15.67 at 5% and 13.75 at 10%. For the
tests based on the trace the values are 19.96 at 5% and
17.85 at 10%.
The column labelled (a=0,b=1) is the Johansen test of
the restriction that a=0 and b=1 in the cointegrating
regressions. The test is chi-squared distributed with a
critical value at 5% of 5.99.
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cointegrate on the basis of trace values at the 5%
level. On the basis of the maximal eigenvalue statistics
all reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at
the 5% level, except for the five day average data three
months prior to maturity, which is significant at the
10% level. It is reasonable to interpret these results
as indicating that the spot and futures prices are
cointegrated and thus meet the first necessary condition
for market efficiency.
The tables also report tests on restrictions on the
parameters in the cointegrating regression. The
restrictions tested are that a=0 and b=1. The
restriction can be tested using the Johansen test
statistic which is chi-squared distributed. For one,
two, four and five months prior to maturity the
restrictions hold for both the daily data and the five
day average data at the 5% level of significance.
However, for three and six months prior to maturity the
restrictions are rejected at the 5% level of
significance. Thus for three and six months prior to
maturity the joint hypothesis of market efficiency and
risk neutrality is rejected, even though spot prices and
futures prices for these dates cointegrate.
Clearly, the finding that futures prices six months
prior to maturity are not unbiased predictors is not
particularly surprising. As was stated in section 4.3,
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the further from maturity, the less likely it is that
futures prices will be unbiased predictors. However, the
finding that futures prices are not unbiased predictors
of the spot price in the long-term for three months
prior to maturity, but are unbiased predictors in the
long-term for four and five months prior to maturity is
both surprising and particularly interesting. One
possible explanation for this finding relates to the
maturity dates of the FTSE-100 stock index futures
contracts. Since these contracts mature at three month
intervals, dates three months prior to the maturity of
one contract are actually maturity dates for earlier
contracts. Indeed, the same is true for dates six months
prior to maturity. Thus, for example, three months prior
to the expiration of the September contract is the date
of the maturity of the June contract. Similarly, six
months prior to the September contract expiring, the
March contract expires.
As was seen in diagrams 2.1 to 2.5 in chapter 2, the
volume of transactions in futures contracts is at its
greatest in the weeks immediately prior to maturity. At
the same time, investors who are using futures contracts
for hedging will shift between contracts as one contract
matures. For example, those using the March contract to
hedge will move out of that contract in March and into,
say, the June or September contract. It is quite
possible that this heavy volume of transactions,
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together with considerable switching between contracts,
will lead to bias in futures prices for those months. In
other words, for short periods, during times of high
transactions volume, the FTSE-100 stock index futures
market exhibits inefficiency.
The results of the above analysis suggest that futures
prices are not unbiased predictors of future spot prices
in the long-run for three and six months prior to
maturity. However, it does appear from the results that
futures prices are unbiased predictors of spot prices
for one, two, four and five months prior to maturity,
and hence that futures markets are efficient in the
long-term for these time horizons. However, as explained
above, while long-run efficiency is a necessary
condition for efficiency, it is also necessary to
consider the short-run dynamics of the relationship. In
particular, it is possible that in spite of long-run
efficiency there may be considerable deviations from the
spot price - futures price relationship in the
short-term. Hence, before drawing conclusions regarding
the nature of efficiency it is necessary to consider
error-correction models.
For those time periods for which there was evidence of
long-run efficiency, ECMs were constructed and
investigated. By doing this the third condition
necessary for market efficiency is examined. The ECMs
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were constructed with lags on the dependent variable of
between one and three. In all cases the coefficient on
the lags were found to be insignificantly different from
zero. We therefore only report the models for lags of
zero. The results for these estimations are presented in
tables 4.4a and 4.4b. Tests carried out for serial
correlation, functional form, normality and
heteroscedasticity confirmed the models' statistical
adequacy6 . The statistics relating to these tests are
reported in tables 4.5a and 4.5b.
Of particular interest in the tables 4.4a and 4.4b are
the values of a, y and p. On the basis of t statistics,
the restrictions that a=0, y=1, and p=-1 were tested
separately. The estimated values of a are
insignificantly different from zero for one, two and
four months from maturity for the five day average data
and for one and two months from maturity for the daily
data at the five percent level of significance. However,
the estimated value of a for five months from maturity
is significantly different from zero at the five percent
level for both types of data used 7 . The t statistics for
the restriction y=1 are such that the restriction cannot
be rejected at the five percent level of significance
for one, two and four months prior to maturity for both
data types used. Once again, however, for five months
from maturity the value of the t statistic is such that
the restriction is not accepted at the five percent
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Table 4.4a: Error correction models for spot and
futures prices: Daily data. 
ALSt
 = a + yALFt_n ,t
 + p[LSt_ i - LFt_n ,t_ i ] + et
Futures' a	 Y p X2
Maturity Statistic
Ft-1 0.0043	 0.8660 -0.8846 2.62(0.0087)
	 (0.0889) (0.1883)
Ft-2 0.0103	 0.9863 -1.0970 0.83(0.0130)	 (0.1708) (0.2340)
Ft-4 0.0307*	 0.5136 -0.4783 '6.13
(0.0150)
	 (0.3222) (0.3184)
Ft-5 0.0360*	 0.3250+ -0.2589+ 20.71
(0.0145)	 (0.2307) (0.2030)
Figures in	 parentheses
	 are standard errors. The
chi-squared statistic is for the restriction a=0, y=1,
p=-1. The critical value at 5% is 7.81.
* denotes significantly different from zero at the 5%
level.
+ denotes significantly different from unity (y) or -1
(p)at the 5% level.
All ECMs have been estimated using a moving average
component.
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Table 4.4b: Error correction models for spot and
futures prices: Five day average data. 
ALSAt = a + yALFAt_n ,t + p[LSAt_ i - LFAt_n ,t_ i ] + et
Futures'	 a	 X2
Maturity
Statistic
FAt_i	 0.0029	 0.9608	 -0.8382	 1.04
(0.0079)	 (0.0888)	 (0.1953)
FAt_2 	0.0176	 0.8605	 -0.9220	 2.24
(0.0132)	 (0.1604)	 (0.2354)
FAt_4	0.0294	 0.5579	 -0.4662	 6.23
	
(0.0151)	 (0.3967)	 (0.3653)
FAt_ 5 	0.0365*	 0.2584+	 -0.1777+	 27.16
	
(0.0146)	 (0.2234)	 (0.2034)
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. The
chi-squared statistic is for the restriction a=0, y=1,
p=-1. The critical value at 5% is 7.81.
* denotes significantly different from zero at the 5%
level.
▪ denotes significantly different from unity (y) or -1
(p)at the 5% level.
All ECMs have been estimated using a moving average
component.
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level. Finally, the restriction p=-1 is tested. The
results are the same as those for the test of the
restriction on y. The restriction holds for one, two and
four months prior to maturity, but not for five months
prior to maturity8.
A formal test of all three restrictions taken together
is also carried out. On the basis of the estimations
reported in tables 4.4a-b the restriction that a=0, y=1,
and p=-1 were tested using a chi-squared test. The test
statistics reported in tables 4.4a and 4.4b show that
for one, two and four months prior to maturity the third
condition for market efficiency is accepted. However,
for five months prior to maturity the restriction is not
accepted. These results confirm the pattern of results
from examining the restrictions separately.
The results presented here suggest that the futures
price is an unbiased predictor of the future spot price
in both the long and short-run for one, two and four
months prior to maturity of the futures contract.
However, while the futures price five months before
expiration is an unbiased predictor of the future spot
price at expiration in the long-run there are
substantial deviations from this relationship in the
short-run. This finding therefore calls into question
the unbiasedness of the futures market for the FTSE-100
stock index futures contract for the period five months
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prior to maturity and demonstrates the importance of
examining the short-run dynamics of the spot price -
futures price relationship. Had these dynamics not been
investigated using an ECM, the conclusion would have
been incorrectly drawn that the futures price was an
unbiased predictor of the future spot price for this
time period. Finally, it should be noted that according
to the diagnostic statistics reported in tables 4.5a-b
relating to the ECMs, the models are adequately
specified, making inferences drawn from them reliable.
4.8 Results of Tests for Futures Market Efficiency based
on Variance Bounds Relationships. 
Table 4.6 presents the results of the variance bounds
tests. For all values of i (period over which the
variance is calculated) consistent results are obtained
for 1, 2 and 4 months prior to maturity. The results for
3 and 5 months prior to maturity vary with the period
over which the variances are calculated. For 1, 2 and 4
months prior to maturity the variance bounds
relationship, equation 4.13, is not violated, suggesting
efficiency. For three months prior to maturity the
relationship is violated for i equal to 1 and 20, but
not for i equal to 4. In contrast, while there is also
conflicting evidence for 5 months prior to maturity, the
relationship is not violated for when variance is
calculated over 1 and 20 days, but is violated when
variances calculated over 4 days are used.
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4.6: Variance bounds tests: Daily data. 
Is the variance bounds relationship accepted?
Months to	 Period over which variances
Maturity	 calculated
1 day	 4 days	 20 days
1	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes
2	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes
3	 No	 Yes	 ' No
4	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes
5	 Yes	 No	 Yes
No indicates rejection of the inequality in equation
4.13 at the 5% level. Yes indicates acceptance.
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This evidence does suggest that variance bounds tests
are sensitive to the period over which the variances are
calculated. Nonetheless, the results of this analysis
confirm very strongly the results of the cointegration
analysis. There therefore seems strong support for the
conclusion that the market for the FTSE-100 stock index
futures contract is efficient for 1, 2 and 4 months
prior to maturity, but not for 3 months prior to
maturity, and possibly not for 5 months prior to
maturity.
4.9 Summary and Conclusions. 
Chapter 2 identified possible inefficiencies in the
pricing of the FTSE-100 stock index futures contract and
also suggested that a risk premium might be evident due
to the contract being a risky asset in systematic risk
terms. This chapter has investigated these issues by
examining the efficiency of the FTSE-100 stock index
futures market in both the long-term and the short-term
using the Johansen cointegration procedure. In addition,
variance bounds tests have been developed and employed
to test for futures market efficiency. By doing this
both the issue of efficiency of the market and the
question of whether a risk premium exists are addressed.
Rejection of the joint hypothesis of market efficiency
and unbiasedness in prices (no risk premium) does not
allow the identification of the reason for the
214
rejection. However, acceptance of the joint hypothesis
means that both parts of the hypothesis are accepted.
Previous studies of this joint hypothesis relating to
futures markets have been deficient in that they either
ignored the problems caused by nonstationary variables,
or, if cointegration has been used, they have only
considered long-run efficiency. Even if there is
evidence of long-term efficiency it is possible that
scope for profitable arbitrage in the short-run remains.
ECMs have been used in this study to examine the
short-run dynamics and the diagnostic tests relating to
those models have shown them to be adequately specified.
In addition, further tests of efficiency, not previously
used, have been used here.
As far as long-run efficiency is concerned, futures
prices appear to be unbiased predictors of spot prices
for one, two, four and five months prior to maturity of
the futures contract. However, they are not unbiased
predictors three and six months prior to maturity. This
could either be due to a positive risk premium, or to
inefficiencies caused by these dates corresponding with
the dates of maturity of earlier futures contracts due
to stock index futures trading on a three month cycle.
Given that the volume of transactions is greatest in the
last weeks of a contract, and that considerable movement
will take place between contracts of differing
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maturities at the time of contract expiration, there may
be inefficiencies evident at these times.
The finding of short-run efficiency for one, two and
four months prior to maturity, but not for five months
prior to maturity, highlights the importance of
examining the short-run dynamics of the pricing
relationship using ECMs. The results of the variance
bounds tests confirm the findings of the cointegration
analysis.
The possibility of a day of the week effect being
evident was addressed in this study by examining the
unbiasedness hypothesis for data relating to both the
last trading day of each month and the average of the
last five trading days of each month. Analysis was
carried out on this basis because of previous findings
of a day of the week effect and because of the results
presented in chapter 2 relating to futures markets
returns. It should be noted that there was considerable
consistency between the results for using last trading
day data and those using the average of the last five
trading days of each month. This suggests that any
possible day of the week effect is not manifesting
itself in the form of differences over the last week of
each contract.
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The results presented in this chapter throw light on the
results of chapter 2 and have important implications for
the users of futures markets. Direct comparison with the
analysis in chapter 2 is not possible due to differences
in the data used in the two studies. In particular, in
chapter 2 data relates to weekly returns and to the
period 1985 to 1990, whereas in this chapter, by
necessity, the data used is quarterly and relates to the
period 1984 to 1992. In addition, in this chapter it was
possible to break down the data according to time to
maturity to a greater extent than was possible in
chapter 2.
Nonetheless, the evidence presented here suggests that
in spite of the FTSE-100 stock index futures contracts
being risky assets in systematic risk terms, the futures
price is an unbiased predictor of the future spot price
for one, two and four months prior to maturity. This
implies that there is no risk premium to futures
contracts over these periods. However, the finding that
futures prices are not an unbiased predictor of future
spot prices for three months prior to maturity implies
that either the markets are inefficient, possibly due to
the sharp change in trading volume at about this time of
each contract's life, or that a risk premium is evident.
Given that no risk premium is evident for one, two and
four months prior to maturity, the former appears a more
likely explanation.
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The implications of the results of chapter 2 may be
partly reconciled with those presented in this chapter
by considering the differences in data between the two
chapters. In particular, when time to maturity was
considered in chapter 2, the data was partitioned into
that relating to zero to three months prior to maturity
and that relating to three to six months prior to
maturity. This chapter has shown that for both of these
periods there is evidence of inefficiency. In the period
relating to zero to three months prior to maturity there
is evidence here that the market is inefficient for
three months prior to maturity. Similarly, for the other
period considered in chapter 2, there is evidence here
that the market is not an unbiased predictor for six
months prior to maturity, and in the short-run for five
months prior to maturity. Nonetheless, the results
presented here do suggest the absence of a risk premium,
which is not what was to be expected following the
results of chapter 2. However, as mentioned in chapter
2, the evidence of betas close to unity may be due more
to the relationship between the market proxy and the
futures under consideration. Hence the caveat in that
chapter about interpreting the results with caution.
Furthermore, the arguments of Black (1976), discussed in
chapter 2 are also relevant here.
As far as the users of the FTSE-100 stock index futures
market is concerned, the results presented in this
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chapter have important implications. In particular, for
those market participants who wish to pursue a strategy
of 'rolling hedges' (i.e. carrying a hedge from one
contract to another), it appears that the time of the
expiration of the contract is not a time when the market
is efficient and hence, it is not the time when the
hedge should be rolled over. Given, the finding of
unbiasedness for four months prior to maturity, it may
be better to roll hedges over at this time rather than
wait for the current contract to mature.
In relation to the other major function of futures
markets, namely price discovery, it does appear that the
market fulfils this function most of the time but that
there are times when it fails to do so. Hence, it is
important to carefully consider the information
incorporated in futures prices. Finally, the finding
that the futures market is possibly inefficient at some
points in the contract's life suggests that they are
opportunities for excess profits to be made. This could
well provide an extra incentive for speculators to enter
the market. However, while speculators may have entered
the market, it was shown in chapter 3 that this does not
appear to have led to the existence of futures markets
having a detrimental impact on the underlying spot
market.
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Footnotes. 
1. The results for tests of unit roots reported in
section 4.7 relate to the use of the Johansen
procedure. Tests of unit roots were also carried
out using the Engle-Granger procedure and
confirmed the results reported here. However, the
Johansen procedure for testing for unit roots has
greater power than does the Engle-Granger
approach. In addition, the procedure was used for
consistency with the subsequent tests of
cointegration. For a discussion of the use of the
Johansen approach for testing for unit roots see
Cuthbertson, Hall and Taylor (1992).
2. We will use St
 and Ft_n,t instead of St+n and
Ft,t+n in discussing the empirical work in this
chapter.
3. Futures trading in the FTSE-100 stock index
contract only began in May 1984. Therefore for the
contract maturing in September 1984 data is not
available relating to six months prior to
maturity.
4. For convenience we will refer to prices as current
prices.
5. Analysis of the data indicated that there was a
problem of normality for three or more months from
maturity. This appears to be due to the stock
market crash of October 1987. For the December
1987 contract futures prices of three or more
months prior to maturity relate to prices before
the crash, whereas the spot price of December 1987
is clearly after the crash. The problem of
non-normality in the data is overcome by including
a dummy variable relating to this one observation.
The results in tables 4.3a and 4.3b relate to
tests including a stationary dummy variable for
observation 14. Exclusion of the dummy does not
alter the pattern of results. Tables 4.3c and 4.3d
present the same statistics for the tests without
a dummy variable.
6. Due to the problem of non-normality the ECMs were
also estimated with a dummy variable for
observation 14 for four and five months prior to
maturity. The results reported in tables 4.4a and
4.4b relate to estimations including the dummy
variable. Exclusion of the dummy does not alter
the pattern of results. Tables 4.4c and 4.4d
present the same statistics for the estimations
without a dummy variable.
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7. For the estimations excluding the dummy variable
the a estimates are insignificantly different
from zero for all time periods prior to maturity
for which estimations were carried out.
8. The pattern of results for the restrictions on y
and p are the same for the estimates excluding the
dummy variable.
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Table 4.3c: Johansen tests for cointegration of spot and
futures prices; Daily data. 
LSt = a + bLFt_n ,t + et
Futures'	 Test for cointegration based on:
Maturity Maximal eigenvalue 	 Trace	 a=0, b=1
Ft_3	 13.0396	 19.3160	 8.09
Ft-4
	
55.3609
	
61.1500	 3.15
Ft_5	 41.7789	 49.6839	 4.49
Ft-6
	
14.3223	 23.2045	 8.18
The null hypothesis is that there is no cointegrating
relationship between the spot and the futures prices.
The critical values for the test based on maximal
eigenvalues are 15.67 at 5% and 13.75 at 10%. For the
tests based on the trace the values are 19.96 at 5% and
17.85 at 10%.
The column labelled (a=0,b=1) is the Johansen test of
the restriction that a=0 and b=1 in the cointegrating
regressions. The test is chi-squared distributed with a
critical value at 5% of 5.99.
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Table 4.3d: Johansen tests for cointecfration of spot
and futures prices; Five day average data. 
LSAt = a + bLFAt-n,t + et
Futures'	 Test for cointegration based on:
Maturity Maximal eigenvalue 	 Trace	 a=0, b=1
FAt-3
	
11.1523	 17.5767	 7.48
FAt-4
	
61.2295	 67.1590	 2.99
FAt_ 5	 36.3900	 45.2023
	 3.17
FAt_6	28.0832	 35.0792	 '22.22
The null hypothesis is that there is no cointegrating
relationship between the spot and the futures prices.
The critical values for the test based on maximal
eigenvalues are 15.67 at 5% and 13.75 at 10%. For the
tests based on the trace the values are 19.96 at 5% and
17.85 at 10%.
The column labelled (a=0,b=1) is the Johansen test of
the restriction that a=0 and b=1 in the cointegrating
regressions. The test is chi-squared distributed with a
critical value at 5% of 5.99.
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Table 4.4c: Error correction models for spot and
futures prices: Daily data. 
ALSt
 = a + yALFt_n ,t + p[LSt _ i - LFt_n ,t_ i ] + et
Futures'	 a	 Y	 P	 X2
Maturity	 Statistic
Ft-4
	 0.0172	 0.7662	 -0.7218	 1.32
(0.0185)	 (0.4016)	 (0.3973)
Ft-5	 0.0276	 0.1729+	 -0.2453 +	10.74
(0.0190)
	 (0.3008)	 (0.2674)
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. The
chi-squared statistic is for the restriction a =0, r=i,
p=-1. The critical value at 5% is 7.81.
* denotes significantly different from zero at the 5%
level.
4- denotes significantly different from unity (y) or -1
(p)at the 5% level.
All ECMs have been estimated using a moving average
component.
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Table 4.4d: Error correction models for spot and
futures prices: Five day average data. 
ALSAt = a + yALFAt_n,t + p[LSAt_i - LFAt_n,t-1] + et
Futures	 a	 X2
Maturity	 Statistic
FAt-4	 0.0168	 0.8476	 -0.7535	 1.61
(0.0183	 (0.4831)	 (0.4436)
FAt_5	 0.0285	 0.0732+	 -0.1276 +	15.91
(0.0186)	 (0.2820)	 (0.2609)
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. The
chi-squared statistic is for the restriction a=0, y=1,
p=-1. The critical value at 5% is 7.81.
* denotes significantly different from zero at the 5%
level.
4- denotes significantly different from unity (y) or -1
(p)at the 5% level.
All ECMs have been estimated using a moving average
component.
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Chapter 5: Hedging with FTSE-100 Stock Index Futures 
Contracts. 
5.1 Introduction. 
It was argued in chapter 1 that hedging is the most
important function of futures markets and the main
reason underlying their evolution. In this thesis the
prime concern is to examine the economic role and
performance of the FTSE-100 stock index futures
contract. To this end chapters 2, 3 and 4 have examined
the risk return relationship, the impact on the
underlying market, and the efficiency of this contract.
In this chapter we turn to an examination of the most
important issue in relation to futures contracts by
analysing the hedging performance of the FTSE-100
contract.
We have seen in chapter 4 that for periods of less than
three months from maturity futures prices are unbiased
predictors of future spot prices and the market for
futures contracts is efficient for the FTSE-100 stock
index futures contract. This has important implications
for the hedging effectiveness of stock index futures,
since if futures markets are to be an effective means by
which investors can hedge risks, it is important that
futures prices are determined in an efficient market.
Given the findings relating to efficiency in chapter 4
it is to be expected that the nearby futures contract
will provide an effective means by which to hedge the
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risk associated with holding a widely diversified stock
portfolio.
In this chapter we investigate the hedging effectiveness
of the FTSE-100 stock index futures contract for the
period from July 1984 to June 1992. It was noted in
chapter 1 that when risk is hedged using futures
contracts, price risk is replaced by basis risk. It was
also noted in that chapter that there are grounds for
believing that the hedge ratio may change over time and
may change with respect to (a) the hedge duration and
(b) the time between the hedge being undertaken and the
maturity of the futures contract being used to hedge.
Furthermore, it was shown that while most previous
studies of the hedging effectiveness of stock index
futures have concentrated on the minimum variance hedge
ratio, some have made comparisons with other hedge
ratios. It is therefore important to give consideration
to the different types of hedging strategies which have
been proposed. In this chapter all of these issues are
addressed.
In addition, in contrast to previous studies, hedging
effectiveness is considered here in relation to hedging
strategies based on historical information. Hedge ratios
are estimated on the basis of such information and the
hedging effectiveness compared to optimal hedging
strategies which implicitly assume perfect foresight.
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The next section considers theoretical issues relating
to hedging, with particular emphasis on the different
hedge strategies. Section 5.3 discusses the methodology
adopted in this chapter to investigate the hedging
performance of the FTSE-100 contract. The data to be
used in the study is then discussed in section 5.4 and
section 5.5 sets out the results of the study. Finally
section 5.6 presents a summary and concluding remarks.
5.2 Hedging with Futures: Theoretical Issues. 
In section A of chapter 1 it was shown that futures can
be used to expand the opportunity set open to investors.
Figure 1.3 demonstrated that by altering the value of h
(the hedge ratio) different combinations of risk and
return could be achieved. The exact point that an
investor will choose on the risk return opportunity set
will depend upon the preferences of the individual.
Alternative hedging strategies have been proposed to
explain this choice. Before going on to examine hedging
performance it is necessary to have an understanding of
these alternatives.
Four theories of hedging will be considered: the classic
one-to-one hedge; the Working view of hedging; the
minimum variance hedge strategy and; the beta hedge.'
The classic hedge strategy (also known as the naive or
traditional model) emphasises the potential for futures
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contracts to be used in reducing risk. The strategy is
very simple, involving the hedger in taking up a futures
market position which is equal in magnitude, but
opposite in sign to the spot market position. If price
changes in the spot market exactly match price changes
in the futures market then price risk will be completely
eliminated. However, as was noted in chapter 1 this is
extremely unlikely to be the case. Thus while
emphasising the avoidance of risk, the traditional
approach does not guarantee a risk minimising position.
The second hedging strategy to be considered is that put
forward by Working (1953). Working questioned the
traditional view of hedging as a means of reducing risk.
He argues that
"...hedging is not necessarily done for the sake
of reducing risks. The role of risk-avoidance in
most commercial hedging has been greatly
overemphasized in economic discussions. Most
hedging is done largely... because the
information on which the merchant or processor
acts leads logically to hedging. He buys the
spot commodity because the spot price is low
relative to the futures price and he has reason
to expect the spot premium to advance".
(Working, 1953, p325).
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Thus Working views hedging as a form of arbitrage and
explicitly considers the speculative aspect of hedging.
However, the generally accepted view of hedging is that
it is a means of protecting or insuring a position held
in the spot market, a view which is not consistent with
that of the Working view of hedging. Indeed, Johnson
(1960) criticises the Working view on the basis of
interviews with participants in commodity markets. He
argues that market participants are motivated to hedge
primarily in order to reduce risk. He therefore proposed
a strategy based on the concept of the minimum variance
hedge ratio (mvhr), (see Johnson (1960)).
The strategy based on the mvhr is consistent with the
traditional approach in that it emphasises the risk
reduction properties of futures. However, unlike the
traditional approach, it does not make naive assumptions
about movements in the basis. Rather, Johnson defines
hedging as minimising the price risk, or variance of the
subjective probability distribution for prices changes,
associated with holding a predetermined spot position.
Following Johnson, let a 12
 be the variance of price
change or price risk from holding one unit in the i
market from time ti to t2. The variance of return from
holding xi
 units is therefore equal to x12 a12 . Likewise,
the price risk of holding one unit in the j market is oi2
and of holding x j units is xj 2 aj 2 . Finally, let covij
denote the covariance of price change between market i
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E(R) = xiui + x.u.3 3 (5.3)
x j = - X.COV..
a.2
(5.4)
and market j. Thus a combination of positions in i and
j has a total variance of return V(R):
V(R) = xi2a12	 x292 + 2XiXiCOVij
	 (5.1)
The combination has an actual return, R, and an expected
return, E(R), given respectively by:
R = XiBi + X 3 Bj	 (5.2)
and
where B i , B j
 denotes the actual price change from ti to
t2 in i and j and u i and u j
 denote the price changes from
ti to t2 expected at ti. Johnson points out that u i and
uj
 are the mean values of the probability distributions
of returns in the i and j markets.
The combination of i and j which has the minimum
variance of returns is found by differentiating 5.1 with
respect to xj, setting the derivative equal to zero and
solving for x j . This yields the optimal (in terms of
minimum variance) value xj*:
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Substituting the value of x j * for x j in equation 5.1
yields:
V(R)* = x12 0. 12 4- (xi2covii 2 ) / ai 2 - (2xi2covij2)/aj2
or
V(R)* = xi2(ai2 - (covij2)/aj2)
Given that the correlation coefficient, p, is equal to
(covij/aiaj ) then V(R)* = x i2ai2(1 - p2). Johnson argues
"Generally speaking the larger the (absolute)
value of the coefficient of correlation, the
greater the reduction in price risk of holding
xi
 that can be effected by carrying the hedge
.*. If the... [hedger] believes at time t1 thatx3
price movements are perfectly correlated between
ti and t2, p is equal to 1 and over-all price
risk is reduced to 0. If he believes that there
is no correlation whatever, V(R)* is equal to
x i2 ai2 - the variance of xi
 alone. The
effectiveness e of the hedge is measured by
considering the variance of return V(R)*
associated with the combination xi, xj * in a
ratio with the variance xi2 a1 2 associated with
the position x i
 held alone". (Johnson, 1960,
p143-144).
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Thus:
e = (1 - (V(R)*/x i2 c7i2 ) = p2
Thus Johnson proposes the square of the correlation
coefficient as an appropriate measure of hedging
effectiveness.
In the above discussion x j * is the number of units held
in market j which minimises the variance of returns. In
chapter 1 the hedge ratio was defined as the number of
units held in the futures market divided by the number
of units held in the spot market. This corresponds to
xj /xi
 in the above discussion and hence, the minimum
variance hedge ratio h* will be equal to x j * /xi
 where
market j is the futures market and market i the spot
market. Thus:
h* = -Cov(RsRf)/a2Rf	 (5.5)
The negative sign reflects the fact that to hedge a long
stock position it is necessary to sell futures
contracts. Figlewski (1984) points out that h* is
computed in practice by regressing the returns on the
spot index against the returns on the futures contract,
using historical data. When this is done the coefficient
of determination, R2 , corresponds to Johnson's measure
of hedging effectiveness.
233
An alternative to the minimum variance hedge ratio is
the beta hedge ratio which has strong links to the
classic hedge. We have seen that the classic 1:1 hedge
ratio requires a futures position that is equal in size
but opposite in sign to the cash position. Lindahl
(1992) points out that
"At first glance, this might be interpreted as
matching the cash and futures positions dollar
for dollar. However, when the cash position is a
stock portfolio, the number of futures contracts
for full hedge coverage needs to be adjusted by
the portfolio's beta - a statistic that
describes the portfolio's tendency to rise or
fall in value compared to the market." (Lindahl,
1992, p35).
However, while the notion of the beta hedge in stock
index futures hedging emanates from CAPM, the market
portfolio to be used in determining the value of beta is
not the true market portfolio (or an approximation of
that portfolio such as the FT All share index) but
rather the portfolio underlying the futures contract. In
other words, the relationship which is of concern, is
that between the stock portfolio to be hedged and the
portfolio underlying the futures contract. In many cases
the portfolio to be hedged will be a subset of the
234
portfolio underlying the futures contract, and hence the
beta will deviate from unity. If the portfolio to be
hedged is that underlying the futures contract, the beta
hedge ratio will equal unity. Thus by comparing the
minimum variance hedge ratio with unity, a direct
comparison is being made betwen h* and the beta hedge.
Figlewski (1984) explains that in the special case of
non-random dividends and the hedge being held until
expiration of the futures contract, the change in the
basis will be nonstochastic, resulting in h* being
equivalent to the portfolio beta. This can be seen from
equation 5.5 where the measure of h* is clearly
consistent with the measure of beta. Indeed, where the
above conditions hold and the portfolio to be hedged is
the same as that underlying the futures contract, the
traditional hedge, the mvhr and the beta hedge will be
the same. However, Figlewski goes on to state that the
basis tends not to be stable, implying that the beta
hedge ratio will be sub-optimal. Indeed, Figlewski
demonstrates that the minimum variance hedge ratio is
superior to the beta hedge ratio, a finding which
receives empirical support in later studies.
Figlewski (1984) argues that in almost all cases of
hedging with stock index futures a cross-hedge is
involved, i.e. the stock portfolio which is hedged
differs from the portfolio underlying the futures
contract. However, even when the hedge involves a
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position in the index portfolio itself (which means
there will be no non-market risk) basis risk remains, as
was shown in section A of chapter 1.
The above discussion raises two important points.
Firstly, the fact that price risk is replaced by basis
risk means that futures cannot be used to eliminate the
risk associated with a spot position. Whatever futures
hedging strategy is adopted, some risk will remain.
Hence, an important point to consider is how effective a
futures market for a particular asset is in reducing
risk. Secondly, in practice, the minimum variance hedge
ratio will depart from unity. This is due in large part
to changes in the basis. Given that such changes depend
in large part on the behaviour of arbitrageurs, and
that this behaviour may change over time, it is
reasonable to assume that the minimum variance hedge
ratio will also change over time. Important empirical
points to consider, therefore, relate to what is the
value of h* for a particular asset and whether h* is
stable.
In addition, it is important to consider theoretical
reasons as to why h* may change. Two major factors have
been identified as being of potential influence on the
value of the minimum variance hedge ratio: namely the
duration of the hedge and the length of time to
expiration of the futures contract.
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It has been established that the relationship between
the spot and futures market may be imperfect except at
expiration and that futures prices will be able to
deviate from their theoretical level within certain
bounds. It is the imperfection between spot and futures
prices prior to maturity which causes basis risk. The
extent to which the two markets are related at any
particular time will crucially depend upon the extent to
which prices are allowed to deviate from their
equilibrium relationship before arbitrageurs are enticed
to enter the market to earn excess returns. As Figlewski
(1984) points out, discrepancies between spot and
futures prices cannot become arbitrarily large due to
the activities of arbitrageurs. However, the variance of
returns will increase with the length of time
considered, and thus the fraction of total risk
accounted for by basis risk will decrease as the holding
period of any hedge increases. Thus, hedging
effectiveness should increase as duration increases.
Similarly, it is to be expected that the duration of a
hedge will affect the value of h*, with longer duration
hedges being associated with higher values of h*. This
occurs because as the duration of the hedge increases
and the basis risk falls as a proportion of total risk,
the covariance of returns in the spot and futures
markets will move closer to the variance of returns in
the futures (and spot) market. Thus h* increases towards
unity as the duration of the hedge increases.
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In addition, Figlewski (1984) argues that the
attractiveness of an arbitrage opportunity depends upon
the length of time that the position must be held to
yield the profit. Since the equilibrium relationship
between futures and spot prices must exist at
expiration, the level of deviations from equilibrium
should fall as contract expiration approaches. Hence, it
is to be expected that as expiration approaches the
minimum variance hedge ratio will change, approaching
unity at expiration.
From the above discussion of hedging it is clear that in
assessing the hedging role of stock index futures it is
necessary to determine the extent of risk reduction
which these contracts allow. In addition, the value of
the minimum variance hedge ratio needs to be determined,
and the stability of this ratio and the effectiveness of
hedges in relation to time to contract expiration and
hedge duration must also be examined.
The final issue to be considered in this section relates
to the calculation of h * . In order to estimate the hedge
ratio which minimises risk it is necessary to have
perfect foresight about the movements of spot and
futures prices over the period of the hedge. Such an
implicit assumption has been made by all the studies
reviewed in chapter 1. In practice, of course, hedgers
do not have perfect foresight. As a result they will
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have to estimate the optimal hedge ratio in terms of
risk minimisation on the basis of expectations about
future price movements. Given that it is not possible to
determine expectations, a useful proxy might be to use
historical information to estimate the mvhr. The
question then arises as to what is the most appropriate
historical information in terms of reducing risk. This
issue is addressed in this chapter in relation to the
FTSE-100 contract.
5.3 Data. 
In this chapter the hedging performance of the FTSE-100
futures contract is examined using data relating to the
period July 1984 to June 1992 and using the methodology
set out in the next section. The spot portfolio to be
hedged is that underlying the FTSE-100 index. Hence, it
is assumed that the portfolio to be hedged moves exactly
with movements in the FTSE-100 index. Given the
widespread use of index funds by portfolio managers this
assumption is reasonable. In line with the discussion in
chapter 1, which showed that dividends did not impact
significantly on the effectiveness of a hedge, no
adjustment is made here to account for dividends. Again,
this is not unreasonable, given the long established
finding that dividends are highly stable (see, for
example, Lintner (1956) and Fama and Babiak (1968)).
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Hedge ratios are calculated by regressing the natural
log of spot price changes against the natural log of the
futures price changes. Logarithmic price changes are
most appropriate since logs tend to minimise
non-stationarities due to changes in price levels. In
all estimations the futures contract nearest to
expiration is used. This strategy is used for two
reasons. Firstly, the liquidity in the nearby contracts,
as evidenced by the information on volume and open
interest presented in chapter 2, strongly suggests that
nearby contracts are more widely used for undertaking
hedging strategies. Secondly, the evidence concerning
efficiency presented in chapter 4 suggests that futures
prices are unbiased predictors of future spot prices for
periods of less than three months from maturity, but are
not always so for periods of three or more months from
maturity. It is therefore likely that futures contracts
which are not the nearby contract will offer a less
effective means of hedging the risk associated with an
underlying spot position.
The data used for both spot and futures relate to
Wednesday closing prices. Thus hedge durations of one
week and multiples of one week may be examined using
this data. In this chapter we examine hedging
effectiveness for hedges of 1, 2 and 4 weeks duration.
The FTSE-100 futures contract trades in a cycle of
March-June-September-December. 	 There are thus 416
240
observations for one week hedges (8 years x 4 quarterly
expiration dates x 13 weeks per quarter), 192
observations for two week hedges (8 x 4 x 6) and 96
observations for four week hedges (8 x 4 x 3). 2 All
prices are obtained from Datastream.
5.4 Methodology. 
In examining hedging effectiveness, minimum variance
hedge ratios are estimated since, as has been shown,
these result in a hedged position with less risk than do
other hedging strategies, such as the beta hedge.
However, comparisons are drawn with the risk return
properties of the beta hedge strategy. The examination
of hedging performance and hedging effectiveness is
undertaken in four stages.
It has been argued that hedging effectiveness may be
affected by the duration of the hedge and by the time
between the hedge being undertaken and the maturity of
the futures contract. The first stage of the analysis is
concerned with the stability of hedge ratios with
respect to hedge duration. OLS simple regressions are
run for nonoverlapping 1, 2, and 4 week hedges. The
hedges are lifted at between zero and twelve weeks prior
to expiration. The OLS regression which is estimated is:
DSt = a + PDFt + et
	(5.6)
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where DSt = the one week difference in the spot index
for one week hedges, the two week difference
in the spot index for two week hedges and the
four week difference in the spot index for
four week hedges
DFt = the one week difference in the futures
price for one week hedges, the two week
difference in the futures price for two week
hedges and the four week difference in the
futures price for four week hedges
a, p . regression parameters, where p is the
minimum variance hedge ratio, h*
and	 et = a residual term.
All observations are in natural logarithms.
By comparing the estimated minimum variance hedge ratios
from equation 5.6 and the R2 's for hedges of different
durations, the impact of hedge duration can be examined.
In addition, comparisons of the mean and standard
deviations of returns for hedged (both mvhr and beta
hedge) and unhedged portfolios are examined. Thus
hedging effectiveness is examined using both R 2 's and
the standard deviation of returns.3
The issue of the stability of the minimum variance hedge
ratios with respect to time to contract expiration
constitutes the second stage of the analysis. This issue
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is examined by means of multiple regression using dummy
variables to represent different subsets of the data
based on weeks to expiration. Equations are estimated
separately for hedge durations of 1, 2, and 4 weeks and
are of the form:
DSt = a + Po.DFt .Do + P i . DFt .D 1 + P 2 .DFt .D2 +...+ Pn.DFt.Dn
+ et
	(5.7)
where a, p i . regression parameters where the beta's are
minimum variance hedge ratios for hedges with
i weeks to expiration
Di = dummy variables set to one for hedges with i
weeks to expiration and zero otherwise.
For hedge durations of 1 week i	 = 0, 1,..., 11
2 weeks i =
4 weeks i =
0,
0,
2,...,
4,	 8.
10
Estimates for hedges up to 12 weeks away from expiration
were not used in this analysis due to some missing
observations.
Having estimated equation 5.7, comparisons of the
estimated P is are made to examine the impact of time to
expiration.
It was noted earlier that if the behaviour of
arbitrageurs changes over time, then the minimum
variance hedge ratio may also change over time,
243
independent of changes in hedge duration and time to
contract expiration. It is therefore of interest to
examine the stability of the hedge ratios further. This
is done in the third stage of the analysis. Two
different approaches are used to analyse this issue.
Firstly, rather than estimate hedge ratios for the whole
period we estimate optimal hedge ratios on a yearly
basis. Thus minimum variance hedge ratios are estimated
for each year from July to June for the period 1984 to
1992. Comparisons are then made of the annual hedge
ratios and hedging effectiveness in each year. Such
analysis is only undertaken for hedge durations of 1 and
2 weeks, due to small sample sizes for hedges of 4 weeks
duration. Secondly, minimum variance hedge ratios are
estimated using a moving window (or rolling) regression
procedure and we then test to see if the generated hedge
ratio series follows a random walk. For this analysis
equation 5.6 is estimated using the first j observations
and then subsequently reestimated for every group of j
consecutive observations by adding the next observation
and dropping the first observation. Different values of
j (the size of the window) are used to see if this
influences the results. The rationale underlying this
approach is that investors who are seeking to hedge
their spot position may choose to adjust their hedge
ratios regularly on the basis of the historical hedge
ratio for the last j weeks. For one week hedges windows
of 4, 8, and 13 weeks are used. The size of the windows
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for 2 week hedges are 4 (8 weeks) and 6 (12 weeks) and
for 4 week hedges the window size is 3 (12 weeks). Tests
for random walk will be carried out by estimating the
following equation:
hrt = bc, + bihrt_ i + b2hrt_2 + et	(5.8)
where hrt , hrt_ i , hrt_2 = hedge ratios.
The null hypothesis that the hedge ratios follow a
random walk corresponds to H0:(b 0 ,101,b2) = (0,1,0). If
the null hypothesis is rejected, the stationarity of the
hedge ratio series will be examined by testing for unit
roots using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller method.
The fourth stage of the analysis of hedging performance
involves an examination of hedge ratios and hedging
effectiveness when hedging strategies are determined on
the basis of historical information. Hedgers could adopt
a number of different approaches to determine the hedge
ratio to be used in the coming period. In this thesis we
examine two different approaches based on the analysis
of the stability of hedge ratios discussed above. The
first approach involves using the annual hedge ratios
estimated when examining hedge ratio stability. The
optimal hedge ratio estimated for one time period is
used as the actual hedge ratio in the subsequent time
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period. Thus, for example, the optimal hedge ratio
relating to the period July 1984 to June 1985 is used as
the actual hedge ratio for the period July 1985 to June
1986. The hedging effectiveness of this strategy is
compared to the hedging effectiveness of the optimal
(perfect foresight) hedge to determine if the use of
historic information severely limits the hedging
performance of the FTSE-100 contract.
The second approach involves a more sophisticated
strategy based on a dynamic hedging strategy. In this
case hedge ratios are estimated using the rolling
regression procedure. The hedge ratio is then adjusted
every 1 or 2 weeks, depending on the hedge duration, to
take account of the newly estimated optimal hedge for
the preceding j weeks. Consider, for example, hedges of
1 week duration and a window size of 8 weeks. In this
case an optimal hedge ratio is estimated for the first 8
weeks and this ratio is used to hedge the week nine
position. At the end of week nine another optimal hedge
ratio is estimated on the basis of weeks 2 - 9 and this
ratio is used in week ten. This procedure is continued
throughout the period under analysis. Different sized
windows are used to determine if the use of different
amounts of historical information impacts on hedging
performance.
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5.5 Results. 
5.5.1 The Duration Effect. 
Equation 5.6 was estimated for hedge durations of one,
two and four weeks. The relevant results from the
regressions are presented in table 5.1. The table shows
the estimated values of h*, the minimum variance hedge
ratio, the standard errors relating to each estimate of
h* and the R2s for each of the regressions. In addition
to this information, table 5.1 also shows whether h* is
significantly less than unity, the beta hedge.
Table 5.1 shows that the minimum variance hedge ratios
(h*) increase markedly as hedge duration increases, in
line with expectations. However, for hedges of all
durations considered the minimum variance hedge ratio is
less than unity, the beta hedge ratio. Hence, if the
classic 1:1 hedging strategy were adopted, the resultant
position would have greater risk than does the position
resulting from a hedging strategy which uses the value
of the minimum variance hedge ratio. This is confirmed
in the lower part of table 5.1 which shows the mean
annual return and the standard deviation of returns for
the unhedged portfolio, the hedged portfolio based on
the mvhr and the hedged portfolio based on the beta
hedge ratio, for hedge durations of 1, 2 and 4 weeks.
The degree of risk reduction achieved with both the mvhr
and the beta hedge is substantial. For example, for
hedges of two weeks duration the standard deviation of
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Table 5.1: Hedging _performance - the duration effect. 
Hedge Duration
One week	 Two weeks	 Four weeks
h*	 .9101	 .9330	 .9633
(mvhr)
Standard	 .0097	 .0107	 .0101
Errors
R2	 .9548	 .9756	 .9898
Number of	 416	 192	 96
observations	 •
Is h*
significantly	 Yes (99.9%)	 Yes (99.9%)
	
Yes (99.9%)
< 1, the beta
hedge?
(confidence level)
Unhedged Portfolio
Mean return	 11.636	 9.746	 9.746
S.	 D.	 of
returns
118.981 91.187 77.141
Mvhr portfolio
Mean return 6.198 5.286 5.141
S.	 D.	 of
returns
25.298 14.255 7.804
Decrease in sd
from unhedged
portfolio
78.7% 84.4% 89.9%
Beta hedge portfolio 
Mean return 5.661 4.965 4.965
S.	 D.	 of
returns
27.786 15.654 8.333
Decrease in sd
from unhedged
portfolio
76.6% 82.8% 89.2%
Mean and standard deviation of returns are in percent
per annum.
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returns is reduced by over 80% using either strategy.
However, in all cases the mean return is higher and the
standard deviation of returns lower using the mvhr, as
compared to the beta hedge ratio. These results are in
line with those of Lindahl (1992) and in contrast to
those of Figlewski (1984, 1985). Figlewski f s results
have been called into question due to the small sample
sizes in his work.
Table 5.1 also shows that the values of R2
 increase as
hedge duration increases, again in line with the
findings of Lindahl (1992) and others, suggesting that
hedging effectiveness increases with hedge duration. The
standard deviations of returns also demonstrate this
clearly. From the values of R 2
 it can be seen that the
variance of the returns for the hedged position
represents only 4.52% of the variance of the returns of
the unhedged position for one week hedges. For two week
hedges this figure falls to 2.44% and for four week
hedges it falls further to 1.02%. Clearly, then the
residual risk associated with the hedged position when
the minimum variance hedge ratio strategy is adopted is
very small in percentage terms compared to that of the
unhedged position.
If returns are normally distributed then 68% of the
observations are estimated to lie within + or - 1 S.D.
of the mean return and approximately 95% within + or - 2
249
S.D.s of the mean. Thus 68% of observations will lie
within the range -19.1% to 31.496% for 1 week hedges,
-8.969% to 19.541% for 2 week hedges, and -2.663% to
12.945% for 4 week hedges. This compares with the
figures for the unhedged portfolio of -107.345% to
130.617% for 1 week, -81.441% to 100.933% for 2 week,
and -67.395% to 86.887% for 4 week returns. Hence, while
it is not possible to eliminate all risk by hedging, the
FTSE-100 stock index futures contract does enable a
substantial reduction in risk to be achieved, especially
with longer duration hedges. These results for the
duration effect are in line with expectations following
the discussion of theoretical issues earlier.
5.5.2 The Expiration Effect. 
In order to investigate the impact of time to contract
expiration on hedge ratios, equation 5.7 was estimated
for hedges of one, two and four weeks duration. Table
5.2 presents the results of this estimation. There is
clear evidence from the table that hedge ratios do vary
with time to contract expiration as was expected.
Although a continuous pattern is not evident it does
appear that for one week hedges the minimum variance
hedge ratios approach the beta hedge as contract
expiration approaches. All hedges lifted within 5 weeks
of expiration have hedge ratios insignificantly less
than the beta hedge at the 95% confidence level.
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Table 5.2: Minimum variance hedge ratios - the
expiration effect. 
Hedge	 Weeks to
Duration	 expiration
h*
(MVHR)
Standard
Errors
1 week	 0 .9738 .0851
1 .9399 .0646
2 .8813 .0833
3 .9176 .0690
4 .8831 .0699
5 .8881 .0686
6 .8230 .0638
7 .8586 .0634
8 .9756 .0673
9 .9331 .0394
10 .8933 .0304
11 .6885 .0445
R2	.8882
Number of observations 416
2 weeks	 0 .8177 .0403
2 .9520 .0417
4 .9313 .0404
6 .9288 .0374
8 .9919 .0286
10 .8592 .0222
R2	.9637
Number of observations 192
4 weeks	 0 .9749 .0372
4 .9777 .0321
8 .9560 .0175
R2	.9805
Number of observations 96
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Similarly all hedges lifted six or more weeks from
expiration have hedge ratios significantly less than
unity at the 95% level, with the exception of the hedges
lifted eight and nine weeks before expiration. The hedge
ratio for nine weeks is significantly less than the beta
hedge at the 90% level. No obvious explanation can be
given for the result relating to eight weeks prior to
expiration, although it could be due to relatively small
sample sizes for each subset of data.
As far as two week hedges are concerned the hedge ratio
values show no discernible pattern. Once again the
finding for the hedge lifted eight weeks prior to
expiration is difficult to explain. Finally, for four
week hedges those lifted zero and four weeks prior to
expiration have hedge ratios insignificantly different
from the beta hedge at all normal confidence levels,
while that relating to eight weeks prior to expiration
is significantly less than unity, at the 95% confidence
level.
While the results for expiration effects do not show
patterns as clearly as do Lindahl's findings, some
general conclusions can be drawn. Of particular
significance is the fact that hedge ratios do clearly
vary with the time remaining before contract expiration.
In addition, for one and four week hedges, those lifted
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further from expiration are generally significantly less
than the beta hedge, in contrast to those lifted closer
to expiration.
5.5.3 Hedge Ratio Stability. 
As explained in section 5.4 hedge ratio stability is
examined in two ways. Firstly, we estimate equation 5.6
on an annual basis. The results of these estimations are
reported in table 5.3 for one and two week hedges. It is
evident from the results in this table that minimum
variance hedge ratios have varied over time. For
example, for both one and two week hedges the mvhr is
insignificantly different from unity for 1984/5, 1985/6
and 1988/9, but is significantly less than unity for the
other five years. Indeed, the estimated annual minimum
variance hedge ratios vary from .8637 to .9906 for one
week hedges and from .8915 to 1.0264 for two week
hedges. Thus there is clearly evidence that hedge ratios
are not stable through time.
Another interesting finding emerges from this analysis,
in that there is evidence of changes in hedging
effectiveness, year on year. In particular, it appears
that hedging effectiveness has increased substantially
since the earliest days of trading in this contract. The
values of R2 are markedly higher for the most recent
years than they are for the early years of trading. It
thus appears that the market for the FTSE-100 stock
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Table 5.3: Hedge ratio stability - annual hedge ratios. 
Year h*
(mvhr)
One week hedges
R2Standard
Errors
1984/5 .9906 .0424 .9160
1985/6 .9830 .0382 .9299
1986/7 .8966+ .0329 .9371
1987/8 .8905+ .0227 .9685
1988/9 .9432 .0341 .9386
1989/90 .8637+ .0279 .9503
1990/1 .8890+ .0202 .9748
1991/2 .9448+ .0195 .9791
Two week hedges
Year h* Standard R2
(mvhr) Errors
1984/5 1.0264 .0467 .9565
1985/6 .9618 .0377 .9674
1986/7 .8915+ .0366 .9642
1987/8 .9230+ .0267 .9820
1988/9 .9567 .0309 .9775
1989/90 .8967+ .0353 .9671
1990/1 .9409+ .0203 .9899
1991/2 .9537+ .0246 .9856
+ Significantly less than 1 at the 5% level.
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index futures contract has provided a more effective
means by which to hedge the risks associated with stock
portfolios in recent years, suggesting a reduction in
basis risk.
We know consider hedge ratio estimations using the
moving window regression procedure. These estimations
were run to examine further the stability of hedge
ratios over time. Figures 5.1 - 5.6 show the values of
the hedge ratios calculated using this procedure for
hedges of 1, 2, and 4 weeks using different size
windows. There is clear evidence from these figures that
the hedge ratio does vary over time, supporting the
previous results and suggesting that a dynamic hedging
strategy is worthy of consideration.
In order to undertake a more formal examination of the
question of hedge ratio stability the estimated hedge
ratios were examined to determine whether they follow a
random walk. This issue is analysed by estimating
equation	 5.8	 and	 testing the null hypothesis
H0 :(b0 ,b11 b2 ) = (0,1,0). The results of the tests of this
hypothesis to determine whether the estimated hedge
ratios follow a random walk are presented in table 5.4.
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Table 5.4: Test of Random Walk of the Hedge Ratio. 
Ho:(b01101 1 b2) = (0,1,0)
Hedge	 Size of bo	 bl	 b2	 X2	 Is Ho
Duration Window
	 (t statistics)	 accepted?
1 week	 4	 .4722	 .4576	 .0276 147.33	 No
	
(9.88)	 (9.24)	 (0.56)
8	 .1488	 .8940	 -.0554 34.71	 No
(5.83 (17.99) (-1.11)
13 .0809 .9609 -.0484	 18.28	 No
(4.27) (19.22) (-0.97)
2 weeks	 4 .5264 .4197 .0224	 74.88	 No
(7.05) (5.74) (0.31)
6 .2869 .6908 .0037	 35.36
	 No
(5.43) (9.53) (0.05)
4 weeks	 3 .7233 .2136 .0371	 63.62	 No
(6.12) (2.10) (0.37)
The
	 critical value
	 for	 the chi-squared
	 statistic
9.49.
is
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Table 5.5: Unit root tests for the stationarity 
of hedge ratios. 
Hedge	 Size of	 Number of	 ADF	 Is hr
Duration Window	 observations statistic stationary?
1 week	 4 (4 weeks)	 411	 -10.1189	 Yes
8 (8 weeks)	 407	 - 5.8661	 Yes
13 (13 weeks)	 402	 - 4.2739	 Yes
2 weeks 4 (8 weeks) 	 187	 - 7.1424	 ' Yes
6 (12 weeks)	 185	 - 5.4647	 Yes
4 weeks 3 (12 weeks) 	 92	 - 6.2144	 Yes
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The results in table 5.4 show that for all hedge
durations and all window sizes for which the tests were
carried out the null hypothesis is rejected. Hence, in
contrast to the findings of Malliaris and Urrutia (1991)
the estimated hedge ratios do not follow a random walk.
Given these findings, the stationarity of the minimum
variance hedge ratios was examined using the
Dickey-Fuller technique. Table 5.5 presents the results
of the ADF tests. The results in table 5.5 clearly
demonstrate that for all hedge durations and for all
window sizes the hedge ratios are stationary. Thus while
figures 5.1 - 5.6 show that the hedge ratios do vary
across time they are nonetheless stationary.
5.5.4 Hedging Effectiveness and the Use of Historical 
Information. 
In this sub-section we report and discuss the results of
analysis examining the hedging effectiveness of the
FTSE-100 stock index futures contract when hedging
strategies based on historical information are used. The
results of the analysis using annually calculated hedge
ratios are presented in tables 5.6a and 5.6b. Table 5.6a
relates to one week hedges and 5.6b to two week hedges.
The tables shows the annual mean returns and standard
deviation of returns for four portfolios: the unhedged
portfolio;
	 the minimum variance hedge portfolio
(assuming perfect foresight); the hedged portfolio based
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Table 5.6a: Hedging effectiveness using historical 
information - annual minimum variance hedge ratios - one
week hedges. 
Year Unhedged
Portfolio
BetaMvhr	 Mvhr(-1)
1984/5
Mean 17.268 0.299 - 0.123
S.D. 104.140 30.179 - 30.193
1985/6
Mean 27.593 4.574 4.396 4.176
S.D. 86.315 22.848 22.857 22.893
1986/7
Mean 33.771 10.594 8.361 7.921
S.D. 101.488 25.452 27.155 27.860
1987/8
Mean -19.503 3.644 3.801 6.488
S.D. 205.925 36.541 36.566 44.222
1988/9
Mean 14.484 5.348 5.857 4.797
S.D. 90.007 22.301 22.825 22.912
1989/90
Mean 8.766 6.717 6.529 6.394
S.D. 100.807 22.464 24.216 27.298
1990/1
Mean 4.675 8.530 8.420 9.012
S.D. 113.750 18.075 18.356 22.878
1991/2
Mean 4.475 6.273 6.167 6.378
S.D. 105.248 15.219 16.417 16.388
Figures are for mean and standard deviation of annual
returns in percent.
Mvhr(-1) refers to a portfolio hedged using the mvhr
from the previous year.
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Table 5.6b: Hedging effectiveness using historical 
information - annual minimum variance hedge ratios - two
week hedges. 
Year Unhedged
Portfolio
BetaMvhr	 Mvhr(-1)
1984/5
Mean 18.462 -1.362 - -0.853
S.D. 70.772 14.757 - 14.864
1985/6
Mean 22.318 3.650 2.396 2.908
S.D. 69.620 12.576 13.391 12.867
1986/7
Mean 39.611 10.936 8.675 7.446
S.D. 76.310 14.438 15.605 17.082
1987/8
Mean -26.582 3.328 2.306 5.822
S.D. 162.721 21.857 22.540 25.662
1988/9
Mean 16.586 3.677 4.131 3.092
S.D. 71.900 10.775 11.062 11.246
1989/90
Mean 10.016 4.945 4.606 4.361
S.D. 80.376 14.587 15.517 17.197
1990/1
Mean -1.868 9.974 9.417 10.717
S.D. 84.172 8.474 9.346 9.973
1991/2
Mean -0.573 5.914 5.827 6.229
S.D. 72.972 8.773 8.826 9.450
Figures are for mean and standard deviation of annual
returns in percent.
Mvhr(-1) refers to a portfolio hedged using the mvhr
from the previous year.
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on the previous year's mvhr (mvhr(-1)); and the beta
hedge portfolio. The third portfolio is a hedged
portfolio where the hedging strategy is based on
historical information.
The results reported in tables 5.6a-b demonstrate that
all three hedged portfolios achieve a substantial
reduction in risk compared to the unhedged portfolio. It
is evident (indeed, almost definitional) that the hedged
portfolio based on the historical mvhr does not achieve
the same level of risk reduction as does the perfect
foresight mvhr portfolio. However, two points are worthy
of note. Firstly, the extent of risk reduction with the
mvhr(-1) is very substantial and extremely close to that
achieved by using the perfect foresight mvhr. Indeed, as
a percentage of the standard deviation of returns of
the unhedged portfolio, the standard deviation of
returns of the mvhr(-1) portfolio is never as much as 2
percentage points higher than that of the mvhr
portfolio. Thus while the level of risk reduction is not
as great using the mvhr(-1), it is still clearly a very
effective hedging strategy.
The second point worthy of note relates to a comparison
of the mvhr(-1) portfolio and the beta hedge portfolio.
For both one week and two week hedges the degree of risk
reduction using a hedging strategy based on the mvhr for
the previous year is greater than that achieved using
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the beta (or classic) hedge in all but one year (1991/2
for one week hedges and 1985/6 for two week hedges).
Both the mvhr and the beta hedge strategies emphasise
risk reduction. However, this analysis suggests that
using the mvhr calculated on the basis of historical
information is superior to the classic hedge strategy in
terms of risk reduction.
We now turn to the analysis of the hedging effectiveness
of historically based hedging strategies using the
moving window regression procedure. The results of this
analysis are reported in table 5.7. Two sets of standard
deviations of returns are reported for different window
sizes. The first relates to the perfect foresight
minimum variance hedge ratio. This column demonstrates
that the larger the window size used to estimate the
mvhrs the higher is the standard deviation of returns.
This is unambiguously true for one week hedges. For two
week hedges the standard deviation of returns does not
rise continuously over all window sizes. Nonetheless,
the pattern is clearly one of the standard deviation
increasing as the window size increases. This is as
expected. If the coming period's price movements are
known exactly then all risk can be removed by
establishing a perfect hedge for each period separately.
Thus for a one week hedge the most important information
when calculating a particular week's hedge ratio relates
to the price movements in that week. The smaller the
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Table 5.7: Hedging effectiveness using historical 
information - rolling regression minimum variance hedge
ratios. 
Window size	 Standard deviation of annual returns
mvhr
(a) One week hedges
mvhr(-1)
8	 22.924 27.381
13 23.812 26.170
26 23.973 24.890
39 24.070 24.725
52 24.150 24.745
65 24.263 24.693
78 24.277 24.670
91 24.407 24.784
104 24.478 24.841
S.D. of returns of unhedged
(b) Two week hedges
portfolio: 125.798
6 12.847 16.287
12 13.551 14.933
18 13.514 14.946
24 13.726 14.754
30 13.712 14.548
36 13.780 14.584
42 13.854 14.490
48 13.900 14.561
S.D. of returns of unhedged portfolio: 97.308
The total samples of 416 (1 week hedges) and 192 (2
week) are used to generate hedge ratios. The first 104
and 48 are dropped to calculate the s.d.s to allow
comparisons on the same basis across the different
window sizes. Thus the s.d.s relate to sample sizes of
312 and 144.
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window size, the greater is the weight given to the
relevant week's price movements and the more effective
is the hedge likely to be.
The second column presents the standard deviation of
returns based on the mvhr calculated for the previous j
weeks. Thus, for example, the mvhr for week 105 is that
calculated on the basis of weeks 97-104 for a window
size of 8 and weeks 92-104 for a window size of 13.
Clearly then, information on the current week (say week
105) is not included when determining the hedge ratio.
The column headed mvhr(-1) shows that the standard
deviation of returns does not rise with the window size.
Rather, the standard deviation falls as the window size
increases over a large range of window sizes. The
minimum standard deviation occurs with a window size of
78 for one week hedges and 42 (84 weeks) for two week
hedges. This suggests that when calculating mvhrs on the
basis of historical information, risk is reduced by
using data over longer periods, in contrast to the
perfect foresight mvhrs. Again, this is as expected.
When historical information is used, no weight is given
to the relevant week's price movements (since it is not
yet available). However, with smaller window sizes more
weight is given to each week included. Given that any
one week may be an outlier (i.e. highly untypical), by
including data from more weeks, the weight given to
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outliers is reduced and a more representative hedge
ratio is likely to result. However, there is likely to
come a point when the use of additional historical data
will not be beneficial. If hedge ratios are changing
over time, then data from, say, two years previously may
have little relevance in determining the current hedging
strategy. Thus beyond a certain window size the standard
deviation of returns will rise, as shown in table 5.7.
A final point to note from table 5.7 is that while the
mvhr strategy based on historical information is not as
effective at reducing risk as the perfect foresight mvhr
strategy, nonetheless, considerable risk reduction is
achieved. For example, the degree of risk reduction
(decrease in standard deviation) achieved by the perfect
foresight mvhr is 81.78% for one week hedges and 86.8%
for two week hedges. The best corresponding figures for
the mvhr based on historical information are 80.39% and
85.11% respectively. Clearly, for the optimal window
size there is very little difference between the perfect
foresight strategy and that based on historical
information.
5.6 Summary and conclusions. 
In this chapter the hedging performance of the FTSE-100
stock index futures contract has been examined for the
period since its introduction in 1984. Hedging is
arguably the major justification for the existence of
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futures contracts. Given this situation it is surprising
that the hedging performance of the FTSE-100 stock index
futures contract has not previously been addressed.
It has been shown in this chapter that using the
FTSE-100 contract to hedge stock portfolios which mirror
the FTSE-100 index is a very effective means of reducing
the risk associated with a spot stock position. Even
with a (perfect foresight) hedging strategy based on
hedge durations of only one week the variance of the
hedged position represents less than 5% of the variance
of the unhedged position. For longer duration hedges the
hedging effectiveness is increased.
Of particular concern in this chapter has been the
question of whether minimum variance hedge ratios are
constant or vary through time. In this regard the study
examines two important factors in determining hedge
ratios: namely the impact of a hedge duration effect and
the question of whether hedge ratios vary with time to
expiration of the contract. In addition, the issue of
whether hedge ratios follow a random walk is considered.
As far as hedge duration is concerned, there is evidence
that hedge ratios rise towards the beta hedge with
increases in the time the hedge is held. The minimum
variance hedge ratio is greater for a four week hedge
than for a two week hedge, which in turn is greater than
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the hedge ratio for a one week hedge. Similarly, as
mentioned above, hedging effectiveness, as measured by
the value of R2 , increases with hedge duration.
The evidence concerning an expiration effect is less
clear cut, although it does appear that hedge ratios
approach unity as the contract expiration approaches, at
least for one and four week hedges. However, there are
some results in this analysis which are difficult to
explain and may be due to relatively small sample sizes
for each subset of data analysed.
The question of whether hedge ratios follow a random
walk is addressed by generating series of hedge ratios
using the moving window regression procedure and the
series are then examined. Different sizes of window are
used, as are different hedge durations. All the results
reject the hypothesis that hedge ratios follow a random
walk, in contrast to the finding of Malliaris and
Urrutia (1991) for the S&P 500 futures contract in the
USA. In addition, unit root tests suggest that the
series of hedge ratios are stationary.
The implication of these results, together with the
clear evidence from figures 5.1 - 5.6 that hedge ratios
vary over time, is that in order to minimise the
variance of returns from a hedged portfolio a dynamic
hedging strategy should be adopted. However, in
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advocating a dynamic hedging strategy it is necessary to
take account of the additional costs which will arise
from pursuing such a course of action. Hence, the
investor must weigh up the benefits of reducing risk by
frequent changing of hedge ratios, against the increased
transactions costs associated with adopting such a
dynamic strategy.
Finally, perfect foresight mvhr strategies and beta
hedge strategies have been compared with hedging
strategies based on historical information. This is an
important comparison given the failure of all previous
studies to address the point that hedgers simply do not
have perfect foresight. While hedge strategies based on
historical information result in less risk reduction
than does the perfect foresight mvhr strategy, they do
greatly reduce risk and appear to be superior to the
beta or classic hedging strategy.
The evidence presented in this chapter strongly suggests
that the FTSE-100 futures contract is an effective means
by which to hedge risk, even if a static hedging
strategy is adopted. A portfolio as broadly diversified
as the FTSE-100 stock index will have virtually no
unsystematic risk. It has been shown here that when such
a portfolio is combined with selling the futures
contract on the basis of the minimum variance hedge
ratio almost all systematic risk can be removed. Thus
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the introduction of the futures contract on the FTSE-100
stock index has clearly given portfolio managers a
valuable instrument by which to avoid risk at times when
they wish to do this without liquidating their spot
position. In addition, while the results presented in
this chapter relate to the hedging of an established
spot position, the fact that the contract is such an
effective means by which to manage risks suggests that
it will also be effective for those investors requiring
anticipatory hedging, as discussed in chapter 1.
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Footnotes. 
1. An alternative hedge strategy is that proposed by
Rutledge (1972). Rutledge considered the hedging
problem (the choice of h) in terms of maximising
utility, where the mean and standard deviation of
returns are arguments in the utility function.
Essentially, the choice of h is a constrained
optimisation problem, where the hedger seeks to
maximise expected returns subject to constraints on
the level of risk incurred. Given that investigation
of such a strategy involves (arbitrary) assumptions
concerning the hedger's choice of constraint, and
that the Rutledge model has strong similarities with
the minimum variance hedge ratio, this model is not
considered here.
2. Given that the contracts trade in 13 week cycles the
hedges of 2 and 4 weeks duration involve one week in
each quarter where the position is not hedged.
3. Given that R2
 is equal to 1-V(H)/V(U), the two means
of examining hedging effectiveness have very strong
links.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion. 
6.1 Summary. 
In the introduction to this thesis it was suggested that
rigorous scientific research is required before policies
are formulated, investment strategies executed and
judgements made concerning the role and functioning of
futures markets. It is the author's belief that the
research carried out in this thesis helps to achieve
this aim and provides an original contribution towards
the understanding of the role and functioning of the
FTSE-100 stock index futures market and its impact on
the underlying spot market.
The aim of this thesis was not only to fill an obvious
gap in the finance literature, but also to improve,
where possible, on previous research. Thus, in addition
to providing insights for the first time for the
FTSE-100 futures market, the methodologies applied have
been developed and refined here, enabling more reliable
inferences to be drawn. In order to achieve the
objectives set at the beginning, this thesis has
examined four issues which are of central concern to
futures market participants and policymakers: the risk
return relationship within an asset pricing model
framework; the impact of futures trading on spot price
volatility and its link to information; the short-term
and long-term efficiency of futures markets; and finally
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the properties of hedge ratios and the effectiveness of
the FTSE-100 stock index futures contract in providing a
hedging vehicle for holders of stock portfolios.
After a review of the literature in chapter 1, chapter 2
examines the risk return relationship within a CAPM
framework using both the Black, Jensen and Scholes and
Fama and MacBeth methodologies. The FTSE-100 futures
contract was found to be a risky asset in systematic
risk terms, with beta values ranging between 1.01 and
1.14. While futures returns are adequately explained by
the CAPM before the 1987 crash, the same is not true
post-crash. Abnormal returns were evident in the latter
period suggesting market inefficiency. Such a conclusion
was given support by the finding of a day of the week
effect. Weekly returns to Mondays and Fridays were found
to be serially correlated, whereas those to Wednesdays
were not. As far as the time to maturity of the contract
is concerned, contracts further from maturity appear to
be associated with lower systematic risk and higher
excess returns. Given the evidence of thin trading in
futures of more than three months prior to maturity,
this is not surprising. While the findings are
interesting in their own right, they also generate
additional areas worthy of further research, which are
taken up in subsequent chapters.
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Chapter 3 investigates the impact of the introduction of
futures trading on the FTSE-100 stock index contract on
the market for the underlying asset. Previous research
has characterised the issue in terms of stabilisation or
destabilisation of the spot market. As shown in this
thesis, such characterisation fails to recognise the
important connecting link between information and
volatility. As such, by criticising the onset of futures
trading for destabilising the spot market, it may be
that the messenger is being blamed for carrying a
message more effectively. It is therefore essential, as
shown here, that when examining this issue a methodology
is used which enables such connecting links to be
established and analysed before any policy implications
are drawn. By using GARCH such links can be examined and
problems of time dependence encountered by previous
studies can also be overcome. The results presented here
for the impact of the existence of futures trading
suggest that spot price volatility has been affected.
Before the introduction of futures the impact of
previous news persisted for longer periods than
post-futures. Thus information is impounded into spot
prices more rapidly post-futures suggesting that futures
have expanded the routes by which information is
conveyed to market participants. Hence, while price
volatility may have increased post-futures, this is due
to an improvement in the quality and speed of
information flowing to the spot market. The prima facie
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evidence supporting the popular view of futures
destabilising the spot market is thus counterproductive
and even dangerous. By undertaking rigorous research
using appropriate techniques it has been shown that
increased short-term volatility is associated with an
improved flow of information.
The efficiency of the market for the FTSE-100 stock
index futures contracts was examined in chapter 4. While
the efficiency of futures markets has been subject to
considerable investigation, the results have been
inconclusive. This is due in some part to inappropriate
methodologies being used in some cases. However,
differences remain and it is therefore important to
investigate efficiency for relatively new markets such
as the FTSE-100 futures market. In addition, the
methodologies used to test for efficiency need to be
extended. In chapter 4 the recent developments in
cointegration analysis have been exploited to test for
market efficiency. Unlike previous studies, the use of
the Johansen procedure allowing tests of parameter
restrictions has been combined with the use of ECMs.
This has allowed examination of both the short-term and
the long-term efficiency of the market. In addition,
variance bounds tests have been developed and used to
further test for efficiency. The market is found to
provide unbiased predictors of future spot prices in
both the short and long-term for 1, 2 and 4 months prior
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to maturity. For 5 months prior to maturity there is
evidence of long-term unbiasedness, but short-term
deviations from this relationship. For 3 and 6 months
prior to maturity futures prices do not provide unbiased
predictors of future spot prices and thus efficiency is
rejected. The evidence from the variance bounds tests
confirmed the findings of the cointegration and ECM
analysis. Given the disagreements evident in previous
research, such confirmation is welcome.
Finally, in chapter 5 hedging strategies and
effectiveness were examined. Given that hedging is the
primary function of futures markets, it is surprising
that this issue has not previously been addressed for
this contract. In addition to examining the duration and
expiration effects, the research investigated the
stability of hedge ratios and, by examining the use of
historical information in devising hedging strategies,
provided a more thorough analysis than have previous
studies. First and foremost, there is clear evidence
that the FTSE-100 stock index futures contracts provide
a highly effective means of reducing the risk associated
with holding a stock portfolio. As far as hedge duration
is concerned, both hedging effectiveness and hedge
ratios increase as the duration of the hedge increases.
Hedge ratios appear to approach unity as expiration
nears, although the evidence in this regard is not as
clear as that for the duration effect. Tests suggest
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that hedge ratios do not follow a random walk and unit
root tests show the hedge ratios to be stationary. The
results strongly suggest that a dynamic hedging strategy
is appropriate. Finally, while hedging strategies based
on historical information are less effective than the
perfect foresight hedging strategies, nonetheless they
are highly effective at reducing risk and more effective
than beta hedges. Thus the FTSE-100 futures contract
allows investors to greatly reduce the risk which they
face without having to liquidate their spot position.
6.2 Relevance of Research Results. 
The results of the research undertaken in this thesis
should be of interest to investors. The evidence
presented here clearly demonstrates that the FTSE-100
stock index futures contract provides a highly effective
means of reducing the risk associated with holding
portfolios of underlying securities. It has also been
shown that dynamic hedging strategies may be appropriate
for investors. In addition, the risk return relationship
discussed in chapter 2 demonstrates that investing in
the FTSE-100 futures contract provides an alternative to
investing in the underlying portfolio. The level of
systematic risk is similar to that of the underlying
portfolio. This is important given that futures have
been shown to provide an alternative means by which to
participate in market index movements cheaply and to
change market position rapidly. The findings regarding
282
efficiency in chapter 4 imply that portfolio managers
and investors in general wishing to formulate future
investment strategies have an important source of
information in current futures prices as to what future
spot prices will be. The finding of inefficiency for 3
and 6 months prior to maturity has implications for the
timing, initiating and rolling over of hedges. The
evidence of chapter 3 should provide reassurance to
investors in the underlying spot market that the onset
of futures trading has not had a destabilising impact.
While spot price volatility has increased, the evidence
suggests that this is due to an increase in the flow of
information to this market.
The research carried out here should also be of interest
to policymakers and regulators alike. The results
suggest that the market for the FTSE-100 stock index
futures contract is efficient and provides an effective
means through which investors in the stock market can
adjust their exposure to risk to reflect their own
personal preferences. Thus this market provides
policymakers with a benchmark for designing and
developing new futures instruments. It should also be of
comfort to regulators that the public disquiet over the
role of futures markets is misguided. The evidence
presented here suggests that the call for further
regulation of futures markets is unwarranted.
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6.3 Implications for further research. 
A natural extension of this thesis would involve
undertaking similar investigations for other futures
markets using the methodologies adopted here. This would
enhance our understanding of the role and functioning of
futures markets in general and provide investors and
policy makers with important information.
It would be interesting to further develop the work
carried out in this thesis. Firstly, the work on the
risk return relationship could be extended to
incorporate time varing risk premia. Secondly,
information transference and the associated impact on
spot market volatility could be examined using higher
frequency data. In addition, recent developments in the
GARCH methodology, including the EGARCH, could be used
to investigate the transmission of information between
markets. The issue of market efficiency could be
examined further by expanding the information set to
include the impact of information from other markets,
such as the money and foreign exchange markets. Finally,
the effectiveness of the FTSE-100 futures contract in
hedging the risk associated with diversified portfolios
which do not necessarily mirror the index could be
analysed.
It should also be recognised that while this thesis has
examined what the author perceives to be the most
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important issues in relation to futures markets, there
are related research questions of importance which have
not been addressed here. For example, this thesis has
not examined the existence or otherwise of arbitrage
opportunities or the pricing relationship between the
current spot and the current futures markets.
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